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For Joop and Peter
I am convinced that we can face them best by studying them without preju-
dice, learning from them and resisting them by being radically different, with
a difference born of a continuous struggle against the evil which they may
embody most clearly, but which dwells everywhere and so ever within each
of us.
Vaclav Havel, ‘Anti-political politics’, in John Keane (ed.), Civil Society and
the State (London, Verso, 1988), p. 387–98 (396)
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With extreme right parties in government in Austria and Italy, and Jean-Marie
Le Pen contesting the run-off in the 2002 presidential elections in France, few
people will dispute their continuing relevance in the politics of Western
Europe. Indeed, ever since the first small electoral successes of parties like the
Centrumpartij in the Netherlands or the Front National in France in the early
1980s, the extreme right has been the most discussed group of parties both in
and outside of the scholarly community. Thousands of newspaper articles and
hundreds of pieces of scholarly work have been devoted to extreme right 
parties, predominantly describing their history, leaders or electoral successes,
as well as proclaiming their danger. Remarkably little serious attention has
been devoted to their ideology, however. This aspect of the extreme right has
been considered to be known to everyone. The few scholars that did devote
attention to the ideology of the contemporary extreme right parties have 
primarily been concerned with pointing out similarities with the fascist and
National Socialist ideologies of the pre-war period. If the similarities were not
found, this was often taken as ‘proof ’ that the extreme right hides its (true)
ideologies, rather than as a motivation to look in a different direction.
Although concerned with the ideology of the extreme right, this book is
also about so-called ‘party families’. In particular, it is about how we can use
ideology as a focus for identifying and analysing a specific party family, in
this case the extreme right. The study is limited in two ways. First, it is lim-
ited in that not every (alleged) extreme right party is included in this study,
which only draws from parties in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands.
This limitation derives from the method chosen: an intensive and in-depth
analysis of party literature. The second limitation, as a consequence of the
method chosen, is that the parties are taken at their word. Since there is no
proof to the contrary, it is assumed that extreme right parties are as
(dis)honest in their propaganda and literature as other political parties. As
various other authors have pointed out, (all) political parties hide certain
aspects of their ideology from their programmes, mostly for opportunistic
6
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reasons. This notwithstanding, when selecting a relatively broad sample of
party literature, and when being aware and critical in analysing this mater-
ial, one can study party ideology in a scholarly way. This is what will be done
in this study for this particular group of extreme right parties; it can, of
course, also be done in exactly the same way for other families of parties,
such as liberal or social democratic parties.
There is another limitation in this study: as the focus is on families of par-
ties, the (whole) political party is the unit of analysis. This means that each
(extreme right) political party is considered as a unitary actor, and I look for
the ideology of ‘the’ party. That there are different factions within each party
is accepted as a possibility, as is their possible relevance for certain aspects of
the party; but they are not the subject of research here. Only when the dif-
ferent factions are so strong and divided on a certain topic or ideological fea-
ture that they inhibit the creation of a (majority) view of the party, will this
be explicitly discussed.
Finally, the picture of the party ideology developed here is a picture which
falls within a certain historical, societal and political context. Various factors
have helped to create the party ideology, but these will be only scantily
touched upon in this study. Extreme right parties, like all new parties, have
to find their place in an already formed political and ideological space (Linz
1967; Ignazi 1996), which influences their behaviour and ideology. To some
extent, certain ideological arguments and features only appear in their 
propaganda as reactions to arguments and features of other parties. Other
topics are addressed by (extreme right) parties, only because other parties
challenge them on these topics. For example, virtually all extreme right 
parties are at one time or another linked to anti-Semitism, even if they have
never addressed topics such as Jews, Judaism or Israel themselves before that
time. It is only in such instances that this study will discuss the interaction of
extreme right parties with their political and social environment, and then
only briefly. For the rest, the book will deal with the extreme right parties
themselves, and most specifically their history, literature and, above all, 
ideology.
But not before I have said my words of thanks to all who have made it pos-
sible for me to write this book. Throughout the years I have profited from
financial, material, personal, and intellectual assistance from a great variety
of people and organisations. For the collection and analysis of the party lit-
erature I have visited various archives, where I have been very kindly assisted
by René Blekman (Anne Frank Stichting, Amsterdam), Monika Deniffel
(Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich), Alois Fischer (Bundesarchiv, Koblenz),
Gabrielle Nandlinger (Blick nach Rechts, Bad Godesberg), Roeland Raes and
Dirk De Smedt (Vlaams Blok, Brussels). Part of these visits has been made
possible by a travel grant from the Dutch Organisation for Scientific
Research (NWO); in other instances, such as the visits to party meetings of
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the Deutsche Volksunion and the Vlaams Blok, I have benefited often from
financial aid from the ‘Vakgroepsfonds’ in Leiden.
I feel privileged to have studied and worked at the Department of Politics
in Leiden, which combines a pleasant social climate with a highly stimulat-
ing intellectual climate. I want to thank all my former colleagues for con-
tributing to this general climate. I especially want to thank Hans Oversloot,
Huib Pellikaan and Margo Trappenburg, for their many hours of small and
big discussions on various scholarly topics, and for their help with and read-
ing of earlier parts of this book. In extremis this applies to Joop Van Hol-
steyn, who has been (and still is) the best scholarly colleague and teacher
possible. Deepest gratitude is also due (finally) to Peter Mair, whose opti-
mistic support and sharp mind have helped me to develop beyond my orig-
inally narrow boundaries; a Doktorvater in the truest sense of the word.
I further want to thank all (former) Dutch Ph.D. students in political sci-
ence, with whom I had the privilege to participate in the so-called ‘Promo-
club’ and ‘Polybios’ sessions between 1993 and 1997. Since defending my
Ph.D. at the University of Leiden in January 1998, I have benefited greatly
from the stimulating environment of the Central European University in
Budapest. The change of scenery and the unique blend of cultures has helped
me to sharpen some of my main thoughts in the book. I thank all my former
CEU colleagues and students, wherever they might be now.
In addition, a number of people outside my departments have discussed
different queries with me or commented on chapters of the book. I would
like to thank all of them, and in particular Uwe Backes, Hans-Georg Betz,
Kris Deschouwer, Marc Spruyt, Andreas Umland and Jaap Van Donselaar. I
owe special thanks to Roger Eatwell, who through the wonderful world of
Internet has become one of my closest colleagues. My friend and colleague
Petr Kopecky has helped me in a great many ways, among others by brain-
storming on any possible academic and other (i.e. football) matter. Marjo
van Ammers and Anna Siskova, the two women in my life, have kept me sane
by being less bothered with the book, while at the same time supporting me
in my endeavour. A final thanks goes out to Tim Mudde, who has made my
scholarly work both difficult and possible. I am grateful for all the help he
has extended to me, and even more for the fact that we still respect each
other despite our differences of opinion.
Edinburgh
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Acronym Original Name English Name
AN Alleanza Nazionale National Alliance
ANR Aktion Neue Rechte Action New Right
BNP British National Party
BP Boerenpartij Farmers Party
BPN Burgerpartij Nederland Citizens Party Netherlands
BR Bayerische Rundfunk Bavarian Broadcasting
BVD Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst National Security Service
CD Centrumdemocraten Centre Democrats
CDa CD-Actueel CD-Up-to-Date
CDi CD-Info CD-Information
CDU Christlich-Demokratische Christian Democratic
Union Union
CN Centrumnieuws Centre News
CP Centrumpartij Centre Party
CP’86 Centrumpartij’86 Centre Party’86
CSU Christlich-Soziale Union Christian Social Union
CVP Christelijke Volkspartij Christian People’s Party
DA Deutsche Anzeiger German Informant
DLVH Deutsche Liga für Volk und German League for Nation 
Heimat and Fatherland
DNZ Deutsche National-Zeitung German National 
Newspaper
DP Deutsche Partei German Party
DRP Deutsche Reichspartei German Reich Party
DSZ Deutsche Soldatenzeitung German Soldiers
Newspaper
DV Deutsche Volksunion e.V. German People’s Union
DVU Deutsche Volksunion German People’s Union
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DWZ Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung German Weekly Newspaper
EC European Community
EP European Parliament
EU European Union
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei Free Democratic Party
FN Front National National Front
FPD Fremskridtspartiet Progress Party (Denmark)
FPN Fremskittspartiet Progress Party (Norway)
FPÖ Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs Austrian Freedom Party
FR Freiheitlicher Rat Freedom Council
FRG Federal Republic of 
Germany
GDR German Democratic 
Republic
JFN Jongerenfront Nederland Youth Front Netherlands
JN Junge Nationaldemokraten Young National Democrats
LL Lega Lombarda Lombard League
LN Lega Nord Northern League
MEP Member European 
Parliament
MP Member of Parliament
MSI Movimento Sociale Italiano Italian Social Movement
NB Nederlands Blok Dutch Block
NCP Nationale Centrumpartij National Centre Party
ND Ny Demokrati New Democracy
NDP Nationaldemokratische Partei National Democratic Party
NF National Front
NOS Nationalistische Omroep- Nationalist Broadcast 
stichting Foundation
NOU Nationale Oppositie Unie National Opposition Union
NPD Nationaldemokratische Partei German National 
Deutschlands Democratic Party
NSB Nationaal Socialistische National Socialist 
Beweging in Nederland Movement in the
Netherlands
NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche German National Socialist 
Arbeiterpartei Workers Party
NSV Nationalistische Studenten- Nationalist Students’ 
vereniging Association
NVI Nationalistisch Vormings- Nationalist Educational 
instituut Institute
NVP Nationale Volkspartij/CP’86 National People’s
Party/CP’86
Acronyms xi
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NVU Nederlandse Volks-Unie Dutch People’s Union
PDS Partei des Demokratischen Party of Democratic 
Sozialismus Socialism
PS Parti Socialiste Socialist Party
PvdA Partij van de Arbeid Labour Party
RA Republikanische Anzeiger Republican Informant
Rep Der Republikaner The Republican
REP Die Republikaner The Republicans
SOPD Stichting Oud Politieke Foundation of Former 
Delinquenten Political Delinquents
SP Socialistische Partij Socialist Party
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei German Social Democratic 
Deutschlands Party
SRP Sozialistische Reichspartei Socialist Reich Party
VB Vlaams Blok Flemish Block
VBJ Vlaams Blok Jongeren Flemish Block Youth
VBM Vlaams Blok Magazine Flemish Block Magazine
Verdinaso Verbond van Dietse Nationaal- Association of Diets 
Solidaristen National Solidarists
VLB Vlaams Blok Flemish Block (party 
paper)
VLN De Vlaams Nationalist The Flemish Nationalist
VMO Vlaamse Militanten Orde Order of Flemish Militants
VNN Volksnationalisten Nederland Ethnic Nationalists 
Netherlands
VNP Vlaams Nationale Partij Flemish National Party
VNV Vlaams Nationaal Verbond Flemish National Union
VU Volksunie People’s Union
VVP Vlaamse Volkspartij Flemish People’s Party
WELL Werkgemeenschap Europa in Working Community 
de Lage Landen Europe in the Low 
Countries
Were Di Verbond van Nederlandse Association of Dutch 
Werkgemeenschappen Working Groups Protect 
Were Di Yourself
xii Acronyms
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Studies of political parties have been based on a multiplicity of both scholarly
and political theories, and have focused on a variety of internal and external
aspects. As is common within the scientific community, complaints have been
voiced about the lack of knowledge in particular areas of the field, such as
party (as) organisations (Mair 1994), party ideology (Von Beyme 1985), and
minor or small parties (Fischer 1980; Müller-Rommel 1991). However, even
though a lot of work certainly remains to be done, political parties do con-
stitute one of the most studied fields in political science in general, and com-
parative politics in particular (Katz and Mair 1992; Janda 1993).
Studies of political parties focus primarily either on the whole group of
political parties or on different subgroups within the larger group. The
former studies are aimed at determining what characteristics all political par-
ties have in common. They mainly focus on constructing a (general) theory
and definition of political parties. Even though many theories have been
developed during the past decades, ‘there has been no dominant theoretical
perspective in the study of political parties’ (Crotty 1991: 145). This also
holds true for the second group, which deals with defining the political party.
There is a wide variety of definitions, based on an almost as wide variety of
criteria, but none can claim general acceptance in the field. However, a con-
sensus can be found in the fact that the political party is to be defined pri-
marily on the basis of its function(s). It is also on this basis that the political
party will be defined in this study, namely as any political group identified by
an official label that places candidates for public office through elections (see
also Sartori 1976: 63). Although such definitions have sometimes been crit-
icised for being (too) narrow (see Janda 1993), and although this criticism
might be valid in certain cases, a ‘minimal definition’ serves the purposes of
this study, i.e. identifying the object.
1
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The concept of the party family
In addition to the group of scholars that study characteristics that are part of
all political parties, a large(r) group centres on the distinction of different
subgroups within the larger group. This is generally done by constructing
typologies or classifications of political parties. The construction of classifi-
cations forces researchers to structure their knowledge and information of
the subject at hand, which again helps them to gain a greater understanding
and control of that subject (Lazarsfeld and Barton 1951). What variable is
chosen as the theoretical basis of the classification, or combination of vari-
ables in the case of a typology, depends on the interest and research question
of the author (e.g. Mair 1990).
One of the most popular classifications is that of the so-called party family,
in which political parties are grouped across countries predominantly on the
basis of their ideology. Although this idea has been elaborated at the theo-
retical level only relatively recently, it has been part implicitly of several of
the older studies in the field, going back to the classical studies of Michels
(1911/78), Duverger (1951:64) and Lipset and Rokkan (1967). The idea of
the party family is not one of the most rigorously tested classifications in
political science, however; and, for the most part, it has its vagueness and
‘common sense’ to thank for its wide usage. However, the distinction of
political parties on the basis of ideology has both theoretical and practical
merits (see Mair and Mudde 1998).
One of the most authorative sources on party families is Von Beyme’s Poli-
tische Parteien in Westeuropa (1984; English translation in 1985). In this
book he constructs several typologies, based on different criteria, of which
the most important criterion is to be found at the ideological level: that of
the familles spirituelles. It is these ideological ‘families’ that are compared on
the basis of the other criteria. Although his main typology is based on ideol-
ogy, Von Beyme writes that he has constructed the different types on the
basis of Rokkan’s famous historical–sociological study of the four critical
lines of cleavages (Von Beyme 1985: 23). Where Rokkan distinguishes ten
‘ideological groups’ on the basis of four major conflicts (cleavages) in West-
ern Europe (Rokkan 1970), Von Beyme specifies only nine ‘spiritual fami-
lies’: (i) liberal and radical parties; (ii) conservative parties; (iii) socialist and
social democratic parties; (iv) christian democratic parties; (v) communist
parties; (vi) agrarian parties; (vii) regional and ethnic parties; (viii) right-
wing extremist parties; and (ix) the ecology movement.
The classification of individual parties into these nine party families is
done on the basis of two ‘ideological’ criteria: the name of the party, and,
when this is not (or no longer) satisfactory, the voters’ perception of party
programmes and ideological position (Von Beyme 1985: 3; my italics).1
2 The ideology of the extreme right
1 Seiler (1980, 1985) has constructed a typology of familles partisanes, which is based even
more closely on Rokkan’s four cleavages model. He comes, however, to a far greater number
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Although party ideology is said to be the most important criterion for clas-
sification, it is used only in an indirect way, i.e. through the eyes of the party
itself (party name) or of the voters. Thus it is not the researcher who assesses
the ideology of the different parties. This is also true for the assessment of
the content of the party ideologies, as the attention in the book is predomi-
nately directed at the ideology of the different familles spirituelles, not at
that of the different member parties. Moreover, whether the ideology of a
certain party family is identical to that of all its member parties, or whether
the individual parties are classified correctly on the basis of (one of) these
indirect criteria, is not discussed by the author. His main interest is clearly in
the party family as a whole, especially its development, rather than in the
individual members that constitute the family.
More recently, Gallagher et al. have listed three criteria on the basis of
which different party families in Western Europe can be distinguished: (i)
‘genetic’ origin, (ii) transnational federations and (iii) policies (1995: 181).
With a shared genetic origin the authors mean that parties mobilised either
in similar historical circumstances or with the intention of representing sim-
ilar interests. As examples of these families they name socialist (or social-
democratic) and agrarian parties. This criterion seems most strongly
influenced by Rokkan’s cleavage approach.
For the classification of political parties in general and the group of par-
ties that is the concern of this study – (alleged) extreme right parties of the
1980s – in particular, the ‘genetic’ criterion is of limited use. Although these
parties by definition mobilised in similar historical circumstances, Western
Europe of the 1980s, they are not the only (group of) parties of this histor-
ical period; the green parties, for instance, also mobilised during this period.
Nor does the criterion of (the intention of) representing similar interests
apply to this specific group. It has been argued that Lipset’s thesis of middle-
class extremism, originally developed for the pre-war Nationalsozialistische
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (German National Socialist Workers Party, NSDAP),
is also valid for the post-war extreme right parties (Lipset 1960; Kühnl et al.
1969). However, this thesis has come under increasing attack in the last
decades (Childers 1983; Falter 1991) and electoral studies have shown that
the electorates of modern extreme right parties of the second (Herz 1975;
Husbands 1981) and third ‘wave’ of post-war right-wing extremism are too
diverse to speak of middle-class extremism (Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995).
The extreme right party family 3
of families than both Von Beyme and Rokkan. The individual parties are classified on the basis
of (1) the historical function performed by the party at its creation; (2a) the sociological struc-
ture of the party’s electorate, membership and inner group; and (2b) the linkage structure
between the party and a given network of pressure groups, movements and associations (Seiler
1985: 81). Many of his familles partisanes clearly coincide with the party families generally clas-
sified on the basis of ideology, which also seems to be the major criterion for the ‘linkage struc-
ture’ in the third criterion.
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The second criterion Gallagher et al. mention is based on pragmatic rather
than theoretical considerations, i.e. the cross-national linkages that parties
have developed among themselves. These linkages are chosen by the parties
themselves, and are generally based on (the assumption of) a shared ideol-
ogy. The most important examples of official organisations of parties from
different countries are (i) the party groups in the European Parliament (EP)
and (ii) the transnational party federations. Both are primarily organised on
the basis of (the assumption of) shared ideological principles (Pridham and
Pridham 1979a, 1979b; Bardi 1994).
From the very beginning of the establishment of some form of EP, various
groupings of parties have been in place. In the first period only three party
groups were represented in the then Common Assembly of the European
Coal and Steel Community: the socialists, the christian democrats and the
liberals. Since the 1980s, there seems to be a trend towards a closer cooper-
ation between national parties within the existing party groups, on the one
hand, and towards competition between these groups instead of between the
various national parties, on the other hand. In addition to the three original
groups the green parties also form a relatively well organised party group in
the EP. Looser coalitions are formed by various regionalist parties in the
Rainbow Coalition and during the years 1984–9 and 1989–94 by extreme
right parties. This notwithstanding, not all political parties represented in
the EP are members of a party group (or ‘official’ party family) and not every
party family is represented as a party group in (every term of) the EP. More-
over, not all political parties that can be described as ‘relevant’ in the Sarto-
rian sense (Sartori 1976) at the national level are represented at the
European level.
Except for the party groups in the EP there are a number of transnational
party federations that reach beyond the geographical boundaries of the
European Union (EU). In his handbook on political parties of the world Day
notes a ‘growing inclination of political parties throughout the world to con-
struct or join international organisations of like-minded formations’ (Day
1988: ix). Some examples of world-wide federations are the Socialist Inter-
national (primarily socialist and social-democratic parties), the Socialist
Fourth International (Trotskyist parties), and the Liberal International. Even
though most of these transnational federations are older than the party
groups in the EP, the latter seem to be of bigger importance in the possible
foundation of transnational, most likely Euro-, parties (Bardi 1994). How-
ever, it will still be a long time before transnational parties will become as
relevant as national parties.
Though the criterion of transnational federations has the obvious advan-
tage of being based on clear and open relations between parties, it has severe
shortcomings when applied to classifying small parties in general and to the
group of extreme right parties of the 1980s in particular. Although there
exist several cross-national linkages between parties within the latter group,
4 The ideology of the extreme right
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most of these are neither official nor at the party level. Various linkages are
ad hoc or only at the individual level. And, although there have been extreme
right party groups in the EP, they have always involved only a few of the par-
ties generally considered extreme right (as most of them never made it into
the EP). On top of this, the party groups differed considerably in member
parties and were highlighted by disputes both within and between the vari-
ous parties (e.g. Osterhoff 1997; Veen 1997; Fennema and Pollmann 1998).
The particular situation of a ‘contaminated’ family name, finally, makes the
more successful parties often cautious to use it, and they often even distance
themselves from ‘family members’ abroad (Pfahl-Traughber 1994).
This leaves us with the third criterion, i.e. policies, or to be more precise
‘the extent to which the policies pursued by one party in a country are sim-
ilar to those pursued by another party in another country’ (Gallagher et al.
1995: 181). The authors warn that this criterion has the disadvantage that it
naively assumes that the same policy means the same thing in different coun-
tries. Seiler even went so far as to state that the use of the criterion of ‘poli-
cies really implemented by political parties’ in cross-national research would
in practice lead to a typology of countries rather than of parties (1985: 81).
The question is how to solve this problem of cross-national comparability.
While authors like Seiler have decided to ignore the criterion, Gallagher et
al. state that ‘to ignore professed policies altogether when looking for simi-
larities between parties would clearly be to stick our heads in the sand’
(1995: 181).
The problem of cross-national comparability can be circumvented by
focusing on the ideology of the parties. Ideologies function as the normative
bases of the pursued policies of political parties and have the advantage of
being more generally formulated than the more nationally centred policies
that are pursued (Christian and Campbell 1974; Sainsbury 1980). Even
though the aspect of ideology has been ignored somewhat within the study
of party politics, most scholars in the field do accept the importance of it
(LaPalombara and Weiner 1966; Janda 1993). This is especially the case in
comparative studies, as ‘[i]deology and program are … a convenient vehicle
for bringing some kind of intellectual order out of what would otherwise be
the chaos of competing political groups’ (Alexander 1973: xix).
The study of extreme right parties
The rise of right-wing extremist parties comes in waves, as authors have
observed for several West European countries (see Knütter 1991; Zimmer-
mann and Saalfeld 1993; Buijs and Van Donselaar 1994). According to some
authors these waves are similar in all or at least most of the countries (e.g.
Von Beyme 1988; Stouthuysen 1993; Epstein 1996), whereas others believe
that they are for the largest part country specific (e.g. Veen 1997). Buijs and
Van Donselaar argue that what seems to be a European development might
The extreme right party family 5
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be no more than a ‘temporary and accidental coming together of the
national development of a number of countries’ (1994: 30). As they 
state, however, at the moment there is insufficient empirical evidence to 
support this, in their own words, relativising view (though see Husbands
1996).
Not only do extreme right parties rise in waves, but so do the studies on
the subject, with a slight delay. This conjunctural development of scholarly
studies on right-wing extremism has been written on and warned against
(e.g. Backes 1990a). The recent ‘high’ in literature on extreme right parties
is in line with this development. As extreme right parties either win or main-
tain their position in the various West European party systems, the number
of writings on the phenomenon is exploding. Most of the literature is of a
primarily descriptive nature, portraying (the history of) either one extreme
right party or extreme right parties in one country. Only fairly recently have
some truly comparative studies been undertaken in the field of party ideol-
ogy (Gardberg 1993; Mudde 1995) and on explanations of the current elec-
toral success of extreme right parties (Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995).
The study of the third wave, 1980–2000
The ‘third wave’ of post-war right-wing extremism (Von Beyme 1988) is
without a doubt the most successful period in both the electoral and ideo-
logical sense for such parties in almost every West European country (see
Suleiman 1995; Taggart 1995). Even though they are still regarded as pari-
ahs in most countries, some extreme right parties have established them-
selves, at the least, as politically important pariahs, as, for instance, the
French Front National (National Front, FN) and the Belgian Vlaams Blok
(Flemish Block, VB). In Italy the Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance, AN)
was the first West European extreme right party of the post-war period to
make it into government. The extreme right has become a relevant factor in
West European politics both within the party system and outside of it (as, for
example, the extreme right linked violence in Germany, Austria and else-
where).
The importance of extreme right parties is also visible in the field of
research. Not only has the number of studies on the subject exploded, but
also the number of scholars active in the field and the theoretical approaches
applied to the field has expanded enormously (see Mudde 1996). Probably
the most important development since the early 1980s has been the influx
of scholars that originally worked outside the field of right-wing extremism
(and historical fascism). This has, on the one hand, brought valuable insights
from the study of, for instance, political parties in general and left-libertar-
ian parties in particular (see, most notably, Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995). On
the other hand, it has incorporated the study of extreme right parties into
the wider study of political parties, thereby providing useful insights for,
among others, the study of small and new parties (e.g. Ignazi 1996). How-
6 The ideology of the extreme right
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ever, these developments have not only made the field broader in volume,
but also the number of debates have increased. In comparison to the situa-
tion some ten years ago, we now know far more about extreme right parties,
yet seem to agree on far less. In particular, there is increasing disagreement
on which parties might be properly regarded as extreme right.
Which parties?
Though formal definitions or derivations based on the history of ideas largely
failed to provide a convincing concept for ‘right-wing extremism’, research
work on political parties of the right has not had serious problems in selecting
appropriate cases. (Von Beyme 1988: 3)
Von Beyme’s observation is valid for most party families: we seem to know
who they are even though we do not exactly know what they are. However,
there are some special circumstances for this particular family that make the
implications of the remark more serious. First, various other parties have
(part) of the family name in their own party name, a feature which is espe-
cially obvious in the case of some left-wing families (notably communist and
green). This is not true for the right-wing extremist parties, however, which
not only reject the term extremist, some even object to the term right-wing
(Verbeeck 1994), as is evident, for example, in the case of the two Dutch
Centreparties. Second, most other party families have some sort of transna-
tional federation in which the various national parties cooperate, whereas
this is missing for the extreme right parties.
The ‘appropriate cases’ that are selected without serious problems by the
various researchers involved in the field are listed in appendix A. The polit-
ical parties listed are those generally considered ‘extreme right’, which con-
tested national elections at least once in the 1980–95 period. Clearly, not
every West European country is mentioned as there is no extreme right party
in, for example, Iceland and Ireland that meets the election requirement.
Nor is every party mentioned studied with equal care and attention. Parties
like the FN and the German Die Republikaner (The Republicans, REP)
belong to the better-known and studied political parties in Western Europe,
while parties such as the Dutch Centrumpartij’86 (Centre Party’86, CP’86)
and the Swiss Schweizer Demokraten (Swiss Democrats) are virtually
unknown beyond (and even within) their own national boundaries.
The fact that German extreme right parties (not only the REP) are stud-
ied so intensively shows that electoral significance is not the only or even
main reason for scholarly attention. Even though they have had some elec-
toral success at the Land (state) level and once at the European level, the
German parties are of mediocre size at the national level in comparison to
many of their European counterparts. Still, the REP has been studied by both
German and non-German scholars more than, for instance, the almost
equally successful Dutch Centrumdemocraten (Centre Democrats, CD). The
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prime reason for this is, of course, the legacy of the past. On top of that and
also because of this legacy there are more scholars from Germany working
in the field of right-wing extremism than from other countries (Roberts
1994).
A practical reason for the difference in scholarly attention is language. As
Müller-Rommel has noted this is a restraining factor in the study of all small
parties, especially when primary sources are involved:
Studying small parties obviously encounters some unique problems especially
when it comes to gathering information for a cross-national analysis. In most
cases there are clearly language problems. Although it is relatively easy to col-
lect information on party programmes, manifestos and party statutes, it is
notably more difficult to read these brochures since (in most cases) they have
not been translated into English or another international language. (1991: 2)
Language is the main reason why the scholarly (English-language) commu-
nity can get more information on, for instance, the British extreme right par-
ties, the National Front (NF) and the British National Party (BNP), whose
electoral relevance is particularly small, than on a party like the Belgian VB,
one of the more successful yet still relatively little-known extreme right par-
ties. It might also be one of the main reasons why the ‘doyen’ of right-wing
extremism, the Italian MSI, has been largely ignored by the international
scholarly community. However, language does not explain everything, since
the MSI has only recently been discovered as a scientific topic by the Italians
themselves (Ignazi 1989, 1994c; Ferraresi 1996). Moreover, the relatively
new regional leagues have been the subject of intensive study both from Ital-
ian and non-Italian scholars, making them the subject of more
(inter)national scholarly attention than the almost five times older and still
more successful MSI (now AN).
There are also some parties whose extreme right status is disputed by
some of the (leading) scholars in the field. One of these borderline cases is
the Lega Nord (Northern League, LN) and its main predecessor the Lega
Lombarda (Lombard League, LL), which some authors define as part of the
regionalist or sub-nationalist rather than the extreme right party family (see
Ignazi 1992; Gallagher et al. 1995). This may, except for the obvious region-
alist platform and support, be partly the result of the fact that the LL itself
chose to be part of the regionalist Rainbow Coalition in the European Par-
liament in 1989 instead of joining the Technical Fraction of the Euroright;
in 1994 the LN joined the Euroliberals.
A party whose ideological status has been the subject of scientific, public
and political debate, is the German Die Republikaner. Whereas most schol-
ars have defined the party as extreme right there are some who have rejected
this labelling. They argue that the REP is fundamentally different from the
traditional German extreme right parties (such as the NPD), among other
reasons because the REP originated as a splinter from a democratic party
8 The ideology of the extreme right
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(see chapter 2) (Backes 1990b; Veen et al. 1993). These scholars have long
been ‘supported’ by the German state, which in its influential Verfassungs-
schutzbericht did not list the REP among the extreme right groups. How-
ever, in December 1992 the German state changed its view and the REP is
from that time officially labelled extreme right. Even though this decision
has been criticised from both inside and outside the REP as being primarily
politically and electorally motivated (Jaschke 1994; More 1994), it has cer-
tainly weakened the argument advanced by the ‘dissidents’; most have since
changed to the new state terminology.
The Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austrian Freedom Party,
FPÖ) did not originate from a purely right-wing extremist environment
either. The party was founded in 1955/6 as the successor of the Verband der
Unabhängigen (Alliance of Independents), a coming together of Deutschna-
tionalen (German-nationalists), liberals and former and new Nazis (Neuge-
bauer 1981). After a clearly nationalist beginning the FPÖ developed into a
(national-)liberal party, thereby losing some right-wing extremists in the
1966 split Nationaldemokratische Partei (National Democratic Party, NDP),
until it was eventually accepted as coalition partner of the Sozialdemokratis-
che Partei Österreichs (Austrian Social Democratic Party) in 1983. However,
with the 1986 take-over by Jörg Haider as Bundesparteiobmann (national
party chairman), a young and energetic populist who had made his political
career in the right-wing extremist Carinthian branch of the party, more and
more authors came to define the FPÖ as right-wing extremist. This inter-
pretation has been strengthened by the increasing grip of Haider (and his
clique) over the party, by the split of prominent liberal party members in the
Spring of 1993 in the Liberales Forum (Liberal Forum), and by the ‘expul-
sion’ of the party from the Liberal International later that year.2 However,
there are still various authors who dispute the right-wing extremist charac-
ter of the party as a whole (Merkl 1993) or consider it (still) as part of the
liberal party family (Gallagher et al. 1995).
Finally, the Scandinavian Progress Parties, the Danish Fremskridtspartiet
(FPD) and the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet (FPN), which are seen by some
as the first of the most recent (third) wave of right-wing extremism (Ignazi
1992; Betz 1994; Svåsand 1998) whereas others consider them to be the last
of the (second) wave of more Poujadist-like parties (Von Beyme 1988;
Stouthuysen 1993). The main question here is certainly not whether the par-
ties are right-wing but whether they are extremist. Various authors see them
as either classical right-wing libertarian parties, admittedly primarily ‘anti’
but certainly not extremist or as part of the secular conservative party family
(Gooskens 1994; Gallagher et al. 1995).
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What right-wing extremism?
The question of which parties are excluded from the extreme right party
family is closely related to the question of what one means by the term
extreme right. Almost every scholar in the field points to the lack of a gen-
erally accepted definition. Even though the term right-wing extremism itself
is accepted by a majority of the scholars, there is no consensus on the exact
definition of the term. A variety of authors have defined it in a variety of
ways. This has been partly caused by the fact that the term is not only used
for scientific purposes but also for political purposes (Knütter 1991; Kowal-
sky and Schroeder 1994). Several authors define right-wing extremism as a
sort of anti-thesis against their own beliefs and/or as (closely) linked to their
‘democratic’ political opponent.3
Notwithstanding these political disputes, there is a rather broad consen-
sus in the field that the term right-wing extremism describes primarily an
ideology in one form or another (Herz 1975; Mudde 1995).4 What this ide-
ology holds, again, is a matter of extensive scholarly debate. Some scholars
define right-wing extremism on the basis of only one single feature. Hart-
mann et al., for example, use right-wing extremism as a collective term for
all ‘progress-hostile forces’ (1985: 9). There are some major objections to
this restricted though at the same time broad usage. The most important
objections are, first, that the term right-wing extremism describes something
already described by another and more suitable term (like progress hostility),
and, second, that it portrays extreme right parties falsely as (primarily)
single-issue movements, thereby obscuring other (sometimes more) impor-
tant features of their ideologies (see Mitra 1988; Mudde 1999).
Most of the authors involved define right-wing extremism as a political
ideology that is constituted of a combination of several different features
(see Mudde 1995). The number of features mentioned in the various defin-
itions varies from one or two to more than ten. Examples of short definitions
are from Macridis, who defines right-wing extremism as an ‘ideology [that]
revolves around the same old staples: racism, xenophobia, and nationalism’
(1989: 231), and Backes and Jesse, who define it as ‘a collective term for
anti-democratic dispositions and attempts, that are traditionally positioned
at the extreme “right” of the left-right spectre’ (1993: 474).
Some definitions are the size of shopping lists, containing eight to ten dif-
ferent features. A good example is the definition of Falter and Schumann,
10 The ideology of the extreme right
3 This can also be seen in the fact that many definitions mention mainly negatively formu-
lated features. Moreover, several scholars demonstrate their rejection of the phenomenon by
declaring right-wing extremism to be an anti- or non-ideology (see Verbeeck 1994; Fennema
1996).
4 Some authors add another dimension to the definition, as, for instance, the use of violence
(Von Beyme 1988; Benz 1989), and/or a particular party strategy (De Schampheleire 1991;
Jäger 1991).
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who list no less than ten features as the core (!) of right-extremist thinking:
‘extreme nationalism, ethnocentrism, anti-communism, anti-parliamentari-
anism, anti-pluralism, militarism, law-and-order thinking, a demand for a
strong political leader and/or executive, anti-Americanism and cultural pes-
simism’ (1988: 101).
In twenty-six definitions of right-wing extremism that can be derived from
the literature no less than fifty-eight different features are mentioned at least
once. Only five features are mentioned, in one form or another, by at least
half of the authors: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and
the strong state (Mudde 1995: 206). As is clear from the large number of
features mentioned in the different definitions, the questions of, how many
features together constitute right-wing extremism and what are the minimal
combination of features that define right-wing extremism, need some clari-
fication.
Only a few authors explicitly state how many features constitute right-
wing extremism. Commonsense would lead us to expect that the more fea-
tures are mentioned in the definition, the less likely the statement is that all
features have to be present. However, there are authors who list a large
number of features and still require all features to be present. Pennings and
Brants, for example, speak of a ‘minimum repertoire’ of six features (1985:
44). Even more extreme is the extensive list of Falter and Schumann, men-
tioned above, who require all ten features to form the core of right extrem-
ist thinking.
These authors are an exception, however, not only in their excessive
demands, but also in the explicitness of these demands. Most authors either
fail to mention or mention only vaguely what combination of features are
necessary to constitute right-wing extremism. This notwithstanding, three
different approaches can be distinguished: the quantitative, the qualitative,
and the mixed approach (Mudde 1995: 218–19). In the first approach all
features are considered equally important and only one criterion is used: the
number of features. In the second approach one (or more) feature is ‘more
equal’ than others: this is, for instance, the case in the extremism-theoreti-
cal tradition, in which at least anti-democracy must be part of the combina-
tion to speak of extremism (see Backes 1989; Backes and Jesse 1993). The
third approach combines these two approaches: for example, the require-
ment of at least two features of which one has to be an ‘exclusionist’ feature,
such as xenophobia, and one a ‘hierarchic’ feature, such as authoritarianism
(see Meijerink et al. 1998).
Beyond right-wing extremism?
Even though right-wing extremism is the most commonly used term for the
parties under study here (Ueltzhöffer 1991), alternatives are being used. On
the one hand, terms that were used to describe right-wing extremist parties
of the first and second wave are still used today. Generally speaking, the
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terms neo-Nazism and to a lesser extent neo-fascism are now used exclu-
sively for parties and groups that explicitly state a desire to restore the Third
Reich (in the case of neo-fascism the Italian Social Republic) or quote his-
torical National Socialism (fascism) as their ideological influence. Examples
of neo-Nazi parties in the 1980s are rare, most notably the sectarian German
Freiheitliche Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (German Free Workers Party), though
there exists a wide variety of neo-Nazi groupings in Western Europe. The
best (and only) example of a neo-fascist party is the Italian MSI, which until
its transformation into the AN officially defined itself as a fascist party. Nev-
ertheless, (neo-) Marxist authors in particular keep using the terms, either
with or without the prefix ‘neo’, considering the parties of the 1980s as no
more than recent examples of the 1930s phenomenon. Working within the
Marxist theory of fascism, most of these authors try to ‘prove’ the historical
continuity and cooperation of the traditional and extreme right (see Schulz
1990; Gossweiler 1995).5
Another term that occasionally surfaces in the literature is right-wing rad-
icalism or Rechtsradikalismus. This predecessor of the term right-wing
extremism is most often used interchangeably with it (e.g. Oswalt 1991;
Weinberg 1993), but there are two traditions in which it is used in a differ-
ent manner. In the German tradition the terms radicalism and extremism are
used to describe a certain view vis-à-vis democracy, both containing a left-
wing and right-wing variant. This tradition is strongly based on the official
definition of the German state, which explicitly defines the ‘fundamental
principles of the free democratic order’ and, since 1973, the distinction
between radicalism and extremism:
The term ‘radicalism’ resp. ‘radical’ has consequently undergone a change of
meaning. What we characterise as ‘extremist’ today, used to be characterised as
‘radical’. Nowadays, attempts that are characterised as ‘radical’ are those aimed
at one-sided solutions that go ‘down to the root’ of certain problems, without
(yet) aiming at the full or partial elimination of the free democratic order.
(Frisch 1990: 8–9)
Simply stated, the difference between radicalism and extremism is that the
former is verfassungswidrig (opposed to the constitution), whereas the latter
is verfassungsfeindlich (hostile towards the constitution). This difference is
of the utmost practical importance for the political parties involved, as
extremist parties are extensively watched by the (federal and state) Verfas-
sungsschutz and can even be banned, whereas radical parties are free from
this control.
In the American tradition the term radical right is still commonly used, yet
has a broader and even somewhat different meaning than in the European
12 The ideology of the extreme right
5 There are also a few scholars working outside the Marxist tradition who use the term ‘fas-
cism’ in a generic sense, that is, for all periods – see, for instance, Griffin (1995) and Eatwell
(1995).
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literature. Authors working within the American tradition use the term ‘rad-
ical right’
to denote a wide variety of groups and small political parties that rekindled a
special American tradition of right-wing radicalism. This old school of nativism,
populism, and hostility to central government was said to have developed into
the post-World War II combination of ultranationalism and anti-communism,
Christian fundamentalism, militaristic orientation, and anti-alien sentiment.
(Sprinzak 1991: 10)
Recently a wide variety of new terms, mainly variants on the term populism,
have made their way into the field: right-wing populism, radical right-wing
populism, national populism, new populism, neo-populism, etc. The terms
not only differ in name but also in their relationship towards the term right-
wing extremism. What most definitions have in common, though, is that it
is claimed that populism is primarily used to describe a specific political form
or style instead of a specific ideology or to distinguish modern from tradi-
tional parties of the extreme right. In most cases the difference between
political style and ideological feature is not really clear, as authors relate the
political style at least indirectly to a specific view of the people. This prob-
lem with defining the term populism is not typical for the field of right-wing
extremism. Populism has always been a widely applied term in the political
and scholarly debate (Canovan 1981; Ionescu and Gellner 1969).
Generally, two different uses of the term populism in relationship to the
term extremism can be distinguished. In the first, authors clearly distinguish
between the two, where the former is used primarily to describe the more
moderate parties of the extreme right (Backes 1991; Betz 1994). In the
second, the term populism is used exclusively to describe a certain political
style used by right-wing extremist parties (Pfahl-Traughber 1994). All in all,
most definitions of (whatever) populism do not differ that much in content
from the definitions of right-wing extremism. They are usually more focused
on political style and less on anti-democratic features. On top of that, the
term populism is often used by authors who stress the newness of the (suc-
cess of the) parties in question (Taggart 1995).
When the whole range of different terms and definitions used in the field
is surveyed, there are striking similarities, with the various terms often being
used synonymously and without any clear intention. Only a few authors,
most notably those working within the extremist-theoretical tradition,
clearly distinguish between the various terms. In addition, every term suffers
from excessive variations in definitions and applications. All in all, the dif-
ferences in definitions vary as much between terms as within terms, though
they all point to some sort of ideology that is constituted from several dif-
ferent features. These features again refer back to the ideological features of
historical fascism and National Socialism (cf. Scheuch and Klingemann
1976). Hence, the ultimate choice of what term is used is often primarily
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determined by the theoretical school the author adheres to (see Mudde
1996).
Subgroups within the extreme right party family
Recently, there has been an increasing number of studies in which various
subgroups within the broader extreme right party family have been distin-
guished on the basis of party ideology. These studies sometimes implicitly
acknowledge the similarity of all parties with regard to some features of
right-wing extremism, but point to differences between them with respect to
other features or with respect to the intensity or importance of the feature(s)
for the party ideology.
One of the early classifications is constructed by the German Stöss, who
distinguishes four different types of right-wing extremism in Germany on
the basis of the party’s stand on the German question (1988: 36; also 1991:
26–8). Only two of the four groups have any real significance: the ‘Old
Nationalism’ or the ‘Old Right-Wing’ and the ‘New Nationalism’ or the
‘New Right-Wing’. The main difference between the two has to do with their
ideological basis, whether it is ‘Old’, i.e. based on the ideas of the Deutschna-
tionalen and the Nazis, or ‘New’, i.e. seeking modern paths adapted to
changing national and international (post-war) conditions. The former are
further characterised by ‘a leaning towards statist and militarist thinking and
a foreign policy preference for pro-Western or European-neutralist
approaches’, as well as a fierce anti-communism (Stöss 1988: 37). The par-
ties of the New Nationalism want to find a ‘new political credo’ and look for
a so-called ‘third way’; a concept that has always remained rather vague and
is mostly used to indicate an economic system different from both capital-
ism and communism and a foreign policy of a neutral Europe free of both
the East and West, i.e. of the United States.
There are some problems with Stöss’ distinction. First, it is developed for
the German context, which is a rather specific one. Even if the concept of
‘Old Nationalism’ is extended to extreme right thinking of the inter-war
period in general, the possibility of applying the classification outside of Ger-
many (and possibly Austria) remains difficult. Second, the classification has
limited value when applied strictly to political parties with some electoral
relevance. Indeed, according to Stöss only two parties fall within the ‘New’
category, both of which never made it into the federal or even a state parlia-
ment.
These problems are for a large part overcome by the fairly similar classifi-
cation of the Italian Ignazi, who distinguishes ‘old’ and ‘new’ extreme right
parties. The whole family of extreme right parties is classified according to
three ideological6 criteria (1992: 7): (1) placement at the far right of the
14 The ideology of the extreme right
6 Ignazi himself speaks of three ‘distinct’ criteria and claims that his definition is, in contrast
to others listed in his work, not solely based on ‘party’s ideology and/or issues’ (1994b: 5). This
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national political spectrum (spatial criterion); (2) fascist features in the party
ideology (historic-ideological criterion); and (3) negative attitude toward
the political system (attitudinal-systemic criterion). The new extreme right
parties are selected on the basis of the first and third criterion, and are essen-
tially right-wing anti-system parties. The old extreme right parties combine
all three criteria. As prototypes of the new extreme right parties, Ignazi lists,
among others, the CD, FN, REP and VB. The prototype of the old extreme
right parties is the Italian MSI, which is according to Ignazi the inspiration
for all extreme right-wing parties up until the 1970s. Other old extreme
right parties are the BNP, CP’86, Deutsche Volksunion-Liste D (German
People’s Union-List D, DVU), and NPD (Ignazi 1992).
In his more recent work Ignazi has renamed the ‘old’ into ‘traditional’,
and the ‘new’ into ‘post-industrial’ extreme right parties (1994a, 1994b).
Even though the basis for classification remains the same, there are some
changes in the actual classification of the individual parties. Former border-
line cases such as the FPD, FPN and FPÖ are now included in the group of
post-industrial extreme right parties. The VB is ‘for certain aspects’ included
in the traditional group, but also in the post-industrial group, albeit with a
question mark (1994a: 243–5; also 1994b). However, this problem of clas-
sification should by no means be limited to the case of the VB, as it can be
argued for all parties involved. The problem stems from the vagueness of the
historic-ideological criterion, which Ignazi summarises as: ‘references to
myths, symbols, slogans of the interwar fascist experience, often veiled as
nostalgia, or in terms of a more explicit reference to at least part of the ide-
ological corpus of fascism’ (1992: 10). As he lists a rather broad and varied
‘fascist corpus’ including features like ‘limitations on personal and collective
freedoms’ and ‘acceptance of hierarchical criteria for social organisation’
(1992: 10), not many of the new or post-industrial extreme right parties will
escape this criterion when applied rigorously. Nevertheless, Ignazi has taken
the distinction between ‘new’ and ‘old’ extreme right parties a step further
by making it less German (thereby making it a bit too much Italian with its
focus on Italian fascism and the MSI) and making it applicable to a wider
range of (electorally relevant) political parties.
An alternative classification is constructed by Betz, who distinguishes two
‘faces of radical right-wing populism’: ‘neo-liberal’ or ‘libertarian’ populism,
on the one hand, and ‘authoritarian’ or ‘national’ populism, on the other
(1993: 680; 1994: 108). The main difference between these two ‘ideal
types’ is defined in relative terms: ‘What ultimately determines whether a
party should be characterised as a neo-liberal populist party or a national
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populist party is the relative weight it attributes to the respective elements in
its program’ (Betz 1994: 108).7 The distinction is far from static as parties
can develop and have developed from one type into the other, partly as a
result of the changing social base of their electorate. However, Betz notes
that since the late 1980s there have been clear signs of an increasing impor-
tance of national-populist elements in the programmes of all the parties. The
one exception to this development is the LN.
Betz’ classification has both theoretical and empirical relevance but strug-
gles with the problem of determining the relative weight of the two ele-
ments. How do you weigh the neo-liberal substance of a programme? Even
though the author claims to provide ‘a comprehensive analysis of the basic
elements of the radical right-wing populist program and the shifts in empha-
sis of its two main components’ (1994: 109), the actual analysis he provides
is a rather general account on the basis of some election programmes and
pamphlets of the various parties. While this might suffice to note ‘a’ shift in
emphasis, it is hardly a solid basis for a meaningful classification.
Putting the extreme right party family to the test
As can be seen from this short overview, different scholars group different
parties together and do this under different labels. In addition, even schol-
ars that use the same term often mean different things. Some consensus can
nevertheless be uncovered. First, the term extreme right (or right-wing
extremist) is still broadly accepted as the most satisfying collective noun.
Second, this term is generally used to describe an ideology containing a com-
bination of several distinct features. Third, despite several borderline cases
there is a large number of political parties whose extreme right status is not
debated. On the basis of this consensus, we can construct the following
propositions:
1 The extreme right party family consists of a distinct group of parties that
share a common ideological core.
2 This common ideological core includes (at least) that combination of fea-
tures generally defined as right-wing extremist.
3 Within the broader extreme right party family at least two subgroups can
be distinguished on the basis of ideological extremity.
The term proposition is used as none of these points has ever been empiri-
cally validated. Moreover, as far as there has been empirical research into a
common ideological core of alleged extreme right parties, the results have
rejected rather than supported the propositions. In an earlier study I have
16 The ideology of the extreme right
7 Betz explicitly mentions the following parties as representatives of neoliberal populism:
Autopartei (Car Party), FPD, FPN, FPÖ, LN and Ny Demokrati (New Democracy, ND); and of
national populism: FN, REP and VB.
chap1  28/5/02  13.30  Page 16
tested the (first two) propositions on a small number of parties (Mudde
1995). After defining right-wing extremism as a combination of five distinct
features (i.e. nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and the
strong state), the literature of three parties was analysed on the basis of the
presence of these features. Only three features were found in all three cases
and could thus be said to constitute the ideological core of the(se) extreme
right parties. So, though an ideological core was found (prop. 1), it did not
include all the features generally described as constituting right-wing
extremism (prop. 2). As all three parties – CP’86, NDP and NPD – belong
to the ‘old’ subgroup (see Ignazi 1992), it could be expected that the more
‘moderate’ extreme right parties, which are also electorally more relevant,
will hold even fewer features (generally described as constituting right-wing
extremism).
In her parallel comparative study Gardberg focused on four ‘new’ extreme
right parties: the FN, REP, VB and ND. The goal of her study was to find the
most appropriate label for their ideologies, using a list of six different labels
or categories: neo-fascism, extreme right, nationalism, xenophobia or
racism, neo-conservative and neo-liberal ideas, and populism or protest
(1993: 8–9). On the basis of an analysis of (some) party programmes and
interviews she concludes that ‘it is indeed difficult to agree on a common
label or category for them’ (1993: 121). As far as there is an appropriate
label for all four parties, it is the label ‘new right’. However, this label has
the disadvantage of being rather vague, i.e. meaning a combination of neo-
liberal and neo-conservative ideas, and is applicable to a far broader range
of parties, such as those normally labelled ‘conservative’ (1993: 122).
These two studies show that although there exists a rather broad consen-
sus on the existence of a distinct extreme right party family that entails (at
least two) different subgroups, this consensus is no more than a proposition
at this time. The few empirical studies provide only (moderate) support for
the first proposition: that these parties share an ideological core. However,
that this core is indeed right-wing extremist, as the second proposition
holds, remains doubtful. Finally, the third proposition, asserting the exis-
tence of subgroups, has as yet not been tested at all. This study therefore
intends not only to test all three propositions, but also to do this on the basis
of a broader selection of cases and material than was employed in either of
the two earlier studies. Indeed, both studies suffer from limitations, most
notably in the particular group of parties selected (Mudde 1995) and the
limited number of party documents studied (Gardberg 1993).
For the purposes of this analysis the following parties were selected
according to both intrinsic and practical criteria: Die Republikaner and the
Deutsche Volksunion in Germany, the Vlaams Blok in Belgium, and the Cen-
trumdemocraten and the Centrumpartij’86 in the Netherlands. The princi-
pal intrinsic criteria were that (i) the party has to have contested at least one
parliamentary election; (ii) it has to be reputed generally as extreme right in
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the scholarly literature; (iii) it has to be part of the ‘third wave’ of right-wing
extremism, i.e. have been politically active since the 1980s. In addition, the
selected parties must differ in ideological extremity to study the third propo-
sition. Ideologically, the CP’86 and the DVU are classified as part of the
(more) ‘radical’ subgroup of the old/traditional extreme right parties,
whereas the CD and the REP are classified as part of the (more) ‘moderate’
subgroup of the new/post-industrial extreme right parties, with the VB being
partly in both groups though mainly in the first (Ignazi 1992, 1994b). The
parties also differ in terms of electoral success. The VB belongs to the elec-
torally successful extreme right parties in Western Europe (in 1994), gaining
around 12 per cent of the Flemish votes;8 the rest are not successful, gaining
under 5 per cent on average in national elections. The CD and the REP are
more successful (or better: less unsuccessful) with around 2.5 per cent com-
pared to the under 1 percent parties CP’86 and DVU. The most important
practical criteria of the study were (accessibility of) language and the avail-
ability of party literature. Having selected the parties to be studied, we now
have to determine how we can best study party ideology.
Studying party ideology
Although party ideology is normally given a chapter or paragraph in studies
on political parties, there are only a few studies that adopt an ‘ideological
approach’, i.e. in which ‘the substance and prevalence of a party’s ideology
are of primary interest to the investigator’ (Lawson 1976: 15). The number
is even less in the case of comparative studies.9 Especially in studies of party
families the ideologies of the individual parties have been of secondary inter-
est. Often it seems to be assumed that (all and only) the member parties share
the family ideology as the core of their respective ideologies. The few com-
parative studies that have adopted the ideological approach compare either
one party through time (Sainsbury 1980; Dittrich et al. 1986) or a number
of parties from the same country (Hoogerwerf 1971; Borg 1966; see also
most of the contributions in Budge et al. 1987) or like-minded parties in dif-
ferent countries (Gardberg 1993; Mudde 1995).
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8 Some authors list the score that the VB gets at the federal level (i.e. in the whole of Belgium,
which was 6.6 per cent in 1991, see Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995). However, as is the case for all
Flemish parties, the VB contests elections only in the Flemish part of Belgium, and in the area
of Brussels, and the federal score thus provides a distorted picture of the party’s real strength.
9 Janda, on the other hand, speaks of ‘the outpouring of empirical research on comparative
party ideologies’ (1993: 169). This difference of opinion is for the largest part due to the fact
that he also includes studies on party’s positions on issues (even when these ‘do not fit common
ideological concepts’), i.e. studies that work with a single left–right dimension. Most of these
studies are not only very limited in scope, as they primarily or exclusively focus on the socio-
economic views of parties, but their interest in party ideology is also often only secondary.
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This lack of comparative research into the ideologies of political parties
can possibly be explained by the fact that during the so-called ‘Golden Age
of comparative politics’ (Dalton 1991), i.e. the late 1950s and early 1960s,
the importance of ideology in party politics was severely challenged by the
‘end-of-ideology’ thesis. This held that the major political parties in the West
had converged so much ideologically that politics had become more a matter
of administration (see in Bell 1960; also Lipset 1960). Not surprisingly, the
few studies of that period that adopted the ideological approach were aimed
at testing this thesis empirically. Hoogerwerf (1971), for instance, demon-
strated on the basis of a both synchronic and diachronic comparative analy-
sis of the 1948 and 1963 election programmes of the four major Dutch
parties that a larger correspondence in socio-economic policies had come
into being. The ideological differences that existed in 1948 were altered into
differences in strategy and means in 1963. Thomas came to similar findings
in a comparison of the major parties of six countries, which led him to the
conclusion that without an ideological revival West European parties ‘could
be headed toward the kind of partisan consensus which now characterises
American politics’ (1980: 364). This revival seemed very unlikely to him, as
the major parties had too much to loose and new parties had never proved
to be very successful over time. Even though the end-of-ideology thesis was
disputed both on empirical and theoretical grounds (see LaPalombara 1966;
Seliger 1976), and seemed to have disappeared in the 1970s, it regained its
influence within the political science community in the late 1980s.
Defining party ideology
Ideology has been defined in numerous ways, and often the definitions are
based on some normative idea. Seliger, for example, distinguishes two uses
of the term ideology: restrictive and inclusive (1976: 14). In the restrictive
use the term is confined to belief systems of the extreme left and right in the
post-war Western world. Seliger argues against this use, describing it as a
manifestation of political conviction and ‘a concomitant of the latest theory,
that of the end of ideology, whose major proponents did not disguise that
what they claimed to be ending was that which they wished to be ending’
(1976: 26). In accordance with Seliger I reject the restrictive use, as it limits
not only our view of the phenomenon at hand, but also its usage in com-
parative research; what is extremist and ideological in one context can be
moderate and non-ideological in another.
In this study the term ideology is used in an inclusive way, i.e. as ‘a body
of normative or normative-related ideas about the nature of man and soci-
ety as well as the organisation and purposes of society’ (Sainsbury 1980: 8).
It thus includes both ideas on how society or man ought to be and ideas on
how they are. Following this definition, party ideology is defined as a party’s
body of normative(-related) ideas about the nature of man and society as well
as the organisation and purposes of society. Once the different ideas (or fea-
The extreme right party family 19
chap1  28/5/02  13.30  Page 19
tures) of the ideology are conceptualised properly, i.e. in a manner ‘suffi-
ciently abstract to travel across national boundaries’ (Rose 1991: 447), the
criterion of ideology should lead to no distinctive problems in cross-national
comparative research.
Which sources of party ideology?
Most studies on party ideology use election programmes as data for analy-
ses. Programmes have the advantage that they are, in general, officially
endorsed by the members of the party and, consequently, can be ‘considered
to represent and express the policy collectively adopted by the party’ (Borg
1966: 97; also Anckar and Ramstedt-Silén 1981). Nevertheless, some
authors take the view that election programmes are not satisfactory, because
out of tactical considerations they do not show the true face of the parties.
Election programmes of political parties are aimed at, among other things,
the attraction of voters and the enhancement of the profile of the party. They
thus have a predominantly external orientation (Flohr 1968; Raschke
1970), and in the case of extreme right parties it has often been argued that
there exists a radical ‘back-stage’ behind this (relative) moderate ‘front-
stage’ (Van Donselaar 1991: 16; also Fleck and Müller 1998).10 However,
extreme right parties do not have the exclusive rights to a discrepancy
between views expressed in the official election programmes and those pro-
claimed elsewhere or supported ‘truly’.11 Flechtheim, among many others
(e.g. Sainsbury 1980; Dierickx 1996), has argued that this is customary with
all political parties:
The programmes alone will hardly fully open the true nature of the party – for
that purpose political programmes are as a rule too much of an ideological cov-
ering. With those parties that are explicit ideological creations … at least much
of what could be compromising will be left unsaid. (1974: 179)
One of the more popular methods to determine the ‘real’ ideology of
(extreme right) parties has therefore been to focus attention on the ‘political
origins’ of the party leaders and officials instead of on the party programmes
(see Müller 1989; Van Donselaar 1991). There are several problems with
this approach. First, the political origin of the individuals can only be inter-
preted when the ideology of the original party can be established. And then,
20 The ideology of the extreme right
10 Eatwell makes a similar distinction between the ‘esoteric and exoteric appeal. The former
refers to the ideological nature of discussion among converts, or in closed circles. The latter
refers more to what it is considered wise to say in public’ (1992: 174).
11 An explanation for the particular focus on extreme right parties in this regard can be found
in the fact that most authors define the extreme right as ‘the other’ of which they are no part
and are often also openly hostile toward. As Naess perceptively states: ‘An important ingredi-
ent in descriptions of outgroups is the hypothesis that the outgroup says one thing, but means
another’ (1980: 136).
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of course, the original question returns: how is this to be done? Second,
which leaders and officials are representative of the (whole) party? In the
case of the REP, for example, there are (and were) leaders that have been
members of ‘openly’ extreme right parties like the NPD, and maybe even of
neo-Nazi groups, but there are (were) also leaders who have never been part
of these groups – several have even been (sometimes prominent) members of
democratic parties. Which official counts more and on what grounds?
The problem of representativeness is also at the root of two other alter-
native methods, interviewing leading party members and using ‘observers’.
How do we know if the opinion of the interviewee(s) is representative of the
(majority) view of the party (Dierickx 1996)? The volatility of the leadership
of many extreme (right) parties makes this a particularly pressing problem.
This can be seen in the study of Gardberg (1993), for example, who inter-
viewed five of the six members of the REP fraction in the EP. Unfortunately,
all five members had left the REP either already at the time of the interview
or slightly afterwards, and the only remaining representative and then party
leader, Franz Schönhuber, had objected to an interview. Gardberg was thus
stuck with the views of REP dissidents, not REP leaders. The second
approach, using ‘observers’ (see Janda 1980), cannot be evaluated on its sci-
entific merits as it is not made clear who these observers in question are, nor
what they observe and how they observe this.
To overcome the danger of being stuck with only the front stage of the
extreme right parties, I have chosen to analyse not only primarily externally
oriented party literature, but also party material whose primary orientation
is internal: party papers. It seems plausible that this literature will hide ‘the
true nature of the party’ to a far lesser extent than externally directed liter-
ature since it is aimed at a different group of recipients, i.e. the party mem-
bers (the internal arena), as against the whole electorate (the external arena;
cf. Sjöblom 1968). A second advantage of party papers is that they are the
official organ aimed at the members on behalf of the party leadership, and
although they are not officially endorsed by the members it can be assumed
that they are officially endorsed by the collective party leadership. These two
sources together (party programmes and party papers) should provide us
with a fairly broad and detailed insight into the ‘institutionalised party ide-
ology’ (Sainsbury 1980: 17; also Holzer 1981).
This selection, though broader than most studies on party ideology, still
contains restrictions. The fact that only the manifest party ideology is stud-
ied means that the ‘latent party ideology’, appearing in unofficial documents
(e.g. pamphlets of party dissidents or of individual party members), is left
outside of the analysis (Helenius 1969; Sainsbury 1980). Moreover, the fact
that only documents from the national party are studied means that mater-
ial, whether official or unofficial, from regional or local party branches is left
aside. Finally, the focus throughout rests on what the party says (party liter-
ature) and not on what the party does (party policy). However, since most
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right-wing extremist parties in Western Europe, and all parties selected for
this analysis, are seen and treated as pariah parties and kept out of power at
all governmental levels, the distinction between what they say and what they
do is largely academic.
What method of analysis?
Studies that deal either primarily or secondarily with party ideology gener-
ally adopt a qualitative approach to textual analysis; the selected material is
‘read carefully’ and the most important ideological features, according to
the researcher, are presented (often with illustratory quotations). Although
this type of textual analysis is still by far the most popular and has proven its
value (especially in explorative studies), it has been criticised for being ‘sub-
jective, idiosyncratic, and overinterpretive’ (Livingstone 1989: 188).
According to some critics genuine textual analysis or content analysis is
quantitative by nature and uses computerised methods to come to ‘exact’
and ‘scientific’ results. As Gerring has noted for the mostly quantitative stud-
ies of party ideology in America: ‘the focus is usually on the general function
of ideology … rather than on the specific content and history of the ideolo-
gies in question’ (1998: 288, my italics). This is also the case for the ECPR-
organised manifesto project, which dominates the comparative study of
party ideology in Europe (see Budge et al. 1987; Klingemann et al. 1994).
However, because of both its method and sources, the manifesto project data
are better used to analyse policies of parties and party families than their ide-
ologies (e.g. Budge and Keman 1990; Laver and Schofield 1990).
Moreover, differences between qualitative and quantitative analysis in
general are not as big as is often claimed (Coffey and Atkinson 1996) and
this is also true for the particular case of textual analysis (Thomas 1994). The
choice between the two approaches is not a matter of principle, but a dif-
ference in attention and emphasis.
Three major differences in qualitative and quantitative emphasis deserve atten-
tion: (1) the distinction between explanation and understanding as the purpose
of inquiry; (2) the distinction between a personal and impersonal role for the
researcher, and (3) a distinction between knowledge discovered and knowledge
constructed. (Stake 1995: 37)
As this study is explorative, aimed at understanding rather than explanation,
and at discovering rather than constructing, a qualitative approach is clearly
more suitable. Moreover, given the complex nature of (party) ideology, clas-
sification or coding is vital. Though a human coder introduces an element of
subjectivity, this should not be seen as ‘a failing needing to be eliminated but
as an essential element of understanding’ (Stake 1995: 45; also Gerring
1998: 297–8). Moreover, the choice between a machine (computer) and a
human coder (researcher) is often in essence a choice between reliability and
validity (also Kepplinger 1989; Livingstone 1989). Whereas computerised
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methods are superior in regard to reliability, both in terms of completed
measurement and future replaceability (Thomas 1994), they are bound to
the categories chosen on forehand and cannot interpret the context of these
categories, and therefore may be inferior in regard to validity. Also, com-
pared to the human coder the machine is far less flexible and less able to
learn during the process. As Coffey and Atkinson write:
codes are organising principles that are not set in stone. They are our own cre-
ations, in that we identify and select them ourselves. They are tools to think
with. They can be expanded, changed, or scrapped altogether as our ideas
develop through repeated interactions with the data. Starting to create cate-
gories is a way of beginning to read and think about the data in a systematic and
organised way. (1996: 32)
On the basis of these arguments I have chosen a form of qualitative textual
analysis that is partly structured by a preliminary list of possibly relevant ide-
ological features and themes. This list has been constructed on the basis of a
variety of sources: (1) ideological features mentioned in the literature on
right-wing extremism (Mudde 1995); (2) themes used in other content
analyses that were expected to be relevant (Borg 1966; Budge et al. 1987);
and (3) an initial study of (a sample of) party programmes of the parties in
question (see appendix B). On the basis of this list the content of the ideo-
logical features of the different parties will be captured.
The importance of the various features within the party ideology as a
whole, however, will be determined by the use of the causal chain approach.
This approach is aimed at discovering the hierarchy of the various features
that are found to be part of the ideology. This is done by following the direc-
tion of the argumentation and assessing what is the prime argument, what is
the secondary argument, etc. (see also Naess 1980). This can best be
explained by a short (self-invented) story:
Crime is sweeping our cities! Even within the police force there is nostalgia for
the time that policemen and bankrobbers were on a first name base and arrests
could still be made without the use of weapons. But these days are long gone,
as the criminals of today are violent sociopaths. This is especially true for the
immigrant youth, by far the majority of the hardened criminals. They have
monopolised the drugs market and made the white criminal an exception in our
own prisons. We should, however, not only blame these criminal black young-
sters, as they are also victims. They have been torn away from their own culture
and, under strong pressure from left-wing welfare people and politicians,
forced to integrate. As we all know, this is impossible and the loss of identity
and a consequent life of crime were the logical conclusions. Even though these
black hoodlums should be punished severely, after having been sent back to
their own countries, the problem can’t be solved by this end alone. Not unless
we punish the traitors in power and return to a pure Dutch society, will we have
our peace and safety back on the streets again.
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This story initially seems to deal with the problem of rising crime, based on
the feature of law and order. However, it is not crime itself that is the main
problem, but a specific sort of crime; crime committed by black youngsters.
Moreover, it is not even their criminality, but the root of it, the fact that
(young) immigrants are ‘torn away from their own culture’, that is the prime
concern of the story. This is a typical example of ethnopluralist reasoning,
which lies behind the law-and-order theme (and behind the xenophobic and
anti-elite views). It is this sort of analysis that is developed by the causal
chain approach.
Outline of the book
The book is composed in the following manner: the five parties are ordered
by country and each of the three countries is addressed in a different section.
Each section begins with a short introduction of the history of post-war
right-wing extremism in the country up until the founding of the parties
under study. Except for the Flemish part, which entails only one party, each
part contains two chapters. Each chapter describes the history, literature and
ideology of a single party in different sections.
The section on the ideology is subdivided into themes and ideological fea-
tures. Some features are discussed for all parties, as they constitute main fea-
tures of right-wing extremism (e.g. nationalism, exclusionism, the strong
state). Other features and themes are mentioned in the case of some parties,
depending on their salience in the party literature. Though the subdivisions
might at times appear artificial or overlapping, they serve first and foremost
to structure the presentation of the analysis of the ideology. The conclusions
will provide for a concise and integrated description of the whole party ide-
ology. The book concludes with a chapter in which the literature and ideol-
ogy of the different parties are compared and the question of the validity of
the propositions is addressed.
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The extreme right in Germany, 1945–80
After the capitulation of Nazi Germany, the country was briefly occupied
and divided into zones by the main four allied forces (France, the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom and the United States). Because of the occupa-
tion and the allied denazification policy, political organisations were initially
severely hindered in their development. They could, for instance, only
organise at the community and later the zone level (Backes and Jesse 1993).
Moreover, the fact that only parties with a democratic character could con-
test elections limited the electoral possibilities of right-wing extremist move-
ments. The ending of the Allied controlled licence duty for political parties
in 1948 and the increasing polarisation of the East–West relations, with the
divided Germany at its heart, created some space for them.
Between 1946 and 1952 several extreme right parties were founded and
allowed in the three zones of the western part of Germany, which in 1949
became the Federal Republic of Germany (further Germany or FRG). Most
of these parties never grew beyond a regional basis. One of the few parties
that did have a wider impact was the Deutsche Konservative Partei-Deutsche
Rechtspartei (German Conservative Party, German Right-Wing Party). It
received 8.1 per cent of the votes in the 1949 state election in Lower Saxony,
which gave it the right to five seats in the Bundestag (the German parlia-
ment).1 After several ideological disputes within the parliamentary faction,
the majority of the delegates founded a new party in 1950, the Deutsche
1 Until 1956 the ‘5 per cent hurdle’ applied only at the state (Land) level. If a party gained
more than five per cent in one state it gained entry in the federal parliament. With the amend-
ments to the electoral law in 1953 and 1956 the electoral system became as follows: every
German has two votes, the Erststimme (first vote) is cast for a candidate in a constituency, the
Zweitstimme (second vote) for a party list at the state level. The second vote determines the
final percentage of parliamentary seats, the first vote (in part) the people that occupy these seats.
A party needs more than 5 per cent at the federal level, or the majority in three constituencies,
to gain entry in the Bundestag (Von Beyme 1983: 26).
Part I
Germany:
‘Deutschland
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Reichspartei (German Reich Party, DRP).2 The main representative of the
first right-wing extremist wave,3 however, was the Sozialistische Reichspartei
(SRP), which received 11.0 and 7.7 per cent in the 1951 state elections in
respectively Lower Saxony and Bremen.4 After October 1952 the first wave
ebbed away after the SRP had been banned on the grounds of its neo-Nazi
character. In the following three months more than sixty-one successors to
the SRP were also banned (Knütter 1991).
Consequently, the DRP remained as the strongest right-wing extremist
party in (West-)Germany. However, the party soon suffered various set-
backs. In 1961 it suffered a defeat at the parliamentary election, gaining a
mere 0.8 per cent, which led to an internal power struggle and a split of the
militant faction of the party. As a reaction to its marginalisation DRP lead-
ers contacted prominent members of other nationalist parties, among them
members of the folding Deutsche Partei (German Party, DP) and the Gesamt-
deutsche Partei (All-German Party). Their primary goal was to found a new
political party, which would become the reservoir of the fragmented German
nationalist right-wing. On 28 November 1964 it was founded under the
name Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD). The second wave
of German right-wing extremism had begun.
The NPD wanted to create the appearance of being a national-conserva-
tive party with a leadership without a Nazi past. The chairman of the party
became Fritz Thielen, in 1945 co-founder of the Christlich-Demokratische
Union (Christian Democratic Union, CDU) in Bremen and later chairman of
the national-conservative DP. The choice of Thielen also served another
purpose, namely that the NPD was a collection of different (national-con-
servative) parties rather than a revamping of the (extreme right) DRP. The
real power, however, was in the hands of former DRP leader Adolf von
Thadden.5 Moreover, a large group within the leadership did have a Nazi
past: two-thirds of the party executive had been member of Hitler’s NSDAP,
from which another two-thirds had either joined before 1933 (the year it
took over power) or had occupied a high position in the Nazi regime
(Niethammer 1967).
26 Germany
2 For an overview of the histories of these parties, see the relevant chapters in Tauber (1967);
Stöss (1983/84); Dudek and Jaschke (1984).
3 Three (short) waves of right-wing extremism in (West-)Germany are generally distinguished
in the literature (see Knütter 1991; Zimmermann and Saalfeld 1993; Wetzel 1994). The first
wave was characterised by the short-lived electoral success of the SRP in the 1948–52 period;
the second wave by that of the NPD between 1964 and 1969; the third wave started at the
beginning of the 1980s, increasing at the end of that decade with the successes of the REP and
to a lesser extent the DVU.
4 Unless indicated differently, all electoral results cited here are based on Stöss (1991).
5 Niethammer (1967: 26) describes von Thadden as ‘the spder in the web of the party lead-
ership’. For a description of the man who became the personification of Germany’s second
wave of right-wing extremism, see Jesse (1990).
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The NPD developed into a full-fledged political party within a few years.
In 1967 its organisation extended over almost the whole territory of the
FRG, relying heavily on the still existing party organisation of the DRP, with
a presence in 75 per cent of all German cities and all ten states (Niethammer
1967: 28). Within a short period of time its membership increased dramat-
ically. The party had started with only 473 members at the inaugural meet-
ing in November 1964, yet at the end of 1966 this figure had risen to over
25,000. This was probably for a large part the spillover effect of the ongo-
ing electoral successes. The party began with a modest 2.0 per cent of the
votes in the 1965 parliamentary election. This was well under the federal 5
per cent hurdle needed to gain entry into the federal Parliament, but more
than twice what its ‘predecessor’, the DRP, had received at the previous par-
liamentary election. Within a year the NPD won 7.8 and 7.4 per cent in state
elections in Hesse and Bavaria respectively. At the state election in Baden-
Württemberg in April 1968 the party reached its peak with 9.8 per cent and
with this result it had achieved a total of sixty-one seats in seven (out of ten)
German state parliaments and some 600 representatives in regional and
local councils throughout the country (Stöss 1991: 147). The ongoing elec-
toral successes also led to a growing interest in the party by the German
state. In the late 1960s the government indicated on several occasions that
it was considering a constitutional ban of the party because of its alleged
extremist character (Dudek and Jaschke 1984).
In 1967 the NPD suffered a short ‘power struggle’ when Von Thadden
decided to step out of the shadow and replaced Thielen as chairman. His
‘coup’ was little more than a surgical correction and changed nothing in the
(electoral) appeal of the party. At the beginning of 1969 the NPD seemed to
have reached its goal of becoming the reservoir of the German extreme right
with no less than 72 per cent of all ‘organised’ right-wing extremists6 in Ger-
many being members of the party (Arndt and Schardt 1989: 284). Most
other right-wing extremist parties had either lost their members to the party
or had called upon the remaining members to vote for the NPD at elections.
The only relevant person in right-wing extremist circles that kept resisting
its omnipotence was the influential Gerhard Frey, owner, publisher and chief
editor of the most important nationalist newspapers in Germany (see chap-
ter 3). Frey remained sceptical about the party and only reluctantly appealed
to his readers to vote NPD in the 1969 parliamentary election (Backes and
Jesse 1993: 87).
The 1969 election was approached with much confidence by the NPD. Its
slogan Man kann wieder wählen (One can vote again) did put the finger at
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6 By ‘organised’ right-wing extremists are generally meant all persons that are member of any
organisation that is officially registered as right-wing extremist by the German State. For an
overview of these organisations and the ‘official’ number of organised right-wing extremists, see
the annual Verfassungsschutzberichten (further VSB).
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the sore spot of German politics of that time: the Grand Coalition. This gov-
ernment coalition of the two major parties, the Union block of the CDU and
the Bavarian Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union, CSU) and the
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social Democratic Party,
SPD), combined with the traditionally weak opposition of the Freie
Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party, FDP), gave the NPD the
opportunity to present itself as the only authentic (right-wing) opposition
party. Within the media and scholarly community a substantial electoral suc-
cess of the NPD was anticipated too. The German left-wing liberal weekly
Die Zeit, for instance, reported already on 9 February 1968:
In the fall of 1969, after the parliamentary election, the President will have to
welcome a new party and a new parliamentary party leader to the Parliament
hall: Adolf v. Thadden and his men of the NPD. There is almost no doubt about
this. The only thing that is still unclear is precisely how many national-democ-
rats will enter Parliament – whether 25, as opinion pollers say, or even 50, as
optimists in the NPD central office suspect. (reprinted in Dudek and Jaschke
1984: 286–7)
In the event, the election resulted in a complete disaster with the party win-
ning ‘only’ 4.3 per cent and no seats in the Bundestag. This was the begin-
ning of the end for the NPD, as became clear in the following year. At state
elections in among others Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse the
party remained well under the 5 per cent hurdle. The rapid collapse led the
government to abandon its preparations for a possible ban on the party. The
mere threat of a ban appeared to have been effective, not only outside of the
party (scaring away possible voters) but even within (Dudek and Jaschke
1984).
The internal struggle, which had been suppressed by the collective eupho-
ria over the seemingly never ending electoral successes in the preceding
years, broke out with great vehemence after the electoral defeats. Militant
members openly indicted the parliamentary strategy of the party leadership
and called for more extraparliamentary activism, partly in reaction to the
highly successful actions of the extreme left Außerparlamentarische Opposi-
tion (Extraparliamentary Opposition) of that time. In November 1971 Von
Thadden stepped down as party chairman, arguing that the NPD had got out
of control. Before he went, however, he made sure that his successor was a
confidant, Martin Mußgnug. In protest against the continuation of the
‘moderate’ law-abiding course a group of some 400 militants left the NPD
and founded the extraparliamentary group Aktion Neue Rechte (Action New
Right, ANR) shortly thereafter.7 Between 1972 and 1979 the NPD became
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trine and, though itself unsuccessful, became a starting point of many right-wing extremist
activists of the 1970s (see Bartsch 1975; Dudek and Jaschke 1984).
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more and more run down. As electoral successes failed to materialise the
number of council seats decreased from 426 in 1971 to only thirteen at the
end of 1979 (Arndt and Schardt 1989: 287).8 However, the problems of the
NPD were not restricted to electoral support. The membership dropped dra-
matically and fluctuated around a mere 8,000 at the end of the 1970s. In a
final attempt to turn things for the better, the party leadership tried to come
to an agreement with Frey, who even became a member of the NPD in 1975
after having been guaranteed a nomination as vice-chairman by Mußgnug
and Von Thadden. But the membership was only short-lived. The nomina-
tion met with fierce resistance within the party and Frey was defeated at the
party conference. In the summer of 1976 he left the NPD, advising his read-
ership to vote CDU/CSU (Schmollinger 1984).
In the 1970s the law-abiding image of the NPD was badly damaged by
neo-Nazi terrorist groups that surfaced in its environment, especially that of
its youth movement, the Junge Nationaldemokraten (Young National
Democrats, JN). The many scandals resulted not only in a dramatic fall in
the membership figures of the NPD, but also in its electoral results. By 1971
the party had lost all its seats in the various state parliaments, generally
receiving around 3 per cent (Stöss 1991). At the end of the 1970s the ongo-
ing decay had reduced the NPD to a ‘less-than-one-per-cent-party’. The
decrease in both members and votes (and thus seats) also had a dramatic
financial effect on the party. Because of its low electoral support the NPD
often could not appeal for the so-called Wahlkampfkostenrückerstattung, i.e.
a state refund of the costs of the election campaign.9 As a consequence, it was
at the edge of bankruptcy on several occasions.
At the beginning of the 1980s the NPD tried to revitalise as well as
improve its image by founding regional single-issue parties. In 1980 the
Bürgerinitiative Ausländerstopp (Citizens Initiative to Stop Foreign Immi-
gration) was founded in North Rhine-Westphalia and in 1982 the Kieler
Liste für Ausländerbegrenzung (Kiel List to Limit Foreign Immigration) and
Hamburger Liste für Ausländerstopp (Hamburg List to Stop Foreign Immi-
gration) followed. These parties presented themselves as independent
protest movements with a single issue: foreign immigration. This had been
made into one of the most important issues of the NPD since 1979, under
strong pressure from the powerful JN. Nevertheless, the ideological renewal
could not stem the lingering malaise of the party. The membership decreased
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8 This was not only caused by internal factors. For instance, the end of the Grand Coalition
and the subsequent polarisation of domestic and foreign politics between the social-liberal gov-
ernment and the christian democratic opposition made it possible for (moderate) nationalist
right-wing voters to support the CDU/CSU again (Stöss 1988).
9 Since 1967 German political parties that gain a certain percentage of the votes in an elec-
tion, initially 2.5 and soon after 0.5 per cent, receive state funding of five DM per vote for the
party’s election campaign (Haller and Deiters 1989: 264; also Conradt 1989: 123).
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further and stabilised after 1982 at some 6,200. In the various state and par-
liamentary elections it remained well below 1 per cent. The once prospering
NPD, reservoir of German nationalism during the second wave of post-war
right-wing extremism, had become a sectarian group of militant outcasts.
The third wave of right-wing extremism would be caused and dominated by
two new political parties.
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chap2  28/5/02  13.31  Page 30
The ups and downs of a discorded party
While the NPD was slipping further and further into oblivion in the 1980s,
dissatisfaction was building up on the right of the Union parties. Their open
support for the process of European integration and hidden support for (or
at least acceptance of) the so-called Ostpolitik, the normalisation of relations
with the communist states initiated by former SPD premier Willy Brandt, led
to much criticism in as well as outside the parties. Originally, the protest was
voiced primarily within the CDU/CSU or through non-party political move-
ments (Jaschke 1994). In 1983 CSU leader Franz Josef Strauß supported a
credit of over ten billion DM to the German Democratic Republic (GDR),
in complete breach with the party’s long-term and radical opposition to any
measures that might stabilise the GDR economy. Several members left the
party in protest, among them two prominent Members of Parliament (MPs),
Franz Handlos and Ekkehard Voigt. Together with Franz Schönhuber, a
well-known Bavarian journalist, they founded a new political party on 17
November 1983: Die Republikaner (The Republicans, REP). Handlos
became leader of the new party, Voigt and Schönhuber his deputies.
In the beginning the party considered itself and was treated by the media
as a Rechtsabspaltung (right-wing breakaway) of the CSU (Pfahl-Traughber
1993). Handlos wanted to build the REP into what Strauß had always 
been threatening the CDU with, a bundesweite (federal) CSU, that is a right-
wing conservative party that would contest elections in the whole FRG 
and not just in Bavaria. Schönhuber also wanted a federal party, but he
wanted a more modern right-wing populist party, inspired by the electoral
successes of the French FN. The two fought a fierce power struggle in 
which Handlos accused Schönhuber of wanting to put the REP on a right-
wing extremist course. After a failed attempt to expel Schönhuber, Handlos
stepped down as party chairman and left the party, followed a year later 
by Voigt. At the Bundesparteitag (federal party meeting) in June 1985 Schön-
huber was elected chairman and Harald Neubauer, a former NPD member
and Frey-journalist, party secretary. This strengthened the allegations in the
2
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media that the REP was right-wing extremist instead of simply right-wing
conservative.
Franz Schönhuber has become the personification of the third wave of
German right-wing extremism.1 Born 1923 in a small rural village in Upper
Bavaria, he joined the NSDAP at the age of 18 and the Waffen-SS a year later.
During the war he served for the most time as instructor in the French
Charlemagne division. Even though Schönhuber fought only once in a real
battle (very briefly in Crete) his Waffen-SS experience would remain impor-
tant to him for the rest of his life (see Schönhuber 1989). After the war he
became a journalist, initially as sport reporter for a communist (sympathis-
ing) newspaper and later becoming chief editor of the Munich tabloid tz. In
the 1970s he changed to the Bayerische Rundfunk (BR), where he became
deputy editor of the television department. Moreover, as presenter of the
popular program Jetzt red i (Now I speak) Schönhuber became a famous 
personality in Bavaria. With his move to the CSU-dominated BR he 
became close to several leading party members (see Hirsch and Sarkowicz
1989: 20). In 1981 Schönhuber published an autobiography of his war-time
experiences entitled Ich war dabei (I was there), which led to a storm of 
negative publicity.2 Schönhuber was accused of trivialising the crimes of the
(Waffen-)SS and the Nazi regime. As a consequence, he was fired by the BR
in April 1982; it was this experience that led him to the CSU rivals REP.
At the beginning the REP could profit from dissatisfaction with the CSU,
which was a consequence of this party’s (alleged) abuse of power, patronage
and limited internal democracy (Pfahl-Traughber 1993). The membership of
the REP increased from 150 in November 1983 to 4,000 in February 1986,3
among them several local CSU-delegates. The party tried from the outset to
establish the image of a federal party. Although the REP had established
branches in all German states in 1987, except for Saarland, the majority of
the members lived in the two southern states of Baden-Württemberg and
Bavaria. After German unification in 1990 the REP organisation was
expanded by five new (and weak) state branches, though the situation did
not change much in the sense that almost half of the 1994 membership (45
per cent) still lived in the two southern states, with 32 per cent in Bavaria.
The REP experienced its first electoral test in the Bavarian state election
of October 1986. The election went surprisingly well for the party, even
though it stayed under the 5 per cent hurdle. Nevertheless, the 3.1 per cent
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1 On Franz Schönhuber, see Hirsch and Sarkowicz (1989); Leggewie (1989: 108–29);
Jaschke (1994: 94–103); Pfahl-Traughber (1993: 38–43); Dammann (1999).
2 At the same time it became a bestseller; in 1989 it had sold already over 130,000 copies
and was in its eleventh edition (Schönhuber 1989), while ten years later it was estimated to have
sold some 220,000 copies (Klußmann 1998).
3 Unless indicated differently membership figures and electoral results of the REP used in the
text are based on Backes and Moreau (1994: 77–103).
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brought it not only national media coverage but also 1.28 million DM
Wahlkampfkostenrückerstattung which it used mainly for the development
of its organisational structure (Backes and Moreau 1994: 83). Following this
successful electoral debut the party membership increased further, doubling
from 4,000 to 8,000 between December 1986 and December 1988. The
party failed to translate this upward trend in membership into votes, how-
ever. In September 1987 it gained 1.2 per cent in Bremen, in March 1988
1.0 per cent in Baden-Württemberg and in May 1988 just 0.6 per cent in
Schleswig-Holstein. In all cases the REP remained behind the scores of
‘other’ extreme right parties that contested the elections, the DVU and the
NPD. These electoral defeats intensified the general idea that the REP was,
as its mother party the CSU, a Bavarian phenomenon.
The year 1989 marked the electoral breakthrough of the party. In January
it won 7.8 per cent in the West Berlin Senate election, which brought it
eleven seats. This result came as a total surprise to both party insiders and
outsiders, as the REP never had a big membership in the Berlin area. More-
over, in the period before the election the local leadership had been so
divided that it was even thought that the party would not contest the elec-
tion at all. Commentators agreed that the massive media reaction to its elec-
toral campaign had been the main reason for its electoral success (see Haller
and Deiters 1989; Hartel 1989). Later that year the REP won 7.1 per cent
in the European election. The support for the party was distributed unequal
over Germany: in Baden-Württemberg it received 8.7 per cent, yet the
absolute stronghold was Bavaria with 14.6 per cent. The REP entered the
European Parliament with a six person parliamentary party, led by Schön-
huber, and joined the French FN (eleven delegates) and the Belgian VB (one
delegate) in the so-called ‘Technical Group of the European Right’ (see Fen-
nema and Pollmann 1998), a coalition of convenience rather than ideology.
Schönhuber had worked together with VB-leader Dillen to ease the FN away
from the MSI, with which party (and the Greek Ethniki Politiki Enosis;
National Political Union) the FN had constituted a full party group in the
previous period. Neither the REP nor the VB wanted to form a group with
the MSI, because of a territorial dispute over South Tyrol. Ironically, the FN
choose the REP for purely opportunistic reasons, believing that it would be
more successful than the MSI in the longer run.
The electoral successes were accompanied by an increase in membership,
from 8,500 in January to 25,000 in December 1989. Moreover, they
brought about a total REP mania in the German public opinion with hun-
dreds of editorials, articles and books being written about the party (Backes
1990a). Some authors predicted that the REP would become the fifth party
of the German party system and they saw themselves supported by voices
within the right-wing of the CDU/CSU, which declared the REP a possible
coalition partner (e.g. Müller 1989). Others were more sceptical, claiming
that the REP had only a small chance of survival in the long turn (e.g. Lepszy
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1989; Roth 1989). The successes also strengthened the debate on the char-
acter of the party: while some experts argued that it was still part of the
democratic right-wing (e.g. Backes and Jesse 1989; Lepszy 1989), the major-
ity considered the party to be part of the extreme right (e.g. Stöss 1991;
Pfahl-Traughber 1993). Especially within (extreme) left-wing circles, a com-
parison between the Bonn Republic of the 1990s and the Weimar Republic
of the 1930s became a topic of serious debate (e.g. Hirsch and Sarkowicz
1989).
As quickly as the successes of the REP had come, the defeats followed. In
the fourteen elections the party contested in 1990 and 1991, it never sur-
passed the 5 per cent threshold. In the case of the Bavarian state election the
party had been extremely close, gaining 4.9 per cent of the votes. The only
other reasonable scores were in the state elections in Saarland (3.3 per cent)
and the now united Berlin (3.1 per cent). In the first parliamentary election
after the 1990 unification the REP gained only 2.1 per cent of the votes; 2.3
per cent in the former West and 1.3 per cent in the former East (Backes and
Jesse 1993: 124). Even though the party was one of the first German
(extreme right) parties to try and ‘convert’ the former East Germans, it never
gained a real foothold (Pfahl-Traughber 1993). This might have been caused
in part by the fact that the REP had been banned by the last Volkskammer
(GDR parliament) between February and August 1990.
The ongoing defeats went hand in hand with a stream of quarrels, scan-
dals and splits. In the summer of 1989, for instance, the leadership of two
state branches, Berlin and North Rhine-Westphalia, were collectively dis-
charged from their office (Pfahl-Traughber 1993). In 1990 the internal divi-
sion climaxed in an open power struggle between the ‘moderate’
Schönhuber and the ‘extremist’ Neubauer.4 In May Schönhuber stepped
down as party chairman as a result of ongoing criticism of his authoritarian
style of leadership and populist style of politics by (‘extremist’ members of)
the party executive. However, a majority of delegates at the party meeting
reinstated him as party chairman two months later. In a later purge of
extremists by the party leadership, Neubauer and various of his supporters
were either expelled or discharged from their leading function. The symbol
of the new leadership was the new vice-chairman Rolf Schlierer, a young and
well-educated man with a national-conservative background. Schlierer had
left the REP shortly in 1988 in protest at its radicalisation, but returned in
1989 to lead the council delegation in his hometown Stuttgart (Backes and
Moreau 1994). All in all, the party had become more homogeneous but also
smaller: its membership had dropped to 20,093 in December 1990 and
16,843 a year later. As a consequence of the ongoing electoral defeats, the
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and was generally considered heir to Schönhuber (see Backes and Jesse 1993: 298–9).
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defections to the Deutsche Liga für Volk und Heimat (German League for
Ethnic Community and Heimat, DLVH),5 and the storm of negative public-
ity, the REP was considered doomed to disappear at the beginning of the
1990s (see Roth 1990).
Despite the gloomy predictions, the REP returned with a blast in the state
election of Baden-Württemberg in April 1992. Under the leadership of
Schlierer, the party gained 10.9 per cent of the votes and, with fifteen seats,
became the third largest party in the state parliament. Again it was proven
that the REP was primarily a southern phenomenon: on the same day it
gained a mere 1.2 per cent in the state election of Schleswig-Holstein. The
electoral success in Baden-Württemberg led to the same public reaction as in
1989. However, the expected REP-avalanche did not follow and the party
was again doomed to die. The results in the following elections remained
under the 5 per cent threshold, though the REP had been extremely close in
the Hamburg Bürgerschaftwahl (state council election) in September 1993,
gaining 4.8 per cent. The lack of electoral successes led to new internal dis-
putes between ‘moderates’ and ‘radicals’, which were strengthened by the
mounting pressure of the German state. In December 1992 the Federal
Home Secretary had decided to put the party under the surveillance of the
Bundesverfassungsschutz (Federal Bureau for the Protection of the Constitu-
tion) at the repeated request of states that already observed the REP (North
Rhine-Westphalia and Hamburg in particular). The REP reacted furiously to
the decision and tried to contest the decision in several courts (VSB 1994).
Though the decision was more widely accused of being politically motivated
(e.g. Jaschke 1994; More 1994), the REP was officially listed as right-wing
extremist in 1994 (VSB 1995).6
During the Superwahljahr (super election year) 1994 the REP contested
the parliamentary and European elections, eight state elections and local
elections (Kommunalwahlen) in ten states (see VSB 1995: 144–8). It started
rather well, gaining 3.7 per cent in the Lower Saxony state election (an
increase of 2.2 per cent), but soon fell back to 3.2 per cent in the European
election and between 1.0 and 1.5 per cent in various Eastern states. Even the
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5 In January 1991 the Neubauer group had founded a new political party, the Deutsche
Allianz-Vereinigte Rechte (German Alliance-United Right-Wing), which on 3 October that year
changed into the DLVH. The goal of the party was the same as that of the NPD in 1964, to
unite the scattered nationalist camp. The DLVH started well: it was supported by several non-
party political groups within the extreme right, among them the influential journal Nation [und]
Europa, and various delegates from the REP (as well as from the NPD and DVU) joined (Wagner
1992). Among these were three of the five former MEPs of the REP, which under the leader-
ship of Neubauer became the German representative of the Technical Group of the European
Right. Despite the good start, the party never posed a serious threat to the REP (or DVU).
6 In 1999 the REP is still officially registered as an extremist organisation, and is consequently
observed by the Federal and all State Bureaux for the Protection of the Constitution, except for
those in Berlin and Rhineland-Palantine (Frankfurter Rundschau, 27 March 1999).
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state election in homeland Bavaria brought only 3.9 per cent. In October the
REP gained a mere 1.9 per cent in the parliamentary election. In the simul-
taneous state elections in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Thüringen and Saar-
land it gained between 1.0 and 1.5 per cent. Only the regional elections in
Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate brought the party some min-
imal local successes.
Electoral fiascos and state monitoring were probably the reason for
Schönhuber’s remarkable rapprochement with his old enemy Frey. On 22
August 1994 the two party leaders issued a joint communique announcing a
new cooperation between the REP and the DVU. The party leadership was
totally bombshelled by Schönhuber’s one-man show: had not both he and
the party always distanced themselves openly from the ‘extreme right DVU’?
In a hastily convened meeting they dismissed Schönhuber as party leader.
Even though not everybody supported the immediate dismissal of Schönhu-
ber,7 the Bundesparteitag of December approved the step and elected
Schlierer as new party chairman. He had to watch Schönhuber supporter
and former CDU MP Rudolf Krause being elected convincingly as one of the
five vice-chairmen however. Having been ruled in an authoritarian style for
almost ten years by Schönhuber, the alleged Führerpartei had dismissed its
Führer.
The next year revolved predominantly around the ongoing struggle
between the camps of Schlierer and Schönhuber (see Backes 1996). Increas-
ingly, it became a struggle between two different visions of party politics, i.e.
a ‘united right-wing’ (Schönhuber) or an independent party with clear dis-
tance to the ‘extremists’ (Schlierer). Schönhuber’s sudden retirement from
the party in November 1995 meant that Schlierer had won a battle, but cer-
tainly not the war. The internal quarrels had cost the REP many seats and
had reduced the membership to some 16,000 at the end of the year (VSB
1996). In addition, the series of unsuccessful state elections, in Bremen and
North Rhine-Westphalia the REP remained even under 1 per cent, did little
to strengthen Schlierer’s position.
The Baden-Württemberg state election of 24 March 1996 were the litmus
test for Schlierer’s power within the party. At various times he had stated
that he would resign as party chairman if the REP would not be reelected to
the state Parliament. Against most expectations, the party and its leader suc-
ceeded in their task, gaining 9.1 per cent of the vote and fourteen seats (VSB
1997: 124). This was also the only election that year in which the party was
successful; though it did almost double its support in Rheinland-Phalantine
(to 3.5 per cent). The Baden-Württemberg result did enough to keep
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7 Schlierer said, in a interview with the author on 24 May 1995, that he had wanted Schön-
huber to stay on until the parliamentary election to limit the electoral impact of the affair, as
Schönhuber had already promised not to contest the election for party chairman at the party
meeting.
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Schlierer in power; at the first post-Schönhuber party meeting, in October
1996, he was reelected by 77 per cent of the delegates, and got his preferred
team of vice-chairpersons approved (Nandlinger 1996).
The next year the REP was able to consolidate itself, most notably in terms
of finances, during 1996 the party had received some 4.5 million DM from
the state (Backes 1997: 138), and in terms of membership, which went
slightly up from 15,000 in 1996 to 15,500 the next year (VSB 1998). At the
same time, Schlierer’s leadership remained disputed and electoral results
remained disappointing – at the Hamburg state council election the REP
dropped from 4.8 per cent in 1993 to just 1.8 per cent (VSB 1998). The next
year the party remained again well below the 5 per cent threshold in various
state elections. Particularly in the Bavarian ‘homeland’, where it had been
polled above the 5 per cent benchmark before the election day, the actual
result of 3.6 per cent meant a rude awakening, even more so because the
party had not faced competition from the DVU. Still even more painful was
the Saxony-Anhalt election, were the REP was completely overshadowed by
the DVU’s record 12.9 per cent.
The parliamentary election of 27 September did not end the loosing streak
either: the REP gained a mere 1.8 per cent. Schlierer tried to interpret the
result in a positive vein, hailing the increase in the actual number of votes
(from 875,000 to 905,000) and the fact that the Republicans remained the
leading party in the right-wing spectre (as the DVU and NPD got even less
votes). This notwithstanding, the electoral results meant that the criticism
against Schlierer and his Abgrenzungsstrategie returned to the centre of the
party discussion (e.g. Braasch 1998; Moreau and Backes 1998). Vice-chair-
man Christian Käs became Schlierer’s most outspoken opponent, openly
challenging him for the party leadership. But a few days before the party
meeting of November 1998, Käs withdrew his candidature and Schlierer, the
only remaining candidate, was reelected with 81 per cent (VSB 1999). Nev-
ertheless, Schlierer had again to accept Käs as one of his five vice-chairper-
sons, and, probably under the great pressure of his challenge, met DVU
leader Frey and agreed that the two parties should not unnecessarily com-
pete with each other (Nandlinger 1998; Pfahl-Traughber 1999). Notwith-
standing the DVU’s absence, and despite the traditional optimistic
predictions of the party leadership, the June 1999 European election turned
out dramatically for the REP, as it gained just 1.7 per cent. In anticipation of
inevitable new attacks on his leadership, Schlierer explained the disappoint-
ing outcome as the result of voter disception by the Union parties and of the
(EU-wide) non-voting by Eurosceptics.
Throughout its existence, the REP has tried to build a strong and broad
political organisation, including a variety of auxiliary organisations. Only on
paper has the party succeeded. The official youth organisation, Repub-
likanische Jugend, founded as an Arbeitskreis (working group) in 1990, is
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organised in just five of the sixteen federal states. It includes all party mem-
bers between the ages of sixteen and thirty, which is estimated at approxi-
mately 200 (Moreau and Backes 1998: 159). The student organisation,
Republikanische Hochschulverband, has an even more limited reach. Except
for the two seats it won in the Marburg university parliament in 1997, of
which it lost one already the next year, very little has been heard of it
(Moreau and Backes 1998: 160). The Republikanischer Bund der öffentlich
Bediensteten or Republikanischer Beamtenbund (Republicans League of
Civil Servants), was founded in October 1993 in reaction to the 1992 deci-
sion of the German state to officially register the REP as right-wing extrem-
ist. The initiative could not prevent the exodus of civil servants, most
notably police officers, from the REP, however, and in 1998 its membership
was estimated at a mere 150 (Moreau and Backes 1998: 160). The women
organisation of the REP, the Republikanischer Bund der Frauen (Republicans
League of Women), finally, is probably the smallest and least important.
According to the webpage8 it was founded on 26 August 1995, became an
official auxiliary organisation of the REP two months later, and has ‘over 70
per cent female members’.
The REP has never been very active in establishing contacts with other
parties in and outside of Germany. This was in part because it originally did
not want to ally itself with ‘contaminated’ parties, i.e. parties officially reg-
istered as extreme right, whereas ‘democratic’ parties did not want to ally
themselves with the contaminated REP. Within Germany the party has vir-
tually always kept its distance from parties like the NPD and DVU. Interna-
tionally, it had a short alliance with the FN and VB, which ended after the
1990 ‘split’ when these parties accepted the group-Neubauer instead of
Schönhuber as member of the Technical Group of the European Right.
Schönhuber has always looked favourably upon the FPÖ, especially when
Jörg Haider took over, but the Austrians kept their distance. During the first
years after the fall of communism the German Republikaner were the inspi-
ration of several short-lived initiatives in countries such as Hungary, Ukraine
and Latvia, with which Schönhuber was also in contact. The contacts with
the only successful East European Republikaner, the Czechoslovak (and later
Czech) Sdruzeni pro Republiku – Republikanska strana Ceskoslovenska
(Association for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia), were
terminated in 1993 due to the increasing anti-German rhetoric of its leader
Miroslav Sladek9 (Dvoraková 2000; Kopecky 1999).
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9 Schönhuber once described the leader of the Czech party, Miroslav Sladek, as a ‘Deutschen-
hasser’ (German hater). See his interview with Backes and Hertel (1996: 144).
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Profiling the literature
Externally oriented: programmes
The so-called ‘party without a programme’ (Hirsch and Sarkowicz 1989:
23) has actually issued no less than seven national programmes in its first six-
teen years of existence. Especially in its first years the programme was not
only changed often, but also comprehensively. The programme of 1985 was
a break with the original programme on several points, in part as a result of
the succession of Handlos by Schönhuber. During these early years the self-
image of the REP changed from being an ‘independent, conservative-liberal
people’s party’ to that of a ‘society of German patriots, a freedom-loving
[freiheitliche] and national party with high social and ecological obligations’
(since 1987).
The original programme, entitled Grundsatzprogramm (Party of Principle,
REP 1983) was adopted at the first Bundeskongreß (federal congress) on 26
November 1983. It contained sixteen A4 pages in which seventeen themes
were discussed. The programme opened with a preamble, stating the party’s
democratic credentials, self-definition and (ten) main theses. At the Siegburg
party meeting of June 1985, Schönhuber was elected party chairman and a
new programme was accepted: Das Siegburger Manifest (The Siegburg Man-
ifesto, REP 1985). It ran to just four pages, covering a total of nine points.
Except for the difference in tone, which had radicalised, the new programme
differed more in what was left out than in what was left in.
The 1987 Programm der Republikaner (Programme of the Republicans,
REP 1987) was of similar size as the 1983 programme (fifteen pages), yet
was more similar to the 1985 manifesto in tone. The structure was com-
pletely new, entailing seven basic principles and ten main points. Under the
pressure of the rapid developments in the (former) communist states and
their consequences for East–West relations the REP revised its programme
again in January 1990. The theme of the Parteiprogramm (REP 1990) fol-
lows clearly from the text on the title page: ‘Our Adherence: Germany; Our
Goal: Restoration of Germany; Our Demand: Berlin – Capital of Germany’.
It entails a preamble, following the theme, and twelve chapters in which var-
ious topics are generously elaborated and well structured on the basis of var-
ious lists of demands. All together the programme runs to a total of
fifty-seven pages (A5 format).
In 1993 the REP again adopted a new programme, entitled Wir machen
uns stark… für deutsche Interessen (We do our best… for German interests,
REP 1993). It is quite similar to the 1990 version, though almost twice as
thick (100 A5 pages). It now contains eighteen chapters, primarily as a con-
sequence of a restructuring of the themes. Some chapters are accompanied
by the note ‘This chapter will be revised by the party council, according to
the resolution at the federal party meeting of 26/27.06.1993, and will be put
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before the next party meeting for decision-making.’10 The new programme
was a reaction to two different events: the unification of Germany and, even
more important, the Maastricht Treaty. As a consequence of the latter, Euro-
pean politics has its own chapter. The preamble has been extensively rewrit-
ten by the late Hellmut Diwald and opens with a sentence that would
become his legacy within the REP: ‘He who does not take his right, gives it
up’ (REP 1993: 3).
The 1998 parliamentary election were contested with a ‘short version’ of
the programme, conveniently called Partei-programm (Kurzform) (REP
1998).11 This pamphlet had a similar form as the DVU-programmes, i.e. one
A4 page, printed on both sides, and folded twice. Despite the radical 
change, i.e. from one hundred pages to some six page sections, the short pro-
gramme did cover the main themes of the party. For the European election
the next year the REP used a more professional programme, Deutschland
und Europa (Germany and Europe, REP 1999). It entailed thirty-one 
A5 pages, in which the party discussed thirteen different topics with a 
special European focus.
Internally oriented: party paper
The official party paper of the REP was originally called Der Republikanische
Anzeiger (Republican Informant, RA). It looked grim, appeared monthly, and
originally contained four, later mostly eight pages (A3 format). Schönhuber
started as chief editor, being succeeded by Neubauer in October 1985. In
January 1986 the paper was renamed Der Republikaner (The Republican,
Rep). Except for the new name, nothing substantial changed in content or
style and also the counting of years of publication was maintained. After Sep-
tember 1988 the paper usually consisted of ten pages.
The power struggle between Schönhuber and Neubauer in 1990 had its
resonance in the make-up of the editorial board of the paper. In May 1990
Schönhuber was listed as publisher and Ralph Lorenz as chief editor. The
next issue named Hans Dorn and Johanna Grund (then MEP) as publishers
and Karl Richter as chief editor; one issue later no publisher(s) was listed,
though Richter was still chief editor. The address of the paper had changed
from Munich to Landshut. The next journal which the various subscribers
received had the same (unlisted) publisher and (listed) chief editor, but was
named Deutsche Rundschau (German Review). It was presented as the suc-
cessor to the Rep, including the same lay-out and counting. At the same time
the REP leadership continued to publish the Rep, though through a new pub-
lishing company and with Schönhuber as both publisher and chief editor.
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The Deutsche Rundschau would soon after become the official party paper
of the DLVH, before being absorbed by Nation [und] Europa in 1994.
In April 1992 the Rep was enlarged in both format and size. The paper got
an additional two pages, making a total of twelve, of which two were filled
with advertisements for an increasing range of party products (such as ban-
ners and lighters with the party logo). In January 1994 the logo again con-
tained the three colours of the German flag (yellow, red and black).
Moreover, the whole paper was more colourful, thereby making it less
sombre and more professional. After the struggle between Schlierer and
Schönhuber in 1994, the party got into serious organisational and financial
problems, which also had their impact on the party paper. While the appear-
ance remained largely the same, from January 1995 the Rep appeared only
as a bimonthly with just four pages. The setback was overcome already the
next year, when the paper returned to its original format (i.e. a monthly of
eight pages). In the summer of 1997 it was renamed Der neue Republikaner
(The New Republican); barring some small details (such as the reintroduc-
tion of colors), it remained identical to its predecessor.
The RA had always been printed in an edition of some 30,000 copies. The
Rep’s second issue already had a total claimed circulation of 80,000. This
figure has been unstable though, fluctuating around 70,000 in the late 1980s
and 85,000 in the early 1990s. As a consequence of the 1994 internal party
struggle, the circulation of the Rep dropped sharply, stablising at some
20,000 in 1997–8 (see the annual VSB). The party deemed the months
before elections particularly important and the circulation was increased
heavily. Before the Bavarian state election of 1986, for instance, the number
of copies of the Rep rose from 100,000 in June to 650,000 in October (the
election month). In the month of the 1987 Bremen state election the circu-
lation was increased to 300,000. The all-time record was reached in the
month of the parliamentary election of 1990: 4,000,000 copies were said to
be printed. Except for the occasional increase in the circulation of the
normal party paper, the Rep also published a few special issues concerning
forthcoming elections.
From national-conservatism to extreme right
Nationalism
The primary ideological feature of the party literature is and always has been
nationalism. It is telling for the political climate in post-war Germany and
the cautiousness of the REP, that the party always denied being nationalist,
rather calling itself ‘national’ or ‘patriotic’. This notwithstanding, the REP
can without any doubt be labelled nationalist. There are even strong indica-
tions of an ethnic nationalist outlook. For one, the REP believes that man is
a Gemeinschaftswesen and can only develop fully within a community. It
identifies various complementary communities, ranging from the smallest,
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the family, to the largest, the Volksgemeinschaft (ethnic community). This
latter is considered to be the most important and should decide over its own
affairs. This is most clearly depicted in Diwald’s introduction: ‘The sover-
eign ethnic community finds its political will in the nation, which releases its
internal and external form in the state’ (REP 1993: 3). 
However, the ethnic community is defined in a both ethnic and state
nationalist manner. For instance, some contributors to the party paper argue
that membership of the ethnic community is to be defined on the basis of the
individual’s adherence to the ethnic community (Rep 9/87), while others
define this adherence in an almost völkisch (ethnic) way: ‘The instinctive
bond to the own ethnic community can develop in perfect form only when
one is born into it, is raised in it and so from childhood on identifies with it,
thus, so to speak, taking solidarity in with one’s mother’s milk’ (Rep 11/87).
This stringent definition of nationality expresses the position of the party
accurately. The REP often criticises the alleged ease with which German
nationality is given to foreigners. To ensure successful assimilation it pleads
for restricting German nationality to foreigners that are genuinely prepared
to dedicate themselves to the German nation ‘as if it was their own’ (Rep
11/87). Among other elements, this includes renouncing the old nationality
(REP 1993: 22). The most positive statement on (large-scale) assimilation
was made by Schönhuber, who acknowledged that the ethnic communities
in Central Europe have mixed and that good Germans have come from that
(Rep 7/88).
The demand for German (re)unification has always featured prominently
in the party literature. From the beginning the REP has defined German uni-
fication as its highest goal. The 1983 programme presented a three-phase
plan for the realisation of German unification,12 which would lead to a
Gesamtdeutschland (All-Germany), by which the party at that time seemed
to refer only to the FRG and GDR. Over the years the topic was voiced more
impatiently and aggressively. The 1987 programme stated: ‘The illegal,
unnatural and violent crumbling of the German ethnic community and its
country in the heart of Europe is a danger to world peace and a humiliation
of the people’ (REP 1987: 3). Though the party welcomed the 1990 unifi-
cation it considered this only a first step in the process of full unification that
would eventually lead to a Germany having the borders of 1937. Within this
vision the 1990 merger was considered a ‘small reunification’ of West Ger-
many and Mitteldeutschland (Central Germany).13 The real East Germany
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are the parts of the ‘German Reich’ that lay behind the Oder-Neiße border,
i.e. the so-called Ostgebiete in Poland, Russia, Ukraine and the Czech 
Republic. Hence, the REP continued its demand for unification and for new
negotiations and treaties with the eastern neighbouring states ‘with the goal
of a peaceful completion of German unity including East Germany’ (REP
1993: 9).
The claim to reinstate the ‘German Reich within its 1937 borders’ has
always been based on legal rather than nationalist arguments. The REP
argues that these are the borders that are (still) recognised by international
law. It speaks of the ‘legally still existing German Reich’ (REP 1990: 10).
Hence it considers the acceptance of the Oder-Neiße border by the German
government, as part of the two-plus-four treaty that formed the legal basis
of the German unification of 1990, a violation of international law. In its
Deutschlandpolitik (Germany politics) the party ‘appeals to the directive of
the constitution and to the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, which
hold that everything should be done and nothing should be refrained from,
that leads to the unity of Germany’ (REP 1990: 4).
Though the party at times uses nationalist arguments for German unifica-
tion it is not consistent in its demand for external exclusiveness. According
to the ethnic nationalist tenet, all nationals have to live within the state
(Koch 1991). The REP regards various groups outside of the aspired
German state as part of the German ethnic community and nation (Austri-
ans, South Tyroleans and so-called Siebenbuerger Sachsen that live in Roma-
nia), yet does not strive for the inclusion of these people or their territories.
In general, the party limits itself to arguing that the FRG should protect the
German character of these groups, for example through the introduction of
an autonomous area and by pressuring the state in which they live.
The party does strive consistently for internal homogenisation, aptly
expressed in its slogan Deutschland den Deutschen (Germany for the Ger-
mans). Consequently, ‘Germany is not allowed to become an immigration
country’ (REP 1985: 1), meaning that the multi-cultural society is rejected
and foreign immigration is to be limited in both the number of people and
the period of stay. The party supports the Swiss model of foreign labour,
which is said to mean that ‘(f)oreign workers are allowed to take jobs that
are impossible to employ by Germans and only according to a temporary
contract and without family members’ (Rep 10/86). Originally, the party
wanted the right to asylum to be reserved, under certain conditions, for real
political asylum seekers (among whom it counted, for example, Afghans). In
1992, during the big asylum debate in Germany, the party reversed its posi-
tion, stating that the fall of communism had made European asylum seekers
impossible and, as refugees should be received in their own cultural envi-
ronment, de facto excluded the possibility of legal asylum seekers in Ger-
many (e.g. Rep 1/92). Even the civil war in Bosnia and the Kosovo ‘crisis’ did
not lead to a change in the party’s situation, as in both cases the REP vehe-
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mently opposed the (generous) adoption of refugees from the former
Yugoslavia.
In exceptional cases foreigners are allowed to stay in Germany: first, for-
eigners who fully integrate (or better: assimilate) into the German society,
though they thereby technically cease to be foreigners; second, temporary
guest workers who have to leave after their contract expires; and, third, the
occasional genuine refugees who have to leave as soon as the situation in
their country of origin is safe again. During their stay in Germany all for-
eigners will be treated as guests, which means hospitably but without certain
rights. Most notably, the party opposes the right to vote for foreigners,
including those from other EU-countries.
The position of so-called Aussiedler – immigrants of German descent that
lived in the ‘lost territories’ and who are by German law considered German
citizens – causes the party an interesting nationalist dilemma. On the one
hand, it considers them to be Germans, thus having the right to live within
the German state. On the other hand, they have become fused with their
Heimat (outside of the FRG) and, moreover, if all Aussiedler would leave,
the territories might be really forever lost to Germany. Nevertheless, despite
pressure from its electorate, which considered them as ‘normal’ asylum seek-
ers (e.g. Betz 1990, 1994), the REP has generally championed the rights of
the Aussiedler to settle in Germany and has often criticised the poor condi-
tions under which they were received (blaming them on the fact that sham
refugees take most of the budget).
In conclusion it is difficult to decide whether the REP is an ethnic or state
nationalist party. As far as the party literature holds elaborations of the
nationalist ideology they fit the ethnic nationalist tenet, emphasising the
importance of the ethnic community and putting it over the state. Its nation-
alism is also mainly voiced in ethnic terms such as Volksgemeinschaft and
Heimat. But at the same time the party accepts the possibility of successful
large scale assimilation (at least in the past) and the fact that large parts of
the German ethnic community live outside of the German state. So even
though the REP adheres foremost to an ethnic nationalist ideology, it is nei-
ther elaborated nor applied rigidly.
Exclusionism
As the REP is almost exclusively centred on Germany and the German ethnic
community, a feature like ethnopluralism is seldom openly present in the
party literature. One of the few instances is a pseudo-scientific discussion on
the naturalness of xenophobia and ethnopluralism, which referred to work
of prominent representatives of the (inter)national new right, such as
Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeld (a former student of Konrad Lorenz) and Alain de
Benoist, intellectual head of the French nouvelle droîte (Rep 10/88). In gen-
eral, however, vague hints of an ethnopluralist view can be derived only
from the desired model of Europe.
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The first programme had fully supported the ongoing process of European
integration, striving for ‘a core Europe with one or more European coun-
tries, to become in the long term to one federal state’ (REP 1983: 11). The
party later changed to a more anti-EC course, however, distancing itself
increasingly from the existing form of European cooperation. Instead of the
alleged ‘United States of Europe’, a Bundesstaat (federal state), it supported
a ‘Europe of United States’, a Statenbund (confederal state) (Rep 2/87). The
ideal type of a future Europe is most often referred to in the famous term of
De Gaulle, a ‘Europe of Fatherlands’ ending at the Ural and the Bosphorus
(REP 1993: 3); some authors, most notably Neubauer, preferred the term
‘Europe of Ethnic Communities’ (Europa der Völker). As none of the
authors actually bothered to elaborate the different concepts, the argumen-
tation behind the desired concept(s) of Europe remains vague, although they
are all supposed to refer to the same model of Europe, i.e. a limited degree
of cooperation on a limited range of policy fields between sovereign nation-
states.
Throughout its existence the REP has regularly been accused of racism
and anti-Semitism. Despite this, explicit evidence of these features cannot be
found in the literature, although the illegal nature and strict monitoring of
these features by the German state might well have pressed them ‘back-
stage’. Nevertheless, even these are hard to find, except perhaps circuitously,
and there have been just a few vague indications of a possible racist vision in
the paper, which were almost exclusively by one author.
The issue that has raised most dust is the alleged anti-Semitism. Given its
past it is understandable that Germans are particularly sensitive to anti-Semi-
tism. Nevertheless, this has led to a climate in which almost any criticism of
Israel or Jewish organisations and representatives have led to suspicions of
(at least latent) anti-Semitism, especially when the critique comes from
alleged right-wing extremists. This was also how Schönhuber defended him-
self against accusations of anti-Semitism after a public argument with Heinz
Galinski, then leader of the Central Council of Jews in Germany. After
having listed a number of ‘good Jews’, he continued: ‘However, I do not like
to have to like mister Galinski. Next to the Berlin zealot Galinski, who per-
manently demeans our ethnic community, the Viennese Wiesenthal looks
almost like Nathan the Wise’ (Rep 12/88).
This notwithstanding, there are indications of at least a conspiracy think-
ing with respect to Jews in the party literature, which is one form of anti-
Semitism, and there are regular attacks on Jewish organisations, which are
accused of an anti-German attitude. There are also regular references to a
very powerful Jewish lobby in the US, as well as to powerful pro-Israeli
European and German politicians (mostly of Jewish descent). Regarding
Israel the paper paints a picture in which Germany keeps paying the Jewish
state, yet will never be forgiven. These themes featured prominently in arti-
cles on the Waldheim-affair and the Gulf War. In a discussion on the latter,
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Israel was described as Stichwortgeber (provider of key words) and world
opinion leader (Rep 3/91). Overall, there is some evidence of a latent anti-
Semitic outlook in the literature, albeit not really prominent and very cau-
tiously expressed.
Xenophobia
Throughout the years immigration has developed into one of the major
topics in the party literature, and most notably in the party paper. Whereas
the first programme had addressed the issue relatively calmly, claiming that
the ‘foreigner issue’ had become a ‘foreigner problem’ (REP 1983: 16), the
later programmes spoke of ‘the flood of foreigners’ (REP 1985: 1) and
‘migration of the ethnic communities’ (REP 1993: 22). This shift towards a
xenophobic view on immigrants and immigration had already been visible in
the party paper which under the leadership of Schönhuber and chief editor
Neubauer had become more negative and radical. The paper changed its
critical though generally constructive style of commenting on (primarily
Bavarian) politics for a negative and pessimistic preaching of doom and
damnation for future Germany:
Mass unemployment, problems with a flood of foreigners, left-wing extremism,
increasing crime, decay of value-consciousness, and a constitutional state that is
on the retreat, build the ingredients of a volatile mix, which could explode
around our ears already tomorrow. Kreuzberg [a Berlin area with a lot of immi-
grants] may not be everywhere yet, though it might already be also there, where
it has not burnt – yet. Only the spark is missing. (Rep 6/87)
Even though the tone became harsher the paper remained in general quite
cautious, using writing tools such as rhetorical questions (e.g. ‘Is the FRG
becoming oriental?’) and including articles in a neutral style which substan-
tiate, on the basis of official figures, a trend which is deemed negative in per-
spective (e.g. ‘More and more asylum seekers’).
Xenophobia is most visible in the articles on asylum seekers. Already in
the 1980s the REP paid attention to this topic, which at that time was of
little importance to the broader political debate in Germany. During the
1990s the number of asylum seekers that came to Germany increased heav-
ily and after several violent attacks on refugee shelters the topic dominated
both the public and political debate for months (see Tränhardt 1995). After
the major German parties had come to an agreement on a more strict law on
asylum in December 1992 (the so-called Asylkompromiß), the topic disap-
peared from the political agenda. The REP tried to keep the issue alive, how-
ever, arguing that the new law should be implemented more strictly as still
too many Scheinasylanten (sham refugees) were coming to Germany. More-
over, the issue was used to prove the political power and success of the REP,
which argued that the tightening of the law had always been a key point of
its political programme, and that the stricter law was the result of the party’s
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growing support and the consequent fear for electoral defeat by the major
parties. It also claimed that the issue proved that all accusations of right-wing
extremism and racism against the party were false, since the established par-
ties had actually enforced the programme of the REP.
The issue of the asylum seekers itself has always been presented in a blend
of xenophobic, financial, legal and law and order argumentations, and is
linked to almost every plague of modern society: crime, drugs, aids, unem-
ployment, etc. (e.g. Rep 1/89). Moreover, practically all articles on the issue
portray asylum seekers as imposters and criminals. The neutral term Asylbe-
werber (asylum seeker) is used only sporadically and the party favours the
more derogative term Asylant or even Scheinasylant (see Cohn-Bendit and
Schmid 1993: 239–40). The general picture that is drawn in the party paper
is that of a ‘Storm on Europe’,14 i.e. millions of alien, criminal and lazy for-
eigners that come to Europe (most notably Germany) to enjoy the good life
at the expense of the European people (e.g. Rep 6/90).
Xenophobia is also directed at particular groups of immigrants, most
notably the Muslims. The latter are portrayed as not (willing to be) inte-
grated and fundamentalist, creating their own sub-cultures from which they
try to expand all over Europe. Xenophobia is also one of the reasons behind
the party’s tough stand on naturalisation. A ‘subtle’ hint to Islam can be
found in the elaboration to the demand to integrate, which includes ‘also
giving up exaggerated national-religious behaviour, which disturbs the
peaceful living together within our society’ (REP 1993: 23). Moreover, if the
law on naturalisation is not toughened Germany could be containing an
increasing number of ‘Germans’ that in case of an emergency would either
flee or would defend foreign interests. This is, for instance, suggested by an
article on the Gulf war in which the author points to the fact that the Pales-
tinian foreign workers in Kuwait either fled the country or chose the Iraqi
side (Rep 10/90).
Not only the foreigners that live in the country are seen as a (potential)
danger to Germany; So are those living outside the country. The REP con-
siders the international environment particularly hostile to Germany. This is
in part a legacy of the Second World War, though the fact that certain limi-
tations to the sovereignty of Germany are still not abolished proves (to the
party) that the former allied countries (the US in particular) treat contem-
porary Germany with hostility too. It even suggests that the Allies had not
been concerned that much with Europe’s liberation, but rather with fifty
years of Germany’s occupation (e.g. Rep 10/87). A prime example of the
international anti-German climate is the so-called ‘enemy state clause’, arti-
cles 53 and 107 of the United Nations (UN) charter, which according to the
REP holds that the allied forces may still decide on the destiny of Germany.
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The supposed alliance of the Western Allies with Germany during the cold
war has not changed this. According to the party they still limit Germany’s
sovereignty and are ‘practising a partly open, partly hidden occupying law
behind the shield of friendly partnership’ (REP 1990: 2). The cold war is
seen as the other main reason for the country’s secondary status in the
world.
We Germans are the muzzled dancing bears of the political world arena, which
are one time rewarded with cinnamon bread and then the other time disciplined
by the whip. The animal trainers are in New York and Moscow. (Rep 2/87)
It is because of this hostile international environment that Germany should
take care of its own interests first. ‘We Germans can safeguard our right to
life only when we think of ourselves again on the principles of the protec-
tion of national interests’ (REP 1985: 1). This credo is taken furthest in
regard to agricultural policy, where the party argues that Germany should be
wholly self-reliant in the production of its food. The party states repeatedly
that looking out for the interests of one’s own ethnic community does not
mean threading on those of other countries. It simply means, as Schönhuber
stated in his often quoted speech to the Siegburg party congress, ‘Andere
Völker achten wir, unseres aber lieben wir’ (We respect other ethnic commu-
nities, but we love our own; REP 1985: 1).
Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty opposition to the EU has
become one of the main themes of the party literature. The REP uses a wide
variety of arguments to express its anti-EU sentiments. In accordance with
its belief in a hostile international environment the REP refers to the Maas-
tricht Treaty as ‘Versailles without weapons’, indicating that the treaty signi-
fied another capitulation of Germany. The financial arguments all come
down to the big difference in the amount of money Germany pays to and
receives from the EU. A strange blend of chauvinist and sanitary argumen-
tation is used in the struggle against the deletion of the German Reinheitsge-
bot (purity injunction) and against the EU policy on environmental
protection and food rights, the alleged sole purpose of which is to bring Ger-
many to a lower level in these fields (Rep-Sonderausgabe I/89). The anti-EU
repertoire of the REP has also been expanded by some mainstream argu-
ments such as, for instance, the democratic deficit, EU centralism, the loss of
German sovereignty, and the unequal representation in the EP (e.g. REP
1999).
Socio-economic policy
A topic on which the REP changed considerably during the years, at least 
in its rhetoric, is socio-economic policy. The party has taken its policies for
a large part from its mother party CSU, supporting the so-called soziale
Marktwirtschaft (social market economy). Socio-economic policy consti-
tutes one of the most widely elaborated themes in the programmes. Under
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several different headings the party applauds the advantages of the liberal
economy in combination with state protection of special groups (families,
persons with a disability, the elderly and pensioners). However, the social
market economy can be preserved only by making several budget cuts, pri-
marily limiting the size and thereby the costs of the bureaucracy and state
subsidies (inter alia, to international organisations). Excluded from these
austerity measures are the farmers, as Germany has to remain independent
from other countries in its supply of food (REP 1983: 15).
In its early years the party paper devoted much attention to the theme of
protecting the interests of the German farmers. Later it also started to cham-
pion the protection of the Mittelstand (middle class), in part to distinguish
itself from (other) right-wing parties, the FDP in particular, which were
accused of favouring big corporations. The programme called for the pro-
tection of German small businesses against foreign competition (especially
from low-wage countries), big corporations and monopolisation (REP 1987:
11). According to the REP, small businesses are the backbone of the econ-
omy, providing for the bulk of the employment in Germany (e.g. Rep 3/86).
The socio-economic programme further called for a ‘social order, which
provides the individual with all opportunities for development, in which
individual responsibility and self-help are the first commandments and in
which communal support for the needy is secured’ (REP 1987: 7). This
social order will have overcome the class struggle and will result in social
peace. However, this can only be realised by a change in consciousness, so
that all working people regain the feeling of solidarity, and by the creation
of a Leistungsgemeinschaft (achievement-oriented society). Finally, employ-
ment policy should combine ‘the right to a job or state support’ with ‘the
duty to work’ (REP 1987: 11).
Throughout the years the REP started to address the interests of the lower
classes more and more. At least two factors strengthened this in the 1990s.15
First, German unification created a pool of socially weak potential voters in
the former Eastern states. Second, Klaus Zeitler, a former SPD mayor for
twenty-two years in the Bavarian city of Würzburg, joined the REP and
quickly became a prominent author in its paper. His articles principally
stressed working-class interests, exposed social abuses, and charged the top
of the SPD and labour unions with egocentrism at the expense of the work-
ing man. The new social image even touched Schönhuber, who argued that
the fall of socialism should not mean the triumph of capitalism (Rep 6/92),
though it nevertheless clashed with the neo-liberal rhetoric, which still
existed on many other issues. Hence, in the 1990s the paper’s socio-eco-
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nomic politics became an amalgam of socialist policies and pleas for budget
cuts and state subsidies, presented in a neo-liberal style.
The Leitmotiv of the socio-economic policy has become welfare chauvin-
ism: German money should be used for German interests and German jobs
should be taken by German workers. Everything non-German, including
immigrants, the EU and most notably asylum seekers (not Aussiedler), was
portrayed as taking much needed money away from the Germans. To pro-
tect its own people, especially the working class, the party therefore pre-
sented a welfare chauvinist programme in which budget cuts were made
with respect to non-German causes and more money was to be invested in
upholding a decent level of welfare and employment for the German people.
Ethical values
One of the favourite topics of Schönhuber has always been the decadence
which prevails as a consequence of the ongoing liberalisation of society. In
one of the first issues of the paper he named examples of the increasing deca-
dence, such as AIDS, women wrestling and corruption, and then stated: ‘We
Republicans call for resistance! It concerns the life of us and our children.
We demand: Stop any further and deadly liberalisation!’ (RA 3/84). The gen-
eral argument is that the process threatens the existence of the German
ethnic community by decreasing the birth rate. The only way out is a return
to traditional values, most notably family values:
Dear fellow-countrymen: Thank God wars no longer decide on the future of a
nation, but birth rates. We can only restore our national and regional identity
when we make the family the centre of our life again, support it morally and
materially. (Rep 10/90)
The party rarely discusses ethical issues in detail, however, and, although
they come up in every issue of the paper, they are mostly part of broader sto-
ries on immigration, Umerziehung (re-education) or on the established par-
ties. The programmes mainly include demands on the issues of family
politics and abortion. Though the number of demands was expanded
throughout the years, the party neither changed its position nor radicalised.
The basis for its family politics has always been a favouring of state protec-
tion of marriage and family (e.g. REP 1998). The concept of the family
applies to heterosexual couples and should not be enlarged to include homo-
sexual or lesbian couples (REP 1993: 27). To create a more family friendly
climate the state should offer financial incentives. However, more important
is a change in mentality, away from the materialist egoism towards commu-
nal solidarity (e.g. REP 1993: 68).
A relatively moderate position on ethical values is generally upheld. For
instance, the REP calls for the protection of the unborn child through a ban
on abortion, though it allows for abortion ‘in case of rape (criminological
indication), hereditary damage (eugenic indication) and danger for mother
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or child (clinical indication)’ (REP 1993: 29). The section on media politics,
which opens with a very liberal agenda (stressing support for freedom of
speech and press, plurality, etc.), calls for enforcement of the few restrictions
(i.e. contradictions to democracy, human dignity and the values of the ethnic
community) mainly through media self-regulation (REP 1993: 79–81).
There are two issues on which the party holds a somewhat ambiguous
position: religion and gender relations. Despite the fact that the REP origi-
nated as a ‘CSU-split’ the first two programmes did not once mention the
issue of religion. The 1987 programme speaks of a system of upbringing and
education that is rooted in German, Christian and abendländische (occiden-
tal) culture and history and which operates independently of confessional
values (REP 1987: 2). The next programme includes a chapter on ‘Church
and Religion’ that starts with the famous idiom of Johann-Gottfried Herder,
‘ethnic communities are the thoughts of God’ (REP 1990: 30), and calls for
‘Christian patriotism’, claiming that the preservation of Christian values and
tradition is of paramount importance for the future of Germany. The 1993
programme is less explicit on Christian values, which now seem to have
become fully integrated into the ‘occidental culture’ from which the party
claims to have taken all its inspiration (REP 1993: 93).
This is not to say that the REP holds a particularly favourable position
towards Christian institutions. On the basis of liberal convictions of the sep-
aration of Church and state and religious freedom, the party demands the
abolition of Church tax (REP 1993: 93). Moreover, it considers the German
Churches to have become infiltrated by left-wing and anti-national forces.
The fact that various religious leaders have been engaged in actions against
the REP has worsened the situation. The programme introduced the demand
that ‘(t)he pulpit should not be misused for political propaganda and for a
one-sided influence on religious voters’ (REP 1990: 31).
The first programme also included a special section entitled ‘Equal Rights
for Man and Woman’ in which the party pledged to dedicate itself to ensure
that the law was put into practice. To send a signal it would award ‘an appro-
priate number of political mandates within the party’ to women (REP 1983:
5). The next programme, though more conservative in many respects,
upheld the claim of equality and explicitly stated that ‘equal work should get
equal pay’ (REP 1985: 4). In the 1987 programme the support for equal
rights for women was combined with a traditional view of the woman as
mother.
Under similar circumstances and demands, woman and man are, despite their
difference in essence, of equal competence in life and work. However, it is in
particular given to the woman to create by warmth and devotion the safety, in
which family and children can prosper. Herein lies the exceptional vocation of
the woman, which cannot be fulfilled by any ‘househusband’ or collective. (REP
1987: 8)
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To keep women from getting swamped with responsibilities and work or
frustrated from not having a family and children, the REP wants to
strengthen the position of the housewife and mother. Among others, the
party wants the state to actively support this policy by providing school girls
with an education as woman, mother and housewife (REP 1987: 9). This
position was later softened, though the REP kept opposing feminism and the
Gleichmacherei (levelling) of man and woman. In political and social
respects, man and woman should be treated equally in terms of rights, not
in character. The party does accept working women, claiming equal pay for
equal work as well as demanding more part-time jobs, job sharing and busi-
ness kindergartens (REP 1993: 31). In addition, it calls for the introduction
of the job of ‘housewife and mother’ (REP 1993: 31).
Strong state
A popular topic in the literature of the party is law and order. Except for the
1987 version, all programmes contain (large) sections on law and order poli-
cies. To stress the importance of the topic the 1990 programme stated: ‘We
Republicans are the party of law and order’ (REP 1990: 13). It further
includes demands for a better equipped police force, which has to be
enlarged in both personnel and powers, and is to be supported openly by
politicians. Sentences should be higher, especially for crimes relating to
drugs and the environment, and the victim instead of the perpetrator should
be at the centre of attention (e.g. REP 1993: 16–22). The party in general,
and Schönhuber in particular, has always opposed the death penalty on eth-
ical grounds. It also takes a tough stand on (primarily left-wing) terrorism,
which is embedded in the official German state policy of streitbare
Demokratie (militant democracy). According to the party terrorism is caused
in part by the ‘general lack of legal security and community spirit’ (REP
1987: 15).
Crime always received a lot of attention in the party paper, although over
time it became more and more a secondary theme, featuring in articles that
dealt primarily with foreigners, asylum seekers or with (critique on) the
established parties. In the 1990s the party shifted its focus to a new group,
the non-organised left-wing extremists (or so-called Autonomen). As they
often demonstrated against and even attacked meetings of the REP, the party
demanded tough repression of these groups. After left-wing extremists had
violently disturbed an official state ceremony, Schönhuber reacted partly
with malicious joy, partly misunderstood: ‘Now German top politicians have
experienced personally what it means to underestimate the left-criminal
scene. We have had to suffer this scene for years, and received support of nei-
ther the media nor the political establishment’ (Rep 11/92).
The party position on defense has always been quite moderate. In the few
articles on the topic the party showed no signs of a militarist outlook. The
REP generally supports the army, arguing specifically for the upgrading of its
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(low) status, yet at the same time takes a cautious approach to the expansion
of weapons and armies. In relation to the Gulf war it rejected war as a means
of politics, accusing the allied forces of not having exploited all diplomatic
possibilities, and the media of covering the war too positively and clinically
(e.g. Rep 1/91). Similar reactions were expressed during the wars in Bosnia
and Kosovo.16
In 1991 the question of a professional army was the topic of the party
paper column entitled ‘controversy’. Arguing in favour of a professional
army was former General Reinhard Uhle-Wettler, while against it vice-chair-
man Schlierer claimed that the army would no longer be anchored in
German society and might become a state-within-the-state (Rep 7/91). The
REP sees military service as peace service though it has become more
favourable to a general year of state service, of which military service is just
one possibility (e.g. REP 1993: 10)
The issue of defense features only secondary in the programmes too,
where it is linked mainly to the ever-changing position on NATO. In 1983
the programme pleaded for full incorporation of Germany into NATO as
well as for more European cooperation in defense politics (albeit with close
cooperation with the US). The next programme included no explicit refer-
ences to either NATO or defense. In 1987 loyalty to NATO was made
dependent upon the condition that its interests were similar to those of the
German ethnic community (REP 1987: 3), and the 1990 programme added
the demand for more German control over its own territory and people.
After reunification little support for NATO seems to remain. The REP wants
NATO to be converted into an ‘all-European security structure, in which
Germany keeps its sovereignty’ (REP 1993: 9), even though the party is very
sceptical about the current attempts at creating such a structure within the
EU (REP 1999: 22).
Populist anti-party sentiment
A theme which clearly combines and guides all ideological themes is that
constituted by the critique on the established parties and politicians. The
REP criticises political parties extremely harshly, targeting all major parties
alike, both government and opposition. However, the party does not reject
parties per se and always presents itself as an alternative, which differs from
the others in almost all possible ways, but which is nevertheless a political
party. That said, the REP does reflect a wide variety of populist anti-party
sentiments. Most notably, parties and politicians are portrayed as egocentric,
corrupt and anti-national.
In the first years the REP predominantly attacked its Bavarian rival and
mother party, the CSU, accusing this all-mighty party in Bavaria of despo-
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tism and corruption. When the party began to contest elections outside of
Bavaria, its main target was expanded to include the CDU. Lacking ideas,
the CDU/CSU had first incriminated the REP, then stolen its ideas, and
finally presented these ideas as their own. In the 1990s the party also increas-
ingly aimed its arrows at the SPD and, to a lesser extent, at the FDP and the
Greens. The SPD is portrayed as a party dominated by teachers and social
scientists, which has betrayed the German working class. Moreover, its 
support for the multi-cultural society and the process of European integra-
tion is characterised as a betrayal of the legacy of its first post-war leader,
Kurt Schumacher, a nationally oriented socialist who is seen as a hero by 
the REP.
A special place in the anti-party sentiments is reserved for the competitors
on the extreme right. From the time when the REP competed with the DVU,
this party and especially its leader Frey have been targets of many verbal
attacks. Frey is accused of only being nationalist for the money and is
referred to with descriptions like ‘the Munich-based merchant in NS-devo-
tional objects’ and ‘the property speculator’ (e.g. Rep 2/89). In a reaction to
the REP’s defeat in the Bremen state election of 1987 the paper claimed 
that Frey’s Spalter-Liste (splitter list) contested the election with the sole
purpose of keeping the REP from success and so protecting the CDU, with
the obvious approval of the latter (Rep 10/87).
At the beginning of the 1990s state monitoring was becoming more and
more a reality for the REP. Consequently, allegations of extremism grew into
one of the main issues in the party paper. These allegations were portrayed
as part of a conspiracy of the established parties against the REP, out of fear
of the latter’s inevitable electoral success. It spoke of a ‘pogrom mood
against the Republicans’ and claimed that a plan to morally destroy the party
was ready, containing four phases: disinformation, monitoring, alleged
proof, and a request for a ban on the party (Rep 11/92). However, it always
felt assured that the ‘decent Germans’ would see right through this conspir-
acy and would support the party even more.
Most anti-party articles are accompanied by or end with a positive refer-
ence to the REP, the only viable alternative. Everything the other parties are
accused of doing, the REP either does not do or can undo. It portrays itself
as the only party that has the ideas and the people to govern the country
through these ominous times and, more importantly, that has the confidence
of the people. This is not that surprising, it argues, as most disasters are a
consequence of the fact that the old parties have ignored the warnings of the
REP. This line of reasoning was used particularly in its defense against alle-
gations of providing ideological fuel to the arsonists of refugee homes in vil-
lages like Hoyerswerda in the early 1990s.
We Republicans are the only party in the new states which can master the his-
torical task of keeping deluded young people from slipping to the radical and
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violent scene. The established parties have lost their credit over there. Hoyer-
swerda is an alarm signal. (Rep 10/91)
The paper also features many articles that exclusively contain (positive) ref-
erences to the REP. Usually these articles are (based on) the quotations of
outsiders, such as politicians of other parties and journalists, which state that
the REP is not an extremist party. One of the most stunning aspects of the
pro-REP articles are the many predictions of its bright future, again gener-
ally based on external sources.17 The party went furthest in blowing its own
trumpet where (then party leader) Schönhuber was concerned. Numerous
headlines and articles cheered his rhetorical talents and the fascination of the
masses with his speeches. In fairness, many of these were (verbatim) citations
from other newspapers, ranging from the left-wing Frankfurter Rundschau
to the right-wing Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, though the party paper
itself was by far the most jubilant. On his sixty-fifth birthday, it wrote:
Schönhuber has kept standing where others fell or left. What would kill the
weaker was confirmation and reinforcement to him. There are no pauses for the
man who runs from appointment to appointment, and as a rhetorical locomo-
tive pulls whole election trains. (Rep 1/88)
The central tenet of the party’s anti-party sentiments is the anti-national
behaviour of German politicians, most notably the way they are seen to
misuse German history against Germany and its people, but primarily
against Schönhuber. In this respect, he still fights a war over the reactions to
his book. A general feature of the many articles on this topic, most often
written by Schönhuber, is the outing of the ‘brown [Nazi] past’ of people
who have in the eyes of the party indulged in anti-national behaviour. They
are generally not attacked because of their past actions, as they only did their
duty, but because of their present denial or concealment of them. Two of his
main targets were the then German President Richard Von Weizsäcker and
the then Austrian President Kurt Waldheim. The articles are presented as a
fight of the little man against the establishment: whereas the former has been
punished too harshly during the process of denazification (like Schönhuber
himself), the latter has escaped punishment. Schönhuber’s favourite remark
is related to the hypocrisy of the elite and holds that it is impossible that
from 80 per cent of National Socialists under Hitler came 90 per cent of
resistance fighters after Hitler.
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Democracy
Several authors have claimed that the REP is anti-democratic according to
the German constitution (e.g. Jaschke 1994; Pfahl-Traughber 1993). This
claim is difficult to substantiate on the basis of the party literature. Nowhere
in the party paper, for example, can one find an open rejection of (German)
democracy or fundamental aspects of it. One of the few possible indications
of a surpressed extremist character is a remark by Schönhuber that contrary
to sectarians like Neubauer and the NPD the REP ‘has to consider the exis-
tence of a certain political environment, however, without thereby allowing
that programmatic basic principles are abandoned. The Bureau for the Pro-
tection of the Constitution is – however one may judge its actions – a real-
ity’ (Rep 1/91). Still, this is hardly evidence to prove the party’s extremist
character. On top of that, the whole party literature is larded with statements
in which the REP counters allegations of extremism and radicalism. A
favourite slogan in this respect is ‘We are radicals only in one aspect: In the
defense against extremism of both left and right’ (e.g. Rep 7/85). There are
two examples that the party never fails to mention to prove its democratic
credentials. First, double-membership of the REP and any extremist organi-
sation, i.e. organisations officially listed as extremist by the Bundesverfas-
sungsschutz, is illegal according to the party statute. Second, the REP has
been purged of all extremists at the Ruhsdorf party meeting of 1990 – by
which they refer to the expulsion of the Neubauer group.
The democratic credentials can, however, best be taken from the various
concrete measures the party supports. Over and over again the REP stresses
its democratic character in articles in the party paper and sections and intro-
ductions of the party programmes. The first thesis of the 1983 programme,
entitled democracy, states:
We Republicans trace back our existence to the old-Roman ‘res publica’. We
want to serve the state and not to make money out of it. All thinking and actions
are to be directed at a society of emancipated citizens in a republic, in which
conservative and liberal principles complete each other. (REP 1983: 3)
All election programmes further include a variety of demands to strengthen
the rights to political cooperation of the citizenry, such as the popular elec-
tion of the Federal President and the introduction of referendums of differ-
ent kinds, especially on topics concerning the sovereignty of the German
state, i.e. German reunification and European integration (REP 1993: 5).
The 1990 programme, which opens with an avowal to all aspects of the offi-
cial definition of German democracy (as mentioned in the constitution),
includes the new demand for a strict separation between private and public
means and positions for politicians (REP 1990: 6). Moreover, the REP has
always been favourable to compromises and power sharing, calling it a
democratic virtue, not a sin: ‘Our goal has to be and remain, to take part in
the parliamentary expression of the will’ (Rep 8/91).
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Revisionism
One of the topics that regularly features in the party literature, most often
in columns of Schönhuber, is the so-called Umerziehung (literally re-educa-
tion) and Vergangenheitsbewältigung, the official dealing with the German
Nazi past. According to the party these are aimed at keeping Germany small
and silent, so that the superpowers can continue to dominate world politics.
Even in the post-Schönhuber era the REP considered the issue important
enough to address it in the introduction of the party programme. Linking
past and present, the party proclaimed
The mental Babylonian imprisonment of the established parties and large parts
of the society as a consequence of the stigmatisation and criminalisation of the
German history has led to the situation that many important law proposals were
not accepted or existing laws were not implemented. (REP 1998)
In the early years the last page of the party paper contained an overview of
books recommended by Schönhuber (and available through the party),
which mainly dealt with German history, the Second World War, and the
‘lost territories’. In articles and book reviews the party presented a moder-
ate and circuitous revisionist view on the Second World War. It rejects Ger-
many’s Alleinschuld (sole guilt), claiming that France and mainly the Soviet
Union had forced the country to war. Believing that the latter country had
been at the verge of invading Germany, the REP considers the German inva-
sion of the Soviet-Union a Präventivschlag (preemptive strike) (e.g. Rep
7/91). It further vehemently rejects the thesis of the Kollektivschuld (collec-
tive guilt) of the German people, claiming that the typical German could not
have known of the Nazi’s atrocities. The fall of the Berlin wall and the con-
sequent unification of Germany have strengthened the REP in demanding an
immediate stop of the (legal) Vergangenheitsbewältigung (e.g. REP 1990).
The favourite topic of Schönhuber in this respect has always been the
defence of the German soldiers that served in the Second World War, par-
ticularly those of the Waffen-SS, like himself. Quoting several (former)
politicians of the main parties Schönhuber argued over and over again that
the Waffen-SS had been more similar to the regular German army, the
Wehrmacht, than to the Nazi-loyal SS. Though in general condemning the
NS regime and confirming its atrocities, Schönhuber at times sounded oblig-
atory or reluctant. This notwithstanding, there are no indications that he (or
the party) supports the NS regime or fundamental aspects of its ideology and
actions. The only exception to this is perhaps the ideal of a Europe of
Nations, which he claims to have experienced in the Waffen-SS (see also
Schönhuber 1989).
Though Schönhuber was the main author of the moderately revisionist
articles, he was certainly not the only high-ranking member of the REP that
held these views. The earlier programmes had been very cautious in this
respect, explicitly stating that the end of the legal Vergangenheitsbewältigung
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would not mean that war criminals would no longer be punished (REP
1983: 12). The 1987 programme, however, openly rejected ‘the absurd
thesis of the “collective guilt” of the German people over generations’ and
demanded the complete opening of all archives ‘to clear the “single guilt”-
thesis’ (REP 1987: 3). And the party deemed the (past) treatment of former
German soldiers important enough to be addressed in the 1990 programme:
‘We demand the rehabilitation of 27,000 German soldiers, who were
unjustly convicted as prisoners of war in short trials in the Soviet Union in
1949/50 (!)’ (REP 1990: 12). The underlying sentiment seems to be personal
rather than political and can best be summarised as: ‘Our fathers were no
criminals’ (Rep 7/91).
Conclusion
The REP originated as a conservative party, ideologically close to its mother
party CSU. Its first programme contains a moderate nationalist outlook,
allowing room for support of the EC, NATO and Third World countries. Its
socio-economic policy entailed full support of the social market economy,
combining a fairly open economy with the protection of specific groups
(most notably farmers and elderly people). The programme is generally set
in a very moderate and general tone and even the policy towards foreigners,
though restrictive, is not presented in a xenophobic style.
The party radicalised shortly afterwards, with the take-over of Schönhu-
ber as party leader and Neubauer as chief editor, expressing an increasingly
nationalist and xenophobic outlook. However, both cautiousness and super-
ficiality kept the party from a clear and elaborated ideology. Instead, the REP
literature contains parts and often starts of a (mainly ethnic) nationalist ide-
ology that is exclusively applied to the own situation. At the core is the
nationalist demand for an independent and culturally homogeneous German
state. This state is neither inhabited with only ‘ethnic’ Germans (as assimila-
tion is accepted) nor all Germans (as some ‘ethnic’ Germans live in other
countries, like Austria).
Xenophobic nationalism is at the core of almost all themes that are dis-
cussed regularly in the party literature. Its socio-economic outlook, for
example, has the two ideological features combined in a welfare chauvinist
programme, stating that the German state should take care of (the socio-eco-
nomic needs of) its own people. Nationally this means work for the own
people and internationally it means cooperation but without the loss of
much sovereignty. The party holds an extremely xenophobic view on the
world in which foreigners within and outside of the country are seen as a
hostile threat. This is closely linked to the struggle for national revival and
pride, leading to (moderate) revisionism and (intense) populist anti-party
sentiments. Though the REP puts a lot of attention on the ongoing process
of degeneration, its views on ethical values are moderately conservative.
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Finally, the REP is a democratic party, in that it supports parliamentarianism,
and even militant democracy, and strives for acceptance and power within
the current German political system.
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The whims of an extreme right business man
One of the most influential people in the German post-war extreme right
scene is Gerhard Frey, the multi-millionaire media czar who owns and pub-
lishes several newspapers (see Müller 1989: 66–74; Backes and Jesse 1993:
295–7; Mecklenburg 1999b). Born in 1933 into a traditional national-con-
servative merchant family, Frey first worked for the Deutsche Soldaten-
zeitung (German Soldiers Newspaper, DSZ) and later bought 50 per cent of
its stock. During the 1960s his publishing company acquired the rest of the
stock and Frey became both publisher and chief editor of the newspaper
(Mayer 1998: 185). He bought several other right-wing newspapers and
journals, among them several journals of the Vertriebenen (expellees), and
shares of various others, among them the influential nationalist monthly
Nation [und] Europa (Sippel 1989).
Under his management the DSZ was renamed several times before getting
its current name Deutsche National-Zeitung (German National Newspaper,
DNZ) in 1968 (Sippel 1989; Virechow 1999). It grew from an almost bank-
rupt monthly with about 9,000 readers into a flourishing weekly with
around 80,000 readers. With it Frey’s own position rose to that of a power-
ful voice within extreme right Germany. In 1971 he enlarged his media
empire even further by buying the Deutscher Anzeiger (German Informant,
DA) and founding a new publishing company, owned by his wife. The FZ-
Verlag publishes several ‘revelation’ books, often edited by Gerhard Frey
himself or his son Gerhard Frey Jr. In 1985 the company was expanded by
a book service, the Deutscher Buchdienst, and a year later by a travel agency,
the Deutsche Reisen (Sippel 1989; Linke 1994). The same year Frey acquired
the Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung (German Weekly Newspaper, DWZ), which at
the end of 1990 absorbed the DA.
In January 1971 Frey founded the Deutsche Volksunion e.V. (German
People’s Union, DV), a registered association without a party licence, as a
successor to the already diminishing Aktion Neue Rechte (ANR). Among the
thirteen co-founders of the DV were leading members of various nationalist
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and expellee organisations, as well as local leaders from right-wing parties,
such as the CDU and the Bayernpartei (Braasch 1996). The organisation
described itself as a ‘supra-party political collection of freedom-loving and
law abiding citizens’. A year later Frey founded the Freiheitlicher Rat (Free-
dom Council, FR), an umbrella organisation of several extreme right (and
revisionist) groups under his own leadership. The FR organised the anti-Ost-
politik ‘March on Bonn’ of April 1972, which was attended by some 5,000
people (Stöss 1991: 194). It was also supposed to prepare the foundation of
a new party, the Deutsche Nationalpartei (German National Party), which,
however, never materialised (Sippel 1989).
During the 1970s Frey founded several specialised ‘action groups’, which
were able to absorb a substantial part of the rapidly diminishing NPD mem-
bership. The various groups worked together in the FR and called them-
selves Vereinigte Freiheitliche (United-Freedom Loving), after 1976
National-Freiheitliche. In the beginning of the 1980s Frey restructured his
organisation: the various groups (and their members) became part of the
umbrella organisation DV.1 In the mid 1990s the Frey imperium was restruc-
tured once again, and this time only four organisations remained: the polit-
ical party DVU, the political organisation DV, and the ‘action groups’
Initiative für Ausländer-Begrenzung (Initiative to Limit Foreign Immigration)
and Ehrenbund Rudel – Gemeinschaft zum Schutz der Frontsoldaten (Rudel
League – Society to Protect Front-Line Soldiers). Although these organisa-
tions engage in virtually no activities, the umbrella organisation DV has 
been the biggest (officially registered) right-wing extremist movement in
Germany since 1980. That year the membership doubled from 6,400 in
1979 to 13,500.2 The next year it decreased somewhat, but until 1986 it
fluctuated around 12,000.
After the short and unsuccessful flirtation with the NPD in the mid 1970s,
Frey stayed away of party politics for almost ten years, devoting his time pri-
marily to the development of his media empire and political movement. At
the end of 1986, however, he decided to found his own political party, the
Deutsche Liste (German List). Surprisingly, he was helped by his old rivals,
the now sectarian NPD. After having used the name Deutsche Volksliste
(German People’s List) for a short time, Frey renamed his party Deutsche
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Volksunion-Liste D (German People’s Union – List D) on 6 March 1987, in
which D stands for Deutschland. In February 1991 it dropped the appendix
‘Liste D’, which was hardly noticed by the outside world, as the party was
generally referred to as DVU or Deutsche Volksunion.
The DNZ of 6 March 1987 opened with the headline: ‘New party to the
right of the CDU. The union of the nationals [Nationalen].’ Frey explained
his step into party politics as a reaction to the fact that the Wende (turning
back), promised by the newly elected CDU/CSU-FDP government in 1983,
had failed to materialise, and to the failings of the government in the areas
of Deutschlandpolitik (the politics of the FRG towards the GDR), internal
security and the immigration issue.
The DVU began its activities in Bremen and Bremerhaven with a ‘citizens’
request to limit foreign immigration’. In 1987 it also made an electoral pact
with the NPD leadership, despite fierce internal opposition within the latter
party (Sippel 1989). It was agreed that only one of the two parties would
stand in each election. For example, the DVU would contest the 1989 Euro-
pean election, whereas the NPD would contest the parliamentary election a
year later. They further agreed that the party that contested the election
would put candidates of the other party on its list. Everything considered the
agreement was primarily an alliance of two weak parties against a stronger
third party (the REP). It was also an alliance of money and cadre: the NPD
had cadre but no money, the DVU had money but no cadre.
Between 1987 and 1990 both parties profited from the alliance. In its first
ever election, the Bürgerschaftswahl (city state election) in Bremen of Sep-
tember 1987, the DVU gained 3.4 per cent. Because of the 5.4 per cent in
the constituency of Bremerhaven the party not only got two seats in the city
council, but was also the first (officially registered) right-wing extremist
party in twenty years that gained a seat in a state parliament. The electoral
success of the DVU had been preceded by a massive campaign, in which Frey
was said to have invested two million DM, more than SPD and CDU
together, and received only sixty-five thousand DM Wahlkampfkostenrück-
erstattung (Assheuer and Sarkowicz 1990: 36–7). Nevertheless, it had been
a successful dress rehearsal for the 1989 European election.
The DVU’s 1989 European election campaign was one of the most expen-
sive in German history. Frey paid no less than seventeen million DM, mostly
his own money, primarily for three national door-to-door deliveries of pam-
phlets with a total circulation of seventy million (Assheuer and Sarkowicz
1990: 37). This notwithstanding the DVU was completely overshadowed by
the REP in the election: the parties won 1.6 and 7.1 per cent respectively.
This political and financial fiasco, involving a loss of fourteen million DM,
led Frey to terminate the alliance prematurely. Despite the electoral misfor-
tunes the membership of the DV(U) grew from 18,600 in 1988 to 25,000 in
1989. In September 1991 the party returned from the dead, being re-elected
into the Bremen state council with six seats. The 6.2 per cent it gained made
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the DVU the third largest party in the council. In April of the following year,
the DVU repeated its success in Schleswig-Holstein, gaining 6.3 per cent of
the votes and six seats (against the REP’s 1.2 per cent). At the Hamburg state
council election in September 1993 the DVU was not able to continue its
success in the northern part of Germany. It gained 2.8 per cent, far less than
the 4.8 per cent of the REP, yet enough to keep the latter out of the council.
Surprisingly, the DVU did not contest any elections in the Superwahljahr
1994. The main reasons for the party’s abstention were the disappointing
results in the prior elections and the poor financial situation of the party (pri-
marily as a result of the first). The DVU was said to have debts of around
nine million DM, which were covered by the personal capital of the Frey
family (VSB 1995: 128). In addition, and following NPD leader Mußgnug’s
succession by former Frey rival Günter Deckert, the relationship between
the DVU and the NPD deteriorated into open hostility. Together with the
hopeless situation of the DVU, this led to the rapprochement with the old
enemy, the REP. Even though Frey had often attacked Schönhuber in his
newspapers, he had always kept open the possibility for cooperation. How-
ever, the consequent publicity led to the expulsion of Schönhuber as REP
leader, and his successor Schlierer immediately terminated the cooperation.
The inactivity of the party in 1994 cost the party dearly: its membership
decreased by almost one quarter to 15,000 the next year (VSB 1996: 153).
This notwithstanding, the DVU contested the May 1995 election in Bremen
with a costly campaign of, according to the party itself, some two million
DM (Mayer 1998: 196). The results were another setback, as the DVU lost
its representation in the state council, dropping to just 2.5 per cent. The next
year it was also voted out of the state parliament in Schleswig-Holstein, gain-
ing 4.3 per cent (Jesse 1997). In September 1997 the party was close to a
stunning comeback, failing the 5 per cent hurdle in the Hamburg state elec-
tion by only 190 votes (Stahl 1997; VSB 1998). The result of 4.97 per cent
did bring the DVU back into the spotlight though (see Mayer 1998). More-
over, it revived the debate on party political cooperation within the extreme
right camp. Frey targeted particularly the REP, hoping to come to some kind
of non-aggression pact with its leader, while at the same time wooing his
internal opponents. However, Schlierer did not budge and Frey found him-
self still isolated – the ‘moderates’ (e.g. REP) rejected his extremism, while
the ‘extremists’ (e.g. NPD) despised his pragmatism (and his businesses).
The next year the party knew both setbacks and successes. Regarding the
former, two of its state branches (Berlin and Brandenburg) left the party in
March, bringing the total number of state branches back to sixteen (VSB
1999). This notwithstanding, on 26 April 1998 the DVU celebrated its
biggest electoral victory so far, winning 12.9 per cent and sixteen seats in the
Saxony-Anhalt state election (Mayer 1998). This was the first time an offi-
cially registered extreme right party made it into parliament in a ‘new’ (i.e.
Eastern) state. The victory brought the party huge publicity as well as a true
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flood of new members (some 3,000). The period of euphoria lasted only a
short time though: on 27 September the party scored just 2.9 per cent in the
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern state election and got stuck at a mere 1.2 per
cent in the parliamentary election – despite the fact that the former REP fig-
ureheads Schönhuber and Krause headed the DVU lists as independents in
Bavaria and Saxony respectively (VSB 1999). In November 1998 Frey and
Schlierer finally met and the two agreed upon forming a strategic pact not to
compete in the Hesse and Bremen elections the next year. This narrowly
paid off in Bremen, where the DVU scored 3.0 per cent overall, but because
of the 6.0 per cent in Bremerhaven, it is for the third time represented in the
state coucil (with one seat; see Ohne 1999). On 13 June 1999 the DVU did
not contest the European election – these were left for the (unsuccessful)
REP.
Even though the DVU has had several (surprising) electoral successes in its
short existence, these were obtained with an existing but not functioning
organisational structure (see Mecklenburg 1999a). The party is and has
always been a ghost party. This is at first sight contradictory to the fact that
it is at the same time Germany’s biggest right-wing extremist party in mem-
bership figures. The membership figures peaked in 1992 at 26,734 to drop
to some 15,000 in the late 1990s (see the annual VSB). The high member-
ship is due to the fact that, since December 1988, all members of the ‘action
groups’ and movement DV have been automatically registered as members
of the party DVU. The membership is primarily built upon the readership of
the two extreme right newspapers though. Moreover, its membership is
ageing, as most members are believed to be older than sixty-five (Moreau
and Backes 1998: 153). More importantly, both papers, and in a sense also
the party and movement, are part of Frey’s business empire. This is also why
the party has always had major difficulties in finding (suitable) candidates for
elections and why it worked together with the more activist-oriented NPD.
The lack of cadre in combination with the authoritarian leadership of Frey
from his Munich headquarters has led to a desolate situation among party
delegates (Butterwege et al. 1997; Löblich 1998). From the six people who
were elected on the DVU ticket in Schleswig-Holstein in April 1992, for
example, only one was still a member a year later, while four of the other
five formed a DLVH faction (Backes and Moreau 1994: 62ff). In the Bremen
state council the situation was much the same (see Hoffmann and Lepszy
1998), while in Saxony Anhalt one quarter of the parliamentary faction had
defected within the first year (Löblich 1999).
Except for the occasional election campaign, often primarily fought by
mail, the DVU is at its most visible during its annual meeting in Passau, at the
border of Germany and Austria. There the party fights (and defeats) the city
council every year in a lawsuit to win the right to keep its so-called
Großkundgebung (big demonstration). The traditional meeting at the end of
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September is one of the biggest ‘extreme right’ meetings in Western Europe,
drawing between 2,000 and 3,000 visitors annually.3 Except for the party
leader and some other prominent members, there are always foreign speak-
ers, among them have been the Russian right-wing extremist politician
Vladimir Zhirinovski and the English revisionist David Irving (both of
whom have been banned from entering Germany since 1993). The speakers
are in general little known right-wing extremists though, such as (in 1994)
Robert Brock (leader of an obscure US black-nationalist movement) and
Hubert Verhelst (low-key delegate of the VB).
Profiling the literature
Externally oriented: party programmes
The party programme of the DVU is probably one of the shortest of all
German parties today. In addition, it is little more than a selection of points
from the programme of the non-party political DV, itself a collection of parts
of the programmes of its various actions groups. The party programme is not
only short, it is also unchanging. Since the foundation of the party in 1987,
the Programm der DVU-Liste D (DVU 1987) has consisted of twelve points
on a total of eight very small or five small unpaged pages, and during this
time its content has undergone no substantial alteration. Even the fall of the
Berlin wall, which forced political parties throughout Europe to rethink
their positions, had little effect on the DVU programme. Though the party
accepted a new Partei-Programm (DVU 1993) in August 1993, the few actual
changes in the programme were more reactions to the ongoing process of
European integration, most notably to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty,
rather than to the end of the cold war. The party has not changed its pro-
gramme since.
Nor has the party been very divergent in the content of its election pro-
paganda. In general the party programme functions as an election pro-
gramme, although the party used special election programmes in some
instances, most notably the 1989 European election. The core programme
for these elections, Schwerpunkt-Programm der DVU zur Europa-Wahl am
18. Juni 1989 (DVU 1989), was almost an exact copy of the party pro-
gramme, though with a particular focus on the European Community. Even
though the party often used the same slogans and material for different elec-
tions, its campaigns were certainly not cheaply run, and far more money was
spent than was received back from the state (see Haller and Deiters 1989:
270). As the party had only money and no activists, its election campaigns
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were primarily capital rather than labour intensive. The party often just
bombarded (special sections of) eligible voters with pamphlets (see Müller
1989: 75–9).
Internally oriented: Frey’s newspapers
As the DVU never published an official party paper, the newspapers of Frey
have served as the effective party press. Originally Frey published three
newspapers, but with the merger of 1991 only two remained: the Deutsche
National-Zeitung (DNZ), with the subtitle ‘freedom-loving, independent
and above parties’, and the Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung (DWZ), with the sub-
title ‘for national politics, culture and economy’. The two papers are almost
identical in style and content and are published weekly; the main difference
is in the timing and wording of the stories. They can be bought at newspa-
per stands, especially in railway stations, though the large majority of its
readership is by subscription.4 Until 1990, the DNZ and DWZ together had
a total circulation of well over 100,000 (Backes and Moreau 1994: 68). This
made them (together) the third best-selling weekly in Germany (Pfahl-
Traughber 1993). In the 1990s, however, the circulation seems to be in a free
fall, fluctuating between 55,000 and 60,000 at the end of the decade (see the
annual VSB). In 1999 the two papers merged.
Because of the similarity of content (and style) the two newspapers are
treated as one and the same in this analysis.5 The lay-out of both papers is
based on the German tabloids, especially its most popular representative
Bild-Zeitung. The papers generally contain twelve pages and are profession-
ally made with big headlines in red ink and a lot of pictures, tables and fig-
ures. The make-up of the papers is clear and consistent: the stories are
organised per issue on a page, there are regular features and several serials.
The papers are further filled with advertisements for (items of) the various
businesses of Frey: the last two pages are always reserved for the Deutscher
Buchdienst, which advertises a broad assortment of books, video’s, cassettes,
flags, medals, coins and maps. Moreover, many articles in the paper are
based on these books or are ended with a reference of ‘further reading’ to
one of these books (or to join one of the action groups within the DV).
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The style of writing in the newspapers is generally very cautious and sug-
gestive. Some of the more often used figures of speech are insinuations and
rhetorical questions: e.g. ‘Do foreigners have more rights than Germans?’
(DNZ 12/87). Frey and his papers have been prosecuted over 120 times and
yet have not once been convicted (Lange 1993: 73). The papers are primar-
ily concerned with the past instead of the present, even though they try to
relate the two. Most articles do not contain much ideological elaboration.
The papers present ‘facts’ and comment on them. The ideology is hidden in
the selection of topics.6 Many articles reappear in different issues through-
out the years and citations (often from books edited and sold by Frey him-
self) are used endlessly in both articles and issues.
Deutschland über alles!
Though a certain difference in content and style between the externally ori-
ented programmes and the internally oriented papers will be present with all
political parties, specific circumstances cause a particular difference in the
case of the DVU. The programme is the only genuine literature of the party
and is very concise but at the same time deals with various themes. The
newspapers, on the other hand, are extensive in number of issues and pages,
yet mainly address a few limited topics. Moreover, they are directed at their
own readership of which only a part are (also) members of the DVU. Hence,
the content of the party programmes will be at the centre of the description
of the party ideology.
Nationalism
The DVU is first and foremost a nationalist party. The struggle for a German
Germany is the only prominent feature in both sources of literature.
Whether the party is state or ethnic nationalist is impossible to decipher
from the literature. Though the party claims the right to a German Germany
it does not explicate the basis for this claim. Nor does it address the issue of
‘who is a German’. In general the language fits the ethnic nationalist dis-
course, with terms like Volksgemeinschaft (ethnic community), but the party
never elaborates on the meaning of the concept. It considers national sover-
eignty a Lebensrecht (right of life) and consequently argues:
Germany should remain the country of the Germans. The German ethnic com-
munity should receive the same rights as all other ethnic communities. This
includes the right to hereditary land, national identity and full sovereignty.
(DVU 1993)
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With the term ‘hereditary land’ the party refers to the territories to the East
of the Oder-Neiße border, including parts of Poland, Russia, Ukraine and the
Czech Republic. Though the terminology seems to indicate a clearly ethnic
nationalist argument, based on the feature of external exclusiveness, the DVU
employs almost solely legal arguments. It claims that the annexations of these
territories are in violation of international law and sees itself thereby sup-
ported by (the preamble of) the German constitution. In line with the legal
argument it wishes to arrange for the return of the territory exclusively by
peaceful means, i.e. through negotiations rather than war. In open contrast to
the nationalist argument of external exclusiveness is the fact that, like the
REP, the DVU feels closely related to the Austrians, which it considers to be a
part of the German Kulturnation, yet accepts the Austrian state (not the Aus-
trian nation). It does express the hope that the two states will one day rejoin.
The rights to national identity and full sovereignty are based on the notion
of internal homogenisation. The party wants the German state to be both
inhabited and governed exclusively by members of the German ethnic com-
munity. This means that the (few) foreigners that are allowed to live in Ger-
many should not be allowed to interfere in German politics. This is why the
party forcefully rejects the extension of the right to vote to foreigners, not
only for non-European guest workers but also for the citizens of the West-
ern allies, particularly of the three former occupying countries (France, the
United Kingdom and the United States). Again the argument is primarily
voiced in legal terms: according to the German constitution the German
people are sovereign and this should ‘thus’ not be changed.
The Maastricht Treaty has pushed opposition to the EU to the fore in the
party literature. This is particularly visible in the programme; where the
1987 version addressed the issue of European integration solely in relation
to agriculture, the 1993 version relates it to several fields. The EU is mainly
opposed on nationalist grounds. Though the party claims to support coop-
eration between European countries, it does not want this to be at the cost
of a loss of sovereignty on the part of the individual countries, most partic-
ularly Germany. In this respect the DVU seems to have given up on its desire
for a European alternative to NATO (DVU 1993).
Patriotism
The second most important ideological feature of the party literature is
patriotism: Germany first! At the core of several sections is the belief that
German interests, which means the interests of the German people, ethnic
community and state, should be the prime (and in fact only) interest of the
(West-)German government. This was expressed most clearly by Frey him-
self:
For us it is Germany that matters in the first place, it is Germany that matters in
the second place, and it is Germany that matters in the third place. Then there
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is for a long time nothing, and then we can talk about the interests of ethnic
communities that live 10,000 km away from us. (Sippel 1989: 176)
The patriotic policy is applied chiefly to foreign policy, and according to the
party all countries should follow such a policy. Germany should not inter-
fere in matters pertaining to other countries and other countries should not
interfere in German matters. This is the only way the Germans can win back
their full sovereignty, especially since the party believes that the country is
still treated as hostile by the outside world, and particularly by the UN which
is dominated by the anti-German Americans (see below). Financial transfers
to foreign countries, both Third World and European Union, should be
linked to the condition that the recipient countries are pro-German, i.e. sup-
port the right to an independent German state. Furthermore, German sol-
diers should not take part in UN missions or support foreign actions that do
not primarily lead to the good of Germany. This was argued forcefully
during the Gulf war, where the party distanced itself from the official
German policy of support for the UN and argued that Germany should sup-
port Iraq, as it is part of the Arab nation, the only true friend of Germany in
the post-war period.7
Except for articles that deal with attacks on anti-national people and
countries, there are a variety of positively formulated examples of patrio-
tism. Several articles on German accomplishments are even outright chau-
vinist. Virtually every German success in a major sporting event, for
instance, is mentioned on the front page of the papers (e.g. the world cham-
pionship in soccer in 1990 or the all-German victory at Wimbledon in
1992). There are also various small (neutrally formulated) articles on posi-
tive performances of German companies and quotations of (often foreign)
leading persons that are positive about (some aspect of) Germany. This
notwithstanding, the papers are always careful not to downgrade other
countries or explicitly to claim superiority of the Germans. In essence, the
fact is simply that the party is not really interested in anything other than
Germany and the German ethnic community.
Exclusionism
Although it is clear that matters of inclusion and exclusion in the German
nation are very important to the DVU there is virtually no reference to the
desired criterion for this process. For example, whether foreigners are
believed to be able and allowed to integrate (assimilate) into the German
community remains unknown, as this question is never addressed. Only very
occasionally does the party portray some signs of an ethnopluralist convic-
tion, as in a book review of Roland Tichy’s Ausländer rein (Foreigners In) in
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which the reviewer almost desperately remarks: ‘Does Tichy fail to see that
nature created people of different ethnic communities, and that those, who
want to change this inflict severe harm to the ethnic communities.’ However,
the reviewer knows the aim of Tichy: ‘the destabilisation of these ethnic
communities, so that the plan to de-Germanise [entdeutschen] Germany and
to lead it into a multicultural society still succeeds’ (DNZ 20/7/90). The main
cause for the ‘destabilisation’ is generally voiced in cultural rather than
ethnopluralist terms, pointing to the lack (or destruction) of ‘natural’ tradi-
tions and bonds.
Another example, pointing to the totally different approach of the party
towards Aussiedler and foreigners, is in the rhetorical question: ‘Do we want
a storm of millions of foreigners from often totally different cultures or the
reinforcement of people of German descent?’ (DNZ 11/5/90). This quote
aptly shows the style of writing and particular use of language in the papers:
first, it speaks of a negatively formulated Ansturm (storm) of foreigners,
which is then contrasted to a positively formulated Zuzug (reinforcement) of
the Aussiedler. Though not openly stated, it is clear that the fact that the
latter group is ‘of German descent’ and the former are ‘from totally differ-
ent cultures’ is the basis of the divergence in treatment: difference (of cul-
ture) means problems.
There have been even fewer hints at racism, and these appeared exclu-
sively in side stories, especially in reports of readers on trips to Namibia
(described by its German colonial name Southwest Africa) which are organ-
ised by Frey’s travel agency. In one report various remarks were made about
the inefficiency and stupidity in agriculture of the black population com-
pared to the white (DNZ 15/5/87). Another report, which wallows in nos-
talgia over the colonial past, states that ‘(i)n almost no black African state
does a functioning parliamentary democracy exist, because this is alien to the
African mentality and will also remain alien’ (DNZ 14/4/89).
Revisionism
While open revisionism is primarily visible in the newspapers, the first pro-
gramme also included a call for a general pardon for all war criminals and a
rehabilitation of all front-line soldiers (DVU 1987). Though this point did
not return in this radical form in later versions, the few minor changes in the
programme were primarily directed at a passage which deals with the issue
of rehabilitation. The text originally contained the sentence: ‘We oppose any
discrimination and outlawing of front-line soldiers, particularly of the
Waffen-SS, and any defamation of their fallen’ (DVU 1987: my italics).8 In
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the 1993 version the marked area was deleted, and the passage was also
enhanced and modernised:
We oppose any discrimination and outlawing of front-line soldiers and any
defamation of their fallen. They did their difficult duty without being responsi-
ble for the actions of the political leadership. (DVU 1993)
The party wants the Germans to be proud (again) of their people and her-
itage. It wants to do away with the ‘anti-national’ Vergangenheitsbewältigung
(the official dealing with the Nazi-past by the German state), so that Ger-
many can again be seen by both Germans and the rest of the world as a coun-
try like any other, with good and bad sides. Referring to Hitler’s aspiration
for a German Reich the paper writes: ‘The Thousand-Year Reign will become
reality after all: 12 years of practice and 988 years of Vergangenheitsbewäl-
tigung’ (DNZ 23/9/88).
Prominent Germans that according to the party indulge in anti-national
behaviour are attacked endlessly in the paper. They are denounced as com-
munists and anti-national left-wingers, or their ‘brown past’ is revealed. The
prime target of the paper was for a long time the then German president
Richard von Weiszäcker, famous for his warnings against nationalistic senti-
ments in Germany. Various articles dealt with the past of the president him-
self as Wehrmacht officer on the Eastern front, but especially with that of his
father, assistant secretary of foreign affairs in the Nazi regime.
The critiques on Von Weiszäcker and his father were also used to attack
the thesis of the collective guilt of the Germans. The DVU denounces this
thesis as a plot to keep Germany small and humble. It believes that the
common German was innocent and that the (few) crimes that were com-
mitted by the Nazi regime were the work and responsibility of a small group
of people around (and including) Hitler. The party argues that it was impos-
sible for ordinary Germans to know of the atrocities of the Nazi regime, but
that Von Weiszäcker himself could have known as his father was part of the
elite. This is not to say that the party explicitly rejects the actions of Von
Weiszäcker (or his father) during the war. It mainly rejects his actions after
the war. On top of that the party wants to show that the fierce anti-nation-
alists of the post-war period have dirty hands themselves, and have become
anti-national as a consequence of either blackmail or opportunism.
The bulk of the articles in the papers deal with topics that are directly
related to the Second World War. Probably the most prominent is the role of
Germany. Almost every issue covers at least one article in which this role is
revised. This is done directly, e.g. by ‘proving’ that crimes generally ascribed
to Nazi Germany were not as bad as is claimed. Several articles deal with the
question of ‘How many Jews really died?’ (DNZ 7/6/91). In these articles the
crimes against the Jews are not denied, but the number of (possible) victims
is considerably reduced. Other articles try to prove that Germany did not
start the war but was forced to react to the aggressive and unjust actions of
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others (most notably France and Poland). In the same spirit the attack on the
Soviet Union in 1941 (Operation Barbarossa) is described as a preemptive
strike on the eve of a Russian invasion of Germany. Sometimes the papers try
to prove that various crimes were not committed by the Nazis at all. In this
case, the crimes are acknowledged in all their horror, but they are simply
ascribed to others. Many of these articles are excerpts from books edited,
published and sold by Frey, with titles like ‘The True Guilty of the Second
World War’, ‘Concealed Documents’ and ‘Acquittal for Germany’.
Another way to get Germany acquitted is by comparison, that is, by
putting war crimes of other countries at the same level of those of Nazi Ger-
many. In this respect it is interesting to see how the papers use the term
‘holocaust’. Under this heading articles are published that deal with the bom-
bardment of Dresden, while no word is spoken about the genocide of the
Jews (e.g. DNZ 23/10/92). The term holocaust is further used in the many
articles that deal with the expulsion of Germans from the Eastern territories
shortly after the war. A related strategy is the so-called Aufrechnung, mean-
ing both ‘guilt comparison’ and ‘addition’ in the German language. This is
primarily achieved by comparing the number of people killed by the Nazi
regime with the number of victims of the communist regime of the Soviet
Union. A lot of attention is also given to the number of wars that have been
fought since the Second World War, especially by former allied forces, and
the number of people that died in these wars.
Even though the papers always devote a few condemnatory words to the
Nazi regime and never openly endorse its politics, their description of the
events and the classifications used often paint a rather favourable picture.
For instance, in an article on the trial of war criminal Klaus Barbie, the
author speaks on the one hand of the ‘terror’ and ‘murder gangs’ of the
Maquis (the French resistance), and on the other hand of the ‘phenomenal
abilities’ of Barbie, who allegedly has been put on the war criminal list
‘because of a thirst for revenge of the resistance’ (DNZ 5/87). No indelicate
word is spoken about Barbie, infamous in the rest of the world as ‘the
butcher of Lyon’. Another example is a review of a book that deals with the
German annexation of Sudetenland (the western part of the Czech Repub-
lic) in 1938, in which the author speaks on the one hand of the ‘overheated
nationalism’ of the Czechs and on the other hand of the ‘liberation of the
Sudetenländer’ (DNZ 24/6/87).
Anti-semitism
A topic that is present in almost every issue of the newspapers is that of the
Jews in general and of Israel in particular. Even though anti-Semitism is
nowhere openly present, there are so many implicit remarks and indications
that the party can be called anti-Semitic without any hesitation. For one,
(individual) Jews are only mentioned in a negative way. Several neutral short
articles deal with fraudulent businessmen, in which it is explicitly written
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that they are Jewish (even though it is not relevant). This is also true for arti-
cles on Israel, which always refer to Israel as the Judenstaat (Jewish state).
Disproportionate attention is devoted to negative aspects of the Israeli state,
particularly its aggression in the occupied territories. The only time that
Jews are mentioned in a positive way is when they support the revisionism
of the DVU, as this is believed to add strength to the own argument.
The party is more open in its many insinuations of a Jewish conspiracy. In
general Jews outside of Israel are seen as first and foremost loyal to Israel and
only secondarily to the country in which they live (and often are born and
raised). For instance, the German Jew Michael Friedman, who is active in
both the Jewish community and local politics in Frankfurt, is described not
only as ‘Frankfurter CDU-politician’ but also as ‘Israeli functionary’ (DNZ
24/11/89). A classic example of anti-Semitic conspiracy thinking is present
in an article on the Alija (the Jewish exodus from Russia), which extensively
covers the alleged disproportionate presence of Jews in the leadership of the
communist party (DNZ 20/7/90). There is also much speculation on ‘Israel’s
true power’ in the papers; they even had a seven-part series on this topic.
Another good example of anti-Semitic conspiracy thinking is taken from an
article on a Jewish anti-fascist living in Germany, who is suspected of work-
ing for the Israeli secret service:
In addition, interested circles in the Federal Republic need to speak and write
about an alleged hatred of foreigners by the Germans, to divert in that way the
attention from the hatred of Palestinians by the Israeli state. (DNZ 19/5/89)
Frey has always denied allegations of anti-Semitism, claiming that he never
said or wrote that all Jews are bad and that he should have the right to call
some of them bad. According to Frey, the fact that everyone is attacking him
only proves that Germany is still not free from its past, and that Jews have a
special position in Germany. As proof of his good behaviour, he points to the
fact that the father of the late famous Jewish violinist Yehudi Menuhin
worked for years as chief of the cultural-political section of the DNZ. In
1967 Moshe Menuhin resigned because, contrary to Frey, he supported the
Ostpolitik and thought the paper was not militant enough towards Israel and
Zionism.
Though the most prominent, Jews and Israel are not seen as the only ‘dark
forces’ in the world. The usual shady enemies of extreme right conspiracies
are present in the party literature: the trilaterals, the Bilderberg group and
the Council for Foreign Relations. Most articles on these organisations and
the people in them are based on the book ‘Leaders without Masks – Inter-
national’, edited by Gerhard Frey himself. The book provides the reader
with information on ‘the truly powerful and the puppet-master
[Drahtzieher] of world politics’. It should come as no surprise that many of
the leaders are … Jews.
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Xenophobia
A feature that has become one of the most prominent in the papers in the
1990s is xenophobia. It is directed at two subgroups of foreigners: immi-
grants and asylum seekers. The picture that is usually painted of the multi-
cultural society is an ominous one in which chaos is the only rule, and the
paper always displays the US, and the city of Chicago in particular, as the
spectre of this degenerated, criminal, violent society.
Asylum seekers became the major issue in German politics in the early
1990s, after their number had increased dramatically. The DVU was well
prepared for this issue, as it had always opposed immigration and had dis-
covered the issue of asylum seekers already at the beginning of the 1980s.
The issue is mostly debated in legal and economic terms. The main argument
is that the large majority are not genuine asylum seekers, which is proven by
the very low percentage that are officially recognised by the German state.
This is combined with the issue of the high costs of the asylum seekers for
Germany, primarily in financial but sometimes also in personal and ecologi-
cal terms. The DVU does not always address the subject only in ‘objective’
terms and the screaming headlines of the papers are used to enhance the
existing fears within the readership for an Überfremdung (a flood of for-
eigners). The paper devotes much attention to scandals in which asylum
seekers are involved: for instance, in articles with telling titles such as ‘Sham
asylum seekers exposed as criminals. Clear way for foreign swindlers’ (DNZ
10/6/88) and ‘What gypsies cost us. Asylum seekers cash in’ (DNZ 16/8/91).
The DVU does not consider itself to be xenophobic and even claims to
help to prevent its (further) widespread outbursts within German society.
After the (obligatory) remark that genuine asylum seekers should be
accepted a Bremen DVU delegate stated:
Throw the swindlers out, the imposters, the criminals of multinational descent,
the heroine Turks and cocaine Negroes, Gipsy plunderers and Polish smugglers
and car thieves, because by tolerating them we breed hate against foreigners!
(DNZ 11/9/92)
This type of argument has always been the party’s main defense against alle-
gations that its alleged anti-foreigner propaganda provides ammunition for
those fire-bombing refugee homes. In reaction to the many campaigns for
Ausländerfreundlichkeit (kindness towards foreigners) and against Auslän-
derfeindlichkeit (hostility against foreigners), which were launched in the
beginning of the 1990s and were supported by all main political parties, the
DVU started a campaign in support of its own organisations with the slogan:
‘In name of the law: deport sham asylum seekers – fight hate against for-
eigners!’
Even though the issue of immigration is a separate issue, it is generally dis-
cussed in the same terms. Originally guest workers had more credit than
asylum seekers. Despite the fact that the party and its papers often pointed
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to the high crime figures of the foreign population in Germany, they did not
fail to mention (though less regularly) that still only a minority is criminal:
Hereby one has to consider: the majority of foreigners living here have no more
to do with crime than that they themselves are threatened by imposters with a
German or foreign passport. Certainly, the majority of the decent foreigners
that live here wish for decisive action against native and foreign gangster as
much as this is the wish of the decent Germans. (DNZ 24/5/91)
After the 1992 compromise of the major German parties on a more strict law
on asylum, the DVU toughened its stand on other foreigners. This is proba-
bly tactically motivated as the issue of asylum seekers proved successful for
the party and it hopes to sustain this success with similar campaigns against
other foreigners.
Socio-economic policy
Socio-economic policy is dealt with rather extensively in the party pro-
gramme, yet is almost non-existent in the newspapers. The programme
entails a combination of socialist and liberal policies, which the party (in imi-
tation of the CSU/CDU) describe as the ‘free social market economy’ (DVU
1987). It is primarily based upon the capitalist system and the freedom of
property, but tries to overcome its negative aspects by (sometimes massive)
state intervention. For instance, German tradespeople should be helped by
granting them public contracts in preference to foreign multinationals. Sim-
ilarly, German farmers should be protected against EU mass production.
Though the DVU claims that this should (and can) be done within the free
market, it is quite clear that it involves protectionist measures: ‘through sub-
sidies the state should keep the coal-mine, shipbuilding and steel industry
alive and competitive, as is also done abroad, as we should not become even
more dependent on foreign interests’ (DNZ 12/2/88).
The papers increasingly express concern over the possible extinction of
German industrial branches as a consequence of the free market. The origi-
nal attacks on the EC are expanded with attacks on the free world market.
More attention is given to what the party considers as its negative aspects,
such as poverty and unemployment (in Germany), international competition
and pollution. This notwithstanding, most articles on socio-economic policy
serve mainly the purpose of proving either the strength of Germany or the
mismanagement of others (most notably the EU). As a consequence of the
latter, as well as because of its welfare chauvinist policy, the party wants to
cut back on Germany’s spending on foreign countries and international
organisations (most are anti-German anyway), and use the money which is
thereby saved to ensure the pensions and social benefits of the German
people (e.g. REP 1993).
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The strong state
Though the issue of the strong state is present in the party literature, it does
not feature prominently. The section in the programme entitled ‘protection
from criminals’ entails a classic collection of law and order demands. It calls
for higher sentences for serious crimes, smuggling (of people and goods) and
drug dealing in particular, which have to be served fully. It believes that the
proposed law and order policy can only be executed by a police force that is
capable, well equipped and no longer the Prügelknabe (scapegoats) of a
failed policy (DVU 1993). Moreover, more attention should be given to the
victim instead of the perpetrator. Both the programme and the papers
devote special attention to crimes of left-wing activists. To put a stop to the
misuse of the right to demonstrate, it calls for a law against Landfriedens-
bruch and disguise (DVU 1993). In the papers the issue is mainly linked to
that of foreigners and drugs, which are themselves interlinked. In general,
the papers call for higher punishment and, contrary to the programme, the
introduction of the death penalty.
The party’s militarism is strongly related to revisionism and national
revival. For years the DNZ ran a series under the heading ‘our immortal
fallen’ (in Gothic letters) in which pictures of memorials for fallen German
soldiers were printed. Another series cheered ‘great German soldiers’. In
both cases a large number of the soldiers in question were (high ranking)
members of the (Waffen-) SS. The programme wants the state to play an
active role in rehabilitating German soldiers of the present and the past,
including ‘putting the standing and honour of German soldiers under legal
protection’ (DVU 1987). It further demands a well-equipped and sovereign
German army, which is commanded by Germans and not by foreigners (i.e.
NATO). German soldiers are not allowed to be deployed for foreign inter-
ests or in a far away war and crisis areas (DVU 1993). The party is also scep-
tical about a leading role for civilians within the army. For instance, the
social scientific institute of the army in Munich is described as ‘a civilian
Fremdkörper within the army’ (DNZ 10/4/87).
Ethical values
The theme of (the loss of) ethical values is primarily related to that of abor-
tion, while the party’s position on the theme is predominantly based on its
nationalism. The DVU strongly opposes the liberalisation of abortion and
attacks prominent supporters of this view (especially those in the CDU like
Rita Süssmuth). The issue of abortion is itself related to the drop in the birth
rate in Germany, which when combined with immigration, draws into ques-
tion the issue of the survival of the German ethnic community.9 The DVU
claims that the established parties use immigration to counter the declining
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birth rate of the Germans, which will lead to the extinction of the German
ethnic community. Against this disastrous policy the party puts forward its
own family friendly policy which is based on ‘generous state support for
German families and mothers’ (DVU 1993). Except for tax measures and a
ban on abortion this would include better possibilities for care outside of the
family and a general recognition of the impressive achievements of mothers.
Other dangers to traditional values and thereby to the survival of the
German ethnic community that feature in the literature are divorces, homo-
sexuality, drugs, pornography and individualism. The programme calls for
better health protection and an effective fight against epidemics, including a
report duty of AIDS (DVU 1987). However, the main value that the party
defends are national(ist) values, i.e. love for the Heimat and the German
ethnic community. In this context the programme argues for an educational
system that is in favour of equal chances but against ‘levelling’ and teaches
‘respect for the values of humans and for religious conviction, courage, sense
of responsibility, spirit of democracy and the sympathy for nations, love of
the fatherland and of the German ethnic community’ (DVU 1993).
Populist anti-party sentiment
Particularly in the 1990s, critique on (most) established parties is clearly
gaining prominence in the party literature. The major bone of contention is
the extensive state financing of the (established) political parties and their
delegates, and every suggestion for an increase of these subsidies is met with
fierce critique and resistance. When confronted with the issue, the party del-
egates voted against such plans in their respective state parliaments. Despite
the often harsh language the populist anti-party sentiments are quite mod-
erate in content and do not cross the line into extremist anti-party senti-
ments. In most instances the behaviour and politics of specific parties are
attacked and criticised in relation to one of the issues mentioned above. The
criticism is mostly directed against left-wing parties, which are accused of
anti-national or even of extremist and terrorist behaviour (in the case of the
Grünen and the ‘post-communist’ PDS). In the case of the SPD, the main cri-
tique concerns its alleged betrayal of the nationalist legacy of Kurt Schu-
macher. Overall, the papers are quite friendly towards the CSU (especially
politicians like Theo Waigel and Friedrich Zimmermann) and to a lesser
extent the CDU.10 Most criticism against the traditional right-wing parties is
directed at the liberal FDP and factions within the CDU – especially ‘left-
wing’ or ‘liberal’ prominent members like Norbert Blum, Rita Süssmuth and
Heinrich Geißler, because of their support for the liberalisation of abortion
and their support of the multi-cultural society.
The most fierce criticism is reserved for the REP. The main reason for the
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critique has always been the outspoken distancing of that party from ‘the
extreme right’. Schönhuber explicitly included the DVU, which he accused
of an anti-democratic ideology (see chapter 2). For its part, the DVU
describes Schönhuber as an opportunist and a destructive force within the
nationales Lager (national camp). Because of his vanity and his lust for
power, he is used as a pawn by the anti-national forces. Typical of this argu-
ment is the reaction to its loss in the 1989 European election, which also
marked the breakthrough of the REP. In an editorial the paper wrote that the
REP had reaped what the DVU had sown, because the whole media had led
the right-wing protest down this ‘harmless road’ (DNZ 23/6/89).
This touches on another sentiment that is often voiced in the paper: the
unjust way in which the DVU is treated by the outside world. Especially in
regard to election campaigns and the annual meeting in Passau the party
complains about the way political enemies (‘left-wing terrorists’) attack its
members and the fact that the other parties and media either ignore this or,
even worse, encourage it. In addition, the party forcefully rejects its descrip-
tion as right-wing extremist by the German state. It has always claimed to be
the most democratic party in Germany, as it takes the German constitution,
its preamble in particular, to be its highest authority. According to the DVU
the 1990 unification proved that it had always been right, as it had always
strived for the unification of the FRG and its ‘lost territories’. The party also
argued that the other parties should recognise its right of existence, among
others by striking the DVU from the official list of right-wing extremist
organisations.
Conclusion
The DVU is in many ways an unusual political party, having a rare combina-
tion of many members and no real cadre. It has won a relatively large
number of seats in regional elections without maintaining functioning
regional branches. The literature of the DVU is quite singular as well. On the
one hand, it entails one of the shortest party programmes in Germany (and
possibly in Europe), a limited range of election material, and strictly speak-
ing no party paper. On the other hand, it has fought very expensive election
campaigns and has two weekly newspapers at its disposal with a total circu-
lation of more than five times its membership. This is the result of the spe-
cific character of the party and its leader. The DVU is first and foremost the
instrument of a wealthy German businessman, who one day decided to add
a political party to his strange blend of nationalist businesses.
Even though the party programme is very short, it includes a broader
range of ideological themes than do the various papers. There is in fact a
rather big difference in (secondary) features presented in the externally and
internally oriented literature. Issues like social and economic politics or ecol-
ogy have a prominent place in the programme, yet are hardly touched upon
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in the party papers. On the other hand, the party papers devote much atten-
tion and space to anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism, whereas these are
absent from the party programme. Though a certain degree of discrepancy
between the two will be present in all parties (resulting from the different
tasks and audiences of the two sources), the situation of the DVU differs
from that of other parties in the fact that the programme is the only genuine
piece of literature that the party as such distributes. The two newspapers,
though owned by the party leader and openly supportive of the party, are at
best officious and not official party papers. They are (semi-)independent
organs, which preceded the political party (and will probably also outlive it). 
Not withstanding the particular situation of the DVU, the two sources of
party literature together constitute a lot of propaganda material based on a
very limited though clear ideology. The DVU ideology is built upon three
main features: nationalism (Germany for the Germans!) patriotism (Ger-
many first!), and xenophobia (alien equals anti-German). The party aspires
to a completely sovereign German state, which contains only German citi-
zens. However, it remains silent on the important question of ‘who is a
German’. This German state should take care of its own people and should
not interfere with the business of other states. International cooperation is
only accepted when it is to the good of the German people and any mem-
bership of supranational organisations like NATO and EU is ‘thus’ rejected.
This negative attitude towards international cooperation is not only the
result of the party’s nationalism but also of its xenophobic, if not paranoid
view on the world. The DVU sees the world as full of anti-German conspir-
acies, which is in part the result and the cause of its (open) anti-American-
ism and (more hidden) anti-Semitism. A final feature of the party ideology is
chauvinism, which is expressed mainly through the demand for a national
revival entailing a moral revision of Germany’s role in the Second World
War and the demand for a renewal of national pride.
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The extreme right in Flanders, 1917–80
Until the beginning of the First World War, the heterogenous Vlaamse
Beweging (Flemish Movement) was primarily cultural in orientation (see
Willemsen 1969: 10–27). Its principal goal was the emancipation of the
Dutch language (i.e. Flemish) and culture from the dominance of French
speaking Belgium, and its supporters looked favourably upon a multina-
tional Belgian state. The First World War led to a split in the movement: a
small section collaborated with the Germans and, led by the Raad van Vlaan-
deren (Council of Flanders), proclaimed the independence of Flanders on 22
December 1917; the majority of the movement remained loyal to Belgium
(Willemsen 1969). Indignant at being linguistically discriminated against by
French speaking officers, Flemish soldiers in the Belgian army founded the
so-called Frontbeweging (Front Movement), which later gave rise to the
Frontpartij.
The Flemish Movement was, by the end of the war, discredited, and it
soon split into two distinct camps: a patriotic, culturally nationalistic camp
that wanted to see a Dutch Flanders within a federal Belgium; and an anti-
Belgian, politically nationalist camp that sought political autonomy for Flan-
ders and the destruction of Belgium (Vos 1992). During the first post-war
years the former was the sole political representative, in the form of the
Frontpartij, which called for the establishment of a federalist Belgian state.
Initially, it gained moderate successes in the Belgian elections: five seats in
1919, four in 1921 and six in 1925 (Fitzmaurice 1983: 37). However, by the
end of the 1930s the Flemish Movement had changed in three respects: its
Flemish identity had grown (if initially only in a cultural sense); its leaders
had become almost exclusively Catholic; and its ideology had become more
extreme, having shifted in favour of the anti-Belgian, politically nationalist
camp (Goedbloed 1991: 400–1). In the 1920s and 1930s many Catholic,
Flemish nationalist intellectuals, mostly active in the Algemeen Katholiek
Vlaams Studentenverbond (General Catholic Flemish Students’ Association)
and in the Katholiek Vlaams Hoogstudentenverbond (Catholic Flemish Uni-
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versity Students’ Association), encouraged an osmosis between Flemish
nationalism and the ‘new order ideologies’ (Vos 1992). This process culmi-
nated in 1933 in the foundation of the Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (Flemish
National Union, VNV) under the leadership of Staf De Clercq (later Hen-
drik Elias).
The VNV wished to see the creation of a Greater Netherlands or Diets-
land, i.e. a ‘re-unification’ of the Netherlands with North and South Flan-
ders,1 within a Europe structured along the lines favoured by Nazi ideology.
After having absorbed the extreme wing of the deteriorating Frontpartij and
other small Flemish nationalist groups (De Wever 1992), it was left with only
one principal rival prior to the Second World War: the Verbond van Dietse
Nationaal-Solidaristen (Association of Diets National Solidarists, Verdi-
naso), founded in 1931 by Joris Van Severen. This was a para-military move-
ment that originally had an almost similar goal as the VNV, i.e. a corporatist,
authoritarian and ‘organic’ Greater Netherlands. However, in the mid 1930s
it changed its goal into a ‘Diets Empire’, including Luxembourg, Belgium,
the Netherlands and their colonies (Willemsen 1969).
At the end of the 1930s, the VNV scored some electoral successes after
entering into various strategic pacts with other political groups. Under dif-
ferent names the Flemish nationalist pacts secured approximately 13 per
cent of the votes (in Flanders and Brussels) in 1936, and 15 per cent in 1939
(Willemsen 1969: 414, 464; Gijsels 1992: 26). During the Second World
War a substantive minority of the Flemish Movement collaborated with the
Nazis; the VNV members thereby hoped to achieve their goal of completely
uniting the Flemish nation(-state) under the VNV banner (De Wever 1992).
However, the Germans played the VNV off against other groups, including
its main competitor, De Vlag (The Flag or German–Flemish Working Com-
munity), which prior to the war had called for an autonomous Flanders but
had abandoned this line during the German occupation in favour of a
Greater Germany. During the war, De Vlag was completely absorbed by the
General (later ‘Germanic’) Flemish SS, which fought ‘the Bolshevik enemy’
on the Eastern Front.
Flemish nationalism emerged from the Second World War in an even
more feeble state than following the First World War. The collaborators
were exposed to all sorts of repressive measures (the same was true for the
many Walloon collaborators) and, although these so-called ‘catacomb days’
only lasted five years, calls for their amnesty or rehabilitation became major
issues for the post-war Flemish Movement (Seberechts 1992). In 1954 some
1,500 collaborators were still in prison and roughly 150,000 Belgians, the
so-called incivieken (those unworthy of citizenship), did not enjoy civil
rights – including the right to vote or to be elected to public office (Gijsels
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1992: 41). In the first few years after the war, most of the former collabora-
tors confined their activities to charitable pursuits, especially on behalf of
former soldiers who had served on the Eastern Front, for example in the
Vlaams Verbond der Oud-Oostfrontstrijders (Flemish Association of Former
Eastern Front Fighters). Within the Flemish Movement, the moderate wing
exercised the most influence, particularly in the christian democratic Chris-
telijke Volkspartij (Christian People’s Party, CVP), and claimed the tradi-
tional ‘holy’ sites of Flemish nationalism as its own. This stirred up ill-feeling
among the radicals of the movement, although for a considerable time they
continued to remain isolated and marginalised.
As of 1949 several radical Flemish nationalist organisations were set up
again, including the anti-repression party Vlaamse Concentratie (Flemish
Concentration), and the direct-action group, Vlaamse Militanten Orde
(Order of Flemish Militants, VMO).2 All these organisations remained mar-
ginal until the Christelijke Vlaamse Volksunie (Christian Flemish People’s
Union) was launched as an electoral alliance to contest the 1954 parliamen-
tary election, in which it won 3.9 per cent of the Flemish vote and one seat
(Dewinter and Van Overmeire 1993: 26). This success led, on 21 November
1954, to the foundation of the Volksunie (People’s Union, VU) as its official
successor. The new political party secured 6 per cent of the Flemish vote in
1961, giving it five seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and two in the Senate
(Vander Velpen 1989: 43). This constituted a significant comeback for Flem-
ish nationalism in Belgian politics.
The movement was fuelled further in the 1960s by the smouldering dis-
pute between Dutch and French speaking Belgians over the national lan-
guage, a dispute that led to rioting and to the first steps towards inaugurating
a federalist structure in Belgium. This federalisation soon developed a
momentum of its own, causing a split within the Belgian political party struc-
ture (see Huyse 1986; Deschouwer 1991). The three important political cur-
rents (christian democracy, social democracy and liberalism) split into
separate Dutch speaking and French speaking parties. In this climate, the
VU, with its Poujadist-like manifesto and style, scored several electoral vic-
tories, gaining a record 18.8 per cent of the Flemish vote (and 21 seats) in
the 1971 parliamentary election (Fitzmaurice 1983: 177).
Although the VU was the only political representative of the Flemish
Movement, and proved to be relatively successful, criticism was nevertheless
forthcoming from within its ranks. From the outset, the federalist party was
regarded with suspicion by the separatists. These suspicions grew when the
VU, under the sway of the democratisation movement of May 1968, increas-
ingly assumed the shape of a left-liberal, moderate nationalist party. Under
the leadership of Hugo Schiltz, Nelly Maes, Maurits Coppieters, and others
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the party attempted to ensure that it was regarded as a respectable coalition
partner, incurring the wrath of the radical wing which saw itself as the ‘whip’
of the CVP (see Dewinter and Van Overmeire 1993). Relations between the
moderate leadership and the radical membership, most notably the activists
of the VMO (who had since the party’s inception staffed its stewarding and
propaganda service), became ever more strained. After protracted debates,
on 12 June 1971, the problems finally seemed to have been resolved when
VMO leader Bob Maes was made a member of the Belgian Senate and
allowed his organisation to be absorbed by the VU. However, only a short
time elapsed before, on 2 July, Bert Eriksson founded a new VMO. In sub-
sequent years this new VMO became a violent, neo-Nazi, direct-action
group, and on 4 May 1981 it was outlawed by the Antwerp high court for
being a private militia (see Gijsels 1992: 54–68).
By the mid 1970s, dissatisfaction with the left-liberal stance taken by the
VU had already prompted several radical members to leave the party. They
initially worked together in non-party political organisations, such as the
(new) VMO, the Verbond van Nederlandse Werkgemeenschappen Were Di
(Association of Dutch Working Groups Protect Yourself, Were Di) and the
direct-action group Voorpost (Outpost), which splintered off from Were Di
in 1976.3 In 1973, twenty-seven of these organisations joined ranks in the
Vlaams National Raad (Flemish National Council), which had as its main
objective to be(come) a thorn in the side of the VU (Gijsels 1992). There
were, however, radicals who wanted to found a new party. Although cir-
cumstances were soon to change, the time was not yet ripe for such a move.
On 24 May 1977 the leaders of the VU signed the so-called Egmont Pact,
which envisioned the federalisation of Belgium.4 Three days later, the VU
party conference adopted the Pact by 62 votes to 31 and joined the second
government of Leo Tindemans. The Egmont Pact provoked heated debates,
and not only in the VU; the whole Flemish Movement was divided over it
and found itself caught up in the worst crisis it had known in the post-war
period. Federalisation, so both the pro-democratic and anti-democratic sep-
aratists believed, did not go far enough and in September 1977 they joined
forces in the Egmontkomitee (Egmont Committee).5 The Committee was
united in rejection of the Egmont Pact, but internally divided on how best to
oppose it, whether from inside or from outside the VU (see Dewinter and
Van Overmeire 1993).
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The group in favour of opposing from within the VU – led by Edwin
Truyens, founder and leader of the Nationalistische Studentenvereniging
(Nationalist Students’ Association, NSV), and Were Di leader Bert Van
Boghout – joined forces in the Vlaams Nationaal Directorium (Flemish
National Directorate). Despite exerting great pressure, this group did not
manage to unite all the anti-Egmont forces under its banner. Two former
prominent members of the VU wished to found their own political party:
former senator Lode Claes, and former leader of the Antwerp Volksunie Jon-
geren (People’s Union Youth), Karel Dillen. Although the two held several
sets of talks, they could not reach agreement on a joint party. Claes was inter-
ested in a broad, national and liberal popular party, whereas Dillen was plan-
ning a small, radical-nationalist, ‘solidarist’ direct-action party (see Gijsels
1992: 83–8; Dewinter and Van Overmeire 1993: 63–84).
On 2 October 1977, after a brief but hectic period characterised by
mutual distrust and confusion, the Vlaams Nationale Partij (Flemish
National Party, VNP) saw the light of day. Its founders included Dillen,
Gerard Slegers, Leo Wouters (the latter two were former VU senators) and
Wim Verreycken, leader of the tiny Vlaams Republikeinse Partij (Flemish
Republican Party) that was immediately absorbed by the VNP (Dewinter and
Van Overmeire 1993). Surprised and indignant, Claes proceeded to found
his own party, the Vlaamse Volkspartij (Flemish People’s Party, VVP) on 19
November. Immediately after these two parties were established, they were
urged to come to a merger by prominent outsiders, such as Truyens and Van
Boghout as well as Jan Brans, former chief editor of the VNV newspaper
Volk en Staat (People and State).
The fall of the government fuelled this effort as the parliamentary election
was brought forward to December 1978. The VVP was prepared to enter
into such a merger, for the duration of the election only, but laid claim to a
dominant role in the election list. This was, in fact, what happened, and in
December the two anti-Egmont parties campaigned for a joint list of candi-
dates under the name Vlaams Blok. The list was dominated by the VVP both
in terms of ideology and candidates, but to everyone’s surprise only Dillen,
whose followers had persuaded him to stand for the list in Antwerp, man-
aged to win a seat in Parliament. Claes failed in his bid to become a senator,
dissolved the alliance and unsuccessfully went it alone with the VVP in the
1979 European election. As he gained less than 1 per cent of the vote, this
marked the end of the political road for both Claes and his VVP (see Gijsels
1992; Dewinter and Van Overmeire 1993).
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The establishment of an anti-Establishment party
On 28 May 1979 the VNP was disbanded and the political party Vlaams
Blok (Flemish Block, VB) was founded as a fusion of the VNP and the
nationalist wing of the VVP (Gijsels 1992: 88; Dewinter and Van Overmeire
1993: 91–3). Dillen (VNP) became party leader and Piet Bocken (VVP)
deputy leader. Shortly thereafter Bocken was replaced by Roeland Raes
(VVP), who continues to fill this post in 1999. For the first few years the VB
remained a small splinter party that drew its strength almost exclusively
from the efforts and reputation of Dillen, Raes and party secretary Jaak
Peeters. The party recruited its members from the ranks of activists in Flem-
ish nationalist organisations with which VB was in close contact, such as the
Taal Aktie Komitee (Language Action Committee), Voorpost, Were Di, and
VMO. Moreover, the various local branches of these organisations often
doubled up as local party branches of the VB.
From the beginning the party (and in particular Dillen himself) received
support from veterans of the radical wing of the Flemish Movement, many
of whom had a history as collaborators and/or were in the VU. When the
Egmont Pact collapsed together with the second Tindemans government, the
anti-Egmont party seemed to have outlived its purpose. In 1981 Dillen was
re-elected to parliament, but with a smaller share of the vote than in 1978
(1.8 as opposed to 2.1 per cent).1 The VB had concentrated its activities
almost completely on the city of Antwerp, standing candidates in less than
thirty of the over 300 Flemish communities (Gijsels 1992: 89; Dewinter and
Van Overmeire 1993: 118). As a consequence of the small scale electoral
success the party was continually pressured to merge with the VU in the first
decade of its existence.
In the mid 1980s, the VB began to change. New members entered the
party cadre and some of the veterans left. This change did not take place
1 All election results of the VB are based on the Flemish vote and taken from the Belgian
political science journal Res Publica.
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without some (minor) blood-letting. For example, Truyens, the party ideol-
ogist, was expelled from the party in 1983 after he had called on Dillen to
muck out the ‘immoral stables’ – referring to some of the prominent VB
members (Verstraete 1992: 125). Moreover, prompted in part by the elec-
toral successes of like-minded parties in the surrounding countries (the
French FN and the Dutch CP), the VB revamped its propaganda. It grew
more and more from an anti-Egmont VU split into a broad and modern
extreme right party. This did not, however, immediately result in rewards at
the polls. In 1984 the VB won 2.1 per cent in the European election, thereby
failing to gain entry into the European parliament. A year later Dillen was
again re-elected, this time with 2.2 per cent.
The results were met with disappointment, to which Dillen reacted with
the so-called ‘Operation Rejuvenation’ (Dewinter and Van Overmeire 1993:
138), which involved an across-the-board change in the party leadership.
Various young VB members, most of them (former) leaders of nationalist
youth and student organisations, were integrated into the party council. In
1987 Gerolf Annemans, a twenty-nine-year-old, took Dillen’s seat in Parlia-
ment. At the same time, serious efforts were undertaken to set up an inde-
pendent party organisation and to make the VB less dependent upon the
resources of its friendly movements. An official youth organisation, Vlaams
Blok Jongeren (Flemish Block Youth, VBJ), was founded in 1987 by former
prominent members of the NSV – notably Filip Dewinter and Frank Van-
hecke.
In April 1987 a group around Roger Frankinouille, co-chairman of the
right-wing anti-tax party Respect voor Arbeid en Democratie (Respect for
Labour and Democracy), switched to the VB, partly out of dissatisfaction
with its Walloon sister party, and partly owing to the VB’s emphasis on the
immigration issue (Dewinter and Van Overmeire 1993). In this manner, the
party’s only remaining competitor on the right was eradicated. At the same
time, the VB won increased media attention. It had conducted a sharp and
vociferous campaign in the 1987 parliamentary election. Under the new
slogan Eigen volk eerst! (Own people first!) the party had doubled its seats
in parliament (3.0 per cent) and, for the first time in its history, had won a
seat in the Belgian Senate. Dillen moved to the Senate and Dewinter, only
twenty-five years old at the time, entered parliament alongside Annemans,
thereby becoming the youngest MP in Belgian history.
In the 1988 local election the VB won twenty-three seats in ten local coun-
cils. It scored its greatest success in Antwerp, where it secured 17.7 per cent
of the vote and ten of the fifty-five seats (Van Eycken and Schoeters 1988:
22ff). The success attracted a great deal of publicity and opponents began to
take the VB seriously. On 10 May 1989 the leaders of the five largest Flem-
ish parties signed an agreement stipulating, among other things, that they
would neither negotiate with the VB nor make immigration a political issue
(Gijsels 1992: 103). This so-called cordon sanitaire was torn apart seven
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weeks later and only the Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party, SP) and the
green party Agalev remained loyal to the ‘anti-Bloc’ agreement (Damen
1998: 15–16). The other parties resumed their ambivalent stance towards
the VB: a great deal of anti-VB rhetoric together with conciliatory gestures
whenever it proved opportune.
In December 1988 the first major split in the VB occurred. Having smoul-
dered beneath the surface for years, dissatisfaction with ‘Operation Rejuve-
nation’ finally came out into the open. A group of long-standing prominent
members of the VB – including party council chairman Geert Wouters and
party secretary Peeters – attempted to squeeze the VBJ-group around
Dewinter out of the ranks of the party leadership. In an ‘Address to Karel
Dillen’ they were accused of being ‘Lepenists’ (supporters of FN leader Le
Pen) and of sidelining the Flemish question in favour of the anti-immigrant
issue (see Gijsels 1992: 141–2; Dewinter and Van Overmeire 1993: 161-2).
When the Wouters group realised that Dillen was siding with Dewinter, the
members left the VB and founded the nationalist pressure group Nationalis-
tisch Verbond-Nederlandse Volksbeweging (Nationalist Association-Dutch
People’s Movement).
The VB was able to continue to win elections even after the split. In 1989
it won one seat on the Brussels city council and one in the European parlia-
ment, polling 6.3 per cent. Dillen took the seat in Strasbourg and, on the
evening of the election, he proclaimed that cooperation with the FN was
considered a possibility.2 During negotiations with his fellow extreme right
MEPs, Dillen first sealed a pact with the REP and subsequently refused to
make any ideological concessions to the FN (Dewinter and Van Overmeire
1993). This resulted in the final organisational structure of a ‘Technical
Group’ of the European Right, which was not organised on the basis of an
ideological programme, but rather on pragmatic principles (i.e. financial
arrangements).
The real breakthrough did not come until the parliamentary election of 24
November 1991. On what was afterwards referred to as ‘Black Sunday’, the
VB more than trebled its 1987 share of the vote, gaining 10.3 per cent. This
yielded a total of eighteen parliamentary seats, twelve in the Lower House
(parliament) and six in the Upper House (Senate). Antwerp again was the
stronghold; every fourth voter supported the VB, making it the strongest
political force in the city. Yet, the VB also put in a vigorous showing outside
of its traditional stronghold. Even in villages with no foreign inhabitants the
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VB picked up roughly 2 per cent of the vote (Swyngedouw 1992: 83). Imme-
diately after the election the VB attracted attention by refusing, after a brief
inner-party discussion, to take up its seat in the Flemish government to
which it was entitled by law (Dewinter and Van Overmeire 1993).
The electoral success of the VB prompted an enormous shock-effect and
consequent reaction within the ‘democratic camp’ (e.g. Piryns 1992).
Numerous new organisations were founded, ranging from broadly sup-
ported anti-racist pressure groups like Objectief 479.417 and Charta ‘91 to
small and violent anti-fascist groups like the Blokbusters (see Gijsels 1994;
Damen 1998). Despite the hostile climate the VB was able to receive a good
press on two occasions the following year. In July a VB motion was for the
first time accepted in the Vlaamse Raad (Flemish parliament); the motion
opposed the right of French speaking inhabitants of Flemish Brabant and
Voeren to vote for Walloon institutions (Dewinter and Van Overmeire
1993). In the autumn of 1992, the party organised a press conference where
it announced that Staf Neel, for twenty-two years a popular SP city council-
lor in Antwerp, was crossing the floor to the VB. His change of allegiance
caused the CVP and SP to lose their majority in the Antwerp city council
(Van den Brink 1994).
In the following years the social and political pressure on the VB increased
even further, leading to a new cordon sanitaire, which was signed by over a
thousand local, regional and national delegates of all major parties (see
Gijsels 1994; Damen 1998). This notwithstanding, the party succeeded in
establishing itself as a solid force in the Flemish party system. In the 1991
parliamentary election it had become the fourth largest political party in
Flanders, overtaking old rivals the VU (which scored 9.3 per cent). At the
1994 European election the VB managed to increase its share to 12.6 per
cent, thereby doubling its number of seats in Strasbourg. A small setback was
that the two-man VB contingent – Dillen was joined by his former
spokesman Vanhecke – could not be part of an official Group of the Euro-
pean Right, due to a lack of cooperation and seats.3
On 9 October 1994 the VB scored a major victory in the local election,
winning a total of 199 seats in eighty-two local councils. As always, it was
again the city of Antwerp where the party did best. With 28 per cent of the
votes it became the largest political party in the local council, increasing its
total number of seats to eighteen. The Antwerp result was the main focus of
media attention inside and outside Belgium, as was the issue whether the
party would be invited to play a part in the city’s administration. The VB had
unequivocally stated that it would be willing to assume responsibility for the
city of Antwerp; it had even formed a shadow cabinet under Dewinter. Nev-
ertheless, the VB remained excluded from power for the next six years,
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owing to the renewed cordon sanitaire instituted by all other parties (which
together formed the new city council).
The next year brought a premiere to Belgian politics: for the first time the
population could directly elect their regional parliament. This meant that on
21 May 1995 the Flemings had to vote for the two federal chambers (i.e.
parliament and Senate) and for the Vlaamse Raad (Flemish parliament).
Despite the fact that the pre-election period was dominated by political scan-
dals, most notably the Augusta affair, the election results showed hardly any
significant difference compared to the 1991 election. The two major parties,
CVP and SP, remained fairly stable, although the latter had been deeply
involved in the Augusta affair. The VB gained 12.1 per cent of the vote for
the Belgian parliament and a slightly higher 12.3 per cent for the Flemish
parliament. This was almost 2 per cent higher than the 1991 parliamentary
result, though just under the 1994 European result. Nevertheless, it meant
that the VB sent more representatives to the various parliaments than ever
before: eleven to the Belgian parliament, three to the (Belgian) Senate, and
fifteen to the Flemish parliament (as well as two to the Brussels city council).
During the next years the VB became increasingly isolated; the other par-
ties kept their distance, while various anti-racist organisations increased
their ‘resistance’. Moreover, the party came into open conflict with leaders
of the Flemish Movement, most notably the organising committee of the
Ijzerbedevaart. This led to endless accusations back and forth and to confus-
ing parallel manifestations in a fierce struggle over the hegemony within the
Flemish Movement. Moreover, the VB was confronted with an increasingly
hostile state; for example, a law banning negationism (i.e. the denail of the
Holocaust) was introduced, while a law linking state funding of political par-
ties to their commitment to human rights was discussed. In both cases the
discussion was for the most part kept in general terms, though it was clear
who was the target. In addition, the VB was more and more curbed in its
actions; as in the surrounding countries, the party had to deal with an
obstructive (local) government, which refused to allow demonstrations or to
rent out facilities.
In this hostile political and public climate, the VB went through the most
perilous stage in its existence, the change in leadership. On 8 June 1996 sev-
enty-year-old Karel Dillen stepped down as party chairman and appointed
his fellow MEP, thirty-seven-year-old Frank Vanhecke, his successor. With
this strategic move Dillen prevented a much anticipated internal fight
between the Flemish nationalist wing around Annemans and the Lepenist
wing around Dewinter (e.g. Swyngedouw 1998). As Vanhecke was accept-
able to both, and had the explicit backing of honourary chairman Dillen, the
VB overcame its first leadership change without any major upsets.
At the same time, and more than ever before, Belgian politics became rid-
dled with scandals. The affair that dominated Belgian politics and society in
the late 1990s was the so-called Dutroux affair. The investigation into
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Dutroux’ pedofile murders uncovered various judicial failures, and, as
always in Belgium, led to a stream of rumours concerning political involve-
ment. So-called ‘white marches’ were organised throughout Belgium,
protesting the crimes, their sloppy investigations, and the alleged political
cover up of the perpetraters. The VB was well prepared for this situation,
having for years attacked the Belgian Establishment in general, and the
allegedly weak law and order policies in particular. Moreover, Gerolf Anne-
mans boosted the party’s image by being one of the most visible members of
the parliamentary committee investigating the Dutroux affair.
On 15 June 1999 the Flemings had to vote for the Flemish (or Brussels),
Belgian and European parliaments. As was prophesied by most opinion
polls, the elections became a true waterloo for the Flemish governmental
parties. The CVP lost its position as largest party to the liberal VLD, while
the VB overtook the SP to become Flanders’ third largest party. In all three
elections the VB scored over 15 per cent, while it became the largest Flem-
ish party in the Brussels city council with 4.5 per cent of the overall vote.
The latter result was nevertheless somewhat disappointing, as the party had
campaigned for almost three years in a self-proclaimed ‘Battle of Brussels’,
distributing hundreds of thousands of bilingual pamphlets, and also using
the popular Johan Demol – the (French speaking) former police chief of the
Brussels area of Schaarbeek who was fired because of his (concealed) mem-
bership in an extreme right youth group – to attract votes from French
speakers (see Abramowicz and Haelsterman 1998: 62–3). This notwith-
standing, the 1999 elections were a clear success for the VB, which brought
it a total number of forty-five parliamentarians: two in the European Parlia-
ment, fifteen in the Belgian parliament, four in the Belgian Senate, twenty in
the Flemish parliament and four in the Brussels city council.
The various electoral successes have brought the VB extensive funds (see
Swyngedouw 1998: 62), which it used, among other things, to build a solid
party organisation. By 1996 the party had over 180 local branches and thir-
teen permanently opened secretariats throughout Flanders (Spruyt 1996:
39). The province of Antwerp has always been the stronghold in terms of
party membership, a long way ahead of East Flanders, Brabant, West Flan-
ders and Limburg, traditionally a region of very weak VB support (e.g.
Kaderblad 4/94). The local party branches are often highly active in political
education, propaganda and demonstrations.
The VB has a strict hierarchical structure, rather similar to that of a com-
munist party (Gijsels 1992; Spruyt 1995). Regional and local party organi-
sations do not have the right to appoint their own heads or preferred
candidates. They can only put forward nominations, which the party coun-
cil has to approve; the same applies to all party decisions. The various cadres
at the upper and middle management levels receive their ideological and
political training from one central organisation, the Nationalistisch Vorm-
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ingsinstituut (Nationalist Educational Institute, NVI), founded in 1987. Like
all other party organisations the NVI comes under the jurisdiction of the
party executive; it not only publishes a fortnightly cadre bulletin, but also
numerous brochures on various topics (see Spruyt 1995). Other important
sub-structures within the VB are the propaganda service, the study service,
the Vereniging van Vlaams Blok Mandatarissen (Association of Vlaams Blok
Delegates), and the Nationalistische Omroepstichting (Nationalist Broadcast
Foundation, NOS). The NOS was established in 1983 and is responsible for
radio and television programmes, providing the material for the air-time the
state grants all parliamentary parties.
It is uncertain how many members the VB precisely has. According to one
source, the VB had 1,231 members in 1980, 3,698 in 1985 and 6,500 in
1990 (Deschouwer in Spruyt 1995: 53). Vanhecke stated in April 1992 that
the VB had 7,639 members, or an increase of 500 over the figure published
prior to the election victory of 1991. Dewinter, on the other hand, spoke at
that time of between 8,000 and 9,000. In January 1995 deputy chairman
Raes spoke of ‘some 9,000’ members, which will probably have gone up to
10,000 by 1999 (Spruyt 1996: 39). However, despite the relatively small
membership, the party is able to mobilise a substantial number of activists,
who often double as (active) members of other Flemish nationalist organisa-
tions.
In addition to virtually all more or less radical Flemish nationalist organi-
sations, the VB holds also good contacts with many nationalist parties
throughout Europe. Traditionally, the closest contacts have been with (mem-
bers of) Dutch and South African extreme right organisations, such as the
CP’86, Voorpost and Boerestaatparty (Boer State Party). Since the mid 1980s,
the party also has a very close relationship with the French FN, and its youth
wing, as well as with several German parties and youth movements (including
the DVU, REP, NPD and JN). The VB has also always been very supportive of
nationalist parties that are generally not considered to be part of the extreme
right, such as the Scottish National Party, the Irish Sinn Fein (Ourselves Alone)
or the Basque Herri Batasuna (People’s Unity), though without keeping offi-
cial contacts at the party level. Ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the VB
has been extremely active in establishing contacts with nationalist parties in
Eastern Europe. Among others, VB delegations have visited the Hrvatska
Stranka Prava (Croatian Party of Rights), the Slovenska národná Strana
(Slovak National Party) and the Bulgarian Vutreshna makedonska revolyut-
sionna organizatsia (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Movement).
Profiling the literature
Externally oriented: programmes and brochures
In 1980 the VB published its first party programme entitled Grondbeginse-
len (Principles, VB 1980). Both the labelling and the programme, albeit in a
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slightly different form, had already been used by the predecessor party VNP
(Spruyt 1995). At the end of 1999 the programme is still, with a few minor
emendations, its ‘manifesto of right-wing Flemish nationalism’ (as has been
the subtitle since 1990). It closely resembled the Were Di programme, enti-
tled Grondslagen (Principles), published in 1973 (Gijsels 1992). This is not
that surprising, given that the lion’s share of the Were Di programme was
written by the present VB deputy chairman, Raes.
The original programme, which, because of its colour, was also called the
‘Orange Booklet’, included sixteen A5 pages and has a professional appear-
ance. It started with some quotes – hailing (Flemish) nationalism, hierarchy
and fighting spirit – and a two-page introduction by party leader Dillen, who
addressed the question of, ‘Why a new political party?’. The answer was
simple: the Egmont Pact had brought an end to the nationalistic character of
the VU and hence the ‘fighting Flemish nationalist Movement’ needed a new
representative political party (VB 1980: 4). The rest of the programme con-
tained five sections, three dealing with particular ideological features and
two providing summaries. The republished 1990 version is almost identical
in both format and substance (VB 1990). The only extensive revision has
been made in the introduction, which now deals with the how and why of
the VB.
During its first decade the VB never published separate election pro-
grammes, fighting the various elections with special issues of the party paper
(which were distributed in far greater quantities than the normal issues). The
breakthrough election of 1991 featured the first professional election cam-
paign of the VB. The party presented a widely circulated election pro-
gramme with the title Uit Zelfverdediging (Out of Self-Defence, VB 1991).4
The belligerent connotation of the slogan was strengthened by the image of
two boxing gloves. The election programme counted twenty-eight A5 pages,
opened with a large general introduction by Dillen and a small specific intro-
duction by Annemans, chairman of the programme commission, and further
contained five major thematic sections and a miscellaneous final section. The
campaign for the European election of June 1994 was organised around the
main slogan Grote kuis (Clean sweep), supported by a picture of a broom.
This combination ‘fully voices the wish of the voter to make a clean sweep
for one time, but also charges that these old, decayed political structures
have to be replaced by new fresh ideas’ (Kaderblad 47/94). The parliamen-
tary election the next year was fought with the similar slogan Nu afrekenen!
(Pay now!). The professionally styled election programme counted no less
than 160 A5 pages, by and large a collection of the main conclusions of the
various thematic brochures of the preceding years (VB 1995).
The 1999 elections were contested with the general slogan Baas in eigen
land (Boss in Own Country). The campaign was focused first and foremost
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on the issue of crime, for which the party had created the slogan Recht op
veiligheid (Right to security). Already in 1997 the VB presented its compre-
hensive programme, entitled Een Programma voor de Toekomst van Vlaan-
deren (A Programme for the Future of Flanders, VB 1997), counting a record
225 pages. The party published also a separate summary version, entitled
Toekomstplan (Plan for the Future, VB 1999a), as well as a Veiligheidsplan
(Security Plan, VB 1999b), bundling the law and order policies of the party
(programme).
Throughout its existence but increasingly since the late 1980s, the VB has
produced a wide variety of thematic brochures. In general these were elab-
orations, and only occasionally innovations or changes, of the relative sec-
tions in the party programme. They were written by leading members,
Annemans and Dewinter in particular, and published by the responsible
party organisation, the NVI. Some were based on a thematic party confer-
ence, summarising the party’s elaborated position on a specific theme.
Others were written as a consequence of an existing feeling within the party
that an elaboration of the specific point was needed, often triggered by the
increasing salience of the issue in day-to-day politics. In addition, general
brochures were published to function either as an introduction to the party
in membership campaigns, or as a general review of the past, present and
future of the party (e.g. Dillen 1992). Finally, both Dillen and Dewinter have
published books of their own (for an overview of the different items, see
Spruyt 1995).
Internally oriented: party paper
The party paper is the elaborated successor to that of the VNP. Since Decem-
ber 1977 this latter party had published a ‘journal of the VNP’ entitled De
Vlaams Nationalist (The Flemish Nationalist, VLN). It initially appeared
twice a month, but was reduced to a monthly already in 1979. As its official
sub-title Dillen had chosen ‘and that’s why we stand here [to] rebel’; in
memory of Reimond Tollenaere, the former propaganda leader of the VNV
who fell at the Eastern Front (Spruyt 1995: 29–30). The VNP paper had
always contained four A4 pages, of which the last page had been devoted at
least half to advertisements and announcements. The circulation of the
paper was later claimed to have been around 1,200 (VLB 8/90).
With the transformation of the VNP into the VB, the paper was trans-
formed into ‘the journal of the Vlaams Blok’. The renewed VLN was identi-
cal to the old paper, except for the fact that it now generally contained
generally eight (later twelve) pages. In September 1981 the paper was
renamed Vlaams Blok (VLB), sub-title ‘The Flemish Nationalist Party’. The
format was changed to eight A3 pages and the lay-out was altered. The
counting, however, was consecutive to that of the VLN. In November 1982
the paper claimed a circulation of 10,000, among members, sympathisers
and others. Except for the monthly issues the party published several special
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issues, some devoted to national or local (Antwerp) elections, some to polit-
ical issues (e.g. the Flemish state). In May 1988 the paper got a new lay-out,
which was again changed one and a half years later. Since then, the party
paper kept more or less the same lay-out until 1997, containing sixteen A3
pages, and being printed in only three colours: black, white and orange. It
contained various regular features, such as ‘In de kijker’ (In the spotlight),
which included short interviews with (local) VB delegates, and ‘Rapport
Buitenland’ (Foreign Report), discussing the (mis)fortunes of ‘like-minded
right-wing nationalist’ parties abroad.5 In August 1990, the VLB claimed a
circulation of 25,000, which had increased by just one thousand by Decem-
ber 1995. In November 1997 the paper went through a complete make-
over, being transformed into the rather glossy Vlaams Blok Magazine (VBM)
with the remarkable sub-title ‘monthly of the Flemish National Party’. The
new magazine is very professionally styled; it is printed in colour, counts
thirty-one A4 pages, and includes various regular features, pictures and
advertisements (also by commercial companies). The only aspects that
stayed the same were the counting, which is consecutive to that of the VLB,
the circulation, which is still at 26,000 (VBM 6/99), and the goal: ‘This paper
is and remains the mouthpiece of the Vlaams Blok, which looks at the cur-
rent affairs through nationalist glasses’ (VBM 11/97).
For a free and Flemish Flanders!
Ethnic nationalism
Flemish independence is and always has been the most prominent topic in
the VB’s literature, both externally and internally oriented. Moreover,
(Flemish) nationalism has always been the most important ideological fea-
ture. According to its party programme ethnic nationalism (volksnational-
isme) is ‘based on the ethnic community being a naturally occurring entity
whose cultural, material, ethical and intellectual interests need to be pre-
served’ (VB 1990: 5). As is typical for ethnic nationalists, the ethnic com-
munity is placed over the state: the state should serve the interests of the
ethnic community and not the other way around (e.g. VLN 4/80).
In the short run, the party wants the Flemings to become the dominant
ethnic community within the Belgian state, as they compose the majority of
the Belgian population. Further, an active state policy is demanded to undo
the Frenchification of the Flemings that live in the areas now dominated by
French speakers. In the long run the VB strives for an independent Flemish
state, including all places that ever were Flemish (such as, for example,
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5 Originally Vanhecke (and sometimes Raes) used to discuss primarily the atrocities of com-
munist regimes, and only secondarily the positive developments of like-minded foreign parties
and right-wing heroes like British prime-minister Thatcher, American president Reagan and
Chilean dictator Pinochet.
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Voeren and Brussels). As a model for the split of the Belgian state, the party
has taken up the ‘velvet split’ of Czechoslovakia in 1993 (see VB 1997: 11;
also Annemans et al. 1998).
The independent Flemish state was for a long time considered but a first
step in the process of creating a Dutch Federation, described as a ‘federalism
within the frame of the Low Countries at the sea’ (VB 1990: 7).
In the coming Europe, twenty million Northern-Dutchmen and Flemings have
to again experience their unity as language, culture, people to take their own,
independent place in Europe and so to maintain their own character. (VB 1990:
7)
This Dutch federation was to do everything possible to ensure that the Flem-
ings living in South Flanders, a small region in northwestern France with
Lille at its centre, should also be able to live ‘according to their own nature’
(VB 1990: 7). In line with the party’s external exclusiveness, it would follow
that they can only accomplish this within the Dutch federation, and not
within the French state they currently belong to. However, this is never
openly stated. Throughout the years, the party paper addressed this issue less
and less; even the solidarity with the Dutch people, contrary to that with the
Afrikaner people, was voiced only occasionally. Indeed, the Dutch were reg-
ularly attacked for their impartiality in the Flemish struggle – an old
reproach within the Flemish Movement. Also, the Netherlands was increas-
ingly presented as a country which has fallen prey to left-wing decadence.
This notwithstanding the ideal of a reunification has not died, but is just
rephrased: ‘The Vlaams Blok strives for a unity of North and South Nether-
lands, with a healthy suspicion for the ethical and societal evolution in North
Netherlands’ (VLB 6/94; also VB 1997).
The feature of internal homogenisation features in almost every issue of
the party paper. It used to be primarily linked to the Belgian problem, but
increasingly became connected to the theme of the ‘immigration problem’.
Though immigration had regularly featured as a topic in the party paper and
has been omnipresent since 1987, it received only little attention in the two
party programmes. However, since its last version in 1990, the party has
issued almost one brochure per year on it, primarily written by Dewinter
(Spruyt 1995: 147–8).
Already in its first programme the VB identified ‘the ever more acute prob-
lem of guest workers’ and called for their prohibition from entering Belgium
and for the gradual reduction in their numbers (VB 1980: 14). Since then,
the problem of the ‘mass invasion of foreigners’ has grown into ‘perhaps the
largest threat to our ethnic community’ (Annemans and Dewinter 1988: 5).
The various proposals that the party developed throughout the years were
collected and published in the seventy-point programme (Dewinter 1992),
which was ‘updated’ four years later (Dewinter 1996). Should this pro-
gramme be implemented, the future Flemish state will be free of non-Euro-
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pean immigrants and will include only assimilated European immigrants.
Moreover, as the party believes that people should be received in their own
cultural environment, and they recognise political refugees only in the most
strict sense, only European asylum seekers from closely related cultures will
be accepted into the country (see also De Man and Dewinter 1991).
The seventy-point programme is only marginally concerned with the
long-term vision of a Flemish Flanders. First and foremost it presents a plan
for the ‘guided repatriation of non-European foreigners to their countries of
origin’, which is ‘operational and immediately performable’ (Dewinter
1992: 3). Among the points that can be implemented in the short-term are
the complete closure of the borders for non-European immigrants, the abo-
lition of the promotion of a multi-cultural society in both words and means
(e.g. subsidising pro-foreigner organisations), and the application of the
‘own people first’-principle in all policy fields. Most of the programme, how-
ever, deals with the (middle-range) period of transition between present-day
Belgium and future Flanders. These policies are aimed at creating a dual
society, or a state of social apartheid, in which immigrants and Flemings will
live completely separated. During this stage, all non-European immigrants
are to be prepared for their repatriation. A separate system of social security
as well as a special tax on the employment of non-European immigrants will
be created and the money generated by these measures will go to a so-called
‘repatriation fund’, which will pay for the repatriation and ‘repatriation pre-
miums’ of the immigrants. To ensure that they will repatriate ‘voluntarily’
the VB proposes a ‘deterrent policy’ containing, for instance, a limitation of
the right to ownership, a reduction of child support and social security, and
the obligatory repatriation after three months of unemployment (Dewinter
1992: 27-8; also Annemans and Dewinter 1988: 25–7). In the revised ver-
sion of the plan, the for the party revolutionary option of assimilation of
non-European immigrants is introduced (Dewinter 1996). However, this
seems to be mainly a token of good will, as it hardly features in other party
literature and goes against the ethnic nationalist ideology of the party.
Against these radical policies on non-European immigrants, the proposed
policies of assimilation for European immigrants look quite moderate. This
is not to say that the VB does not consider the European immigrants a prob-
lem. For the party the sizable group of European immigrants in Flanders,
especially the thousands of ‘Eurocrats’, are one of the most important
threats to the (restoration of the) Flemish character of Brussels and its neigh-
bouring rural areas. Whereas the non-European immigrants are primarily
inhabiting the inner city areas of Brussels, the Eurocrats inhabit the richer
areas in and around the city. There they integrate into the French speaking
sub-culture, for example by sending their children to French schools, which
strengthens their dreaded ‘facilities’. Even worse, they have been given the
right to vote at local elections from the year 2000, according to European
legislation, and the VB is convinced that the majority will vote for parties of
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French speakers. Hence, the VB emphatically campaigns against ‘Euro
voting right’, i.e. the right of EU-citizens to vote in Belgian local elections
(e.g. VBM 10/98), and against ‘Euro-Brussels’ (e.g. VLB 6/94).
Exclusionism
The ethnopluralist world view of the VB is based on the belief that the ethnic
community is the core unit for organising large groups of human beings.
Combining liberalism and nationalism, the party argues that its only goal is
‘the maximum self-fulfilment of all members of the ethnic community’ (VLB
2/83). To achieve this people need, and have the right, to develop within
their own ethnic community. After all, ‘(o)utside of the group he can neither
exist nor even grow up and live. It is natural groups like the family, the ethnic
community, which in their turn, like man himself, are equal and different’
(VLB 7/83).
Ethnopluralism is at the heart of the party position on Europe (e.g. Verr-
eycken 1994). The VB has always been very supportive towards European
cooperation, though not towards the current European Union. It considers
the EU both too limited (in territory) and too extended (in power), but it also
sees in European cooperation the chance for Flanders to break away from
the dreaded Belgian state. This is only possible if the current road of inte-
gration is abandoned though, and a new ‘Europa der volkeren’ (Europe of
Ethnic Communities) is created (e.g. VB 1997: 138–9). This Europe will not
be based on artificially constructed states, but on natural ethnic communi-
ties. In addition, it will be based on the respect for the sovereignty and indi-
vidual character of every individual ethnic community instead of a
supranational (and thus imperialist) goal.
Ethnopluralism is also one of the core arguments in the party’s solution to
the immigration problem. The Flemish ethnic community should remain
untouched by alien elements and must defend itself against the ongoing inva-
sion of ‘elements from alien cultures’. According to Annemans, the right to
cultural identity includes the right to one’s own culturally homogeneous ter-
ritory (VLB 12/92). In this manner the VB claims not only to protect the
identity of its own people, but also that of the immigrants. Given that each
ethnic community has the right to a strong and protected identity, the party
opposes any attempt at integration. It defines integration as genocide, since
it transforms independent ethnic communities into an ‘inferior mixture’
(VLB 7/83). Its ethnopluralism is moderated to the extent that the VB dis-
tinguishes between European and non-European ethnic communities. The
first are believed to be related to the Flemings, as they share a (higher-order)
European culture. This would enable Europeans to assimilate, whereas non-
Europeans miss this communality and are (thus) seen as incapable of assim-
ilating into the Flemish community.
Opponents have condemned this distinction between European and non-
European immigrants as racist. This view is believed to have been strength-
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ened by the party’s explicit reference to different ‘races’ and its exclusion of
Turks from the ‘Occident’ (Avondland). The VB always sharply rejected any
suggestion of racism; Annemans even called upon his colleagues to press
legal charges against people that call them racist (VLB 6/87). The party
insists that it never speaks in terms of ‘superiority’ and that it even explicitly
states that Flemings are no better than people of any other ethnic commu-
nity. It merely states that just as Flemings would have difficulties living in the
desert, so too would North Africans (Muslims) have difficulties living in a
complex modern society such as Flanders. Moreover, having been uprooted
from their own culture, they find themselves embroiled in all sorts of prob-
lems, such as drug addiction, crime, etc. Since this is a natural process, the
immigrants themselves are not responsible, but rather the Belgian and Flem-
ish politicians. They have torn them out of their own cultures by false
promises and stripped them of their own identity by a policy of integration.
The immigrants are therefore ‘deracinated’ which, in the party propaganda,
is tantamount to saying ‘murdered’. Consequently, the VB concludes that it
is the established parties that are the real racists (VLB 11/82).
Notwithstanding the dominance of ethnopluralism the party paper is not
completely free from claiming the inferiority of other cultures. For instance,
in its protest against ritual slaughter the VB claims that ‘(i)t is wrong that
more and more foreign cultures, and that more and more foreign customs
and traditions, which often involve a centuries-old civil and cultural degen-
eration, would be getting protection with us’ (VLB 8/87). This kind of eth-
nocentrist reasoning is quite recurrent in the party paper. Outright racism,
on the other hand, is not.6 Even though the party does distinguish between
different races and ascribes certain hereditary features to them, it does not
place them in a hierarchical order. In accordance with the ethnopluralist
vision, it speaks of ‘different but equal’.
The party has only rarely been accused of anti-Semitism. The first time it
happened, Dillen reacted furiously. He compared the accusing journal to the
defamatory (and rabidly anti-Semitic) pre-war German journal Der Stürmer
(The Stormtrooper) and dared them to find one anti-Semitic remark in all
his (many) writings. As far as the party literature is concerned, no evidence
of, or even hint at, anti-Semitism could be found. The few times that Jews
are mentioned in the paper, they are cited as examples of a nationalism that
is accepted by the media and the left-wing, in sharp contrast to the nation-
alism of the Flemings.
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sweet innocent savages, so adored and glorified by the red media, churches, literature and other
lucrative organisations, have in a natural manner beheaded at least 17 opponents. Whether they
have eaten their prey, we do not know. They did have a large banquet, so they say, and the heads
were put on the table. Because we do not know French, we say: Chase away the whites, and the
savages will come back at a gallop’ (VLB 1/83).
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Xenophobia
In the early years the VB aimed its xenophobia mainly, though not exclu-
sively, at the French speaking part of the country. Even in the 1990s, every
issue of the party paper contains at least one article in which the Belgian
abuses against the Flemish people were raised. In the vision of the party Bel-
gium is a ‘historical mistake’, founded against the wish of the (Flemish)
people by French speaking ‘mutineers’. With reference to its 150th anniver-
sary, the Belgian state was described as: ‘The absurdity that has enslaved,
crushed, derided, hit, hurt and oppressed our ethnic community – with the
deliberate intent to destroy Flanders and the Flemish ethnic community –
and this is the truth’ (VLN 2/80).
By French speaking Belgians the party refers to both Walloons and ‘Belgi-
cists’, i.e. people that consider themselves first and foremost Belgians instead
of Walloons or Flemings. Though the Walloons are attacked at least as often
as the Belgicists, they are treated with (slightly) more respect and under-
standing. The VB accuses the Walloons, most importantly, of imperialistic
and expansionist behaviour by not honouring the ‘facilities’ of the Flemish
minority in Walloon, while at the same time misusing their own facilities in
Flanders. Belgicists are seen primarily as immoral entrepreneurs, who act
solely out of egocentric materialist motives. Its personification is the Belgian
royal family, which only supports the Belgian state because its life of luxury
depends on it. Even more detested are the pro-Belgian Frenchified Flemings,
referred to as franskiljons, who are not only hedonists, but also traitors to
the own ethnic community – the most serious crime for nationalists. How-
ever, as most of them are perceived as victims of actions of earlier genera-
tions or simply weak characters, the VB is prepared to take them back. After
all they remain (inextricably linked) members of the Flemish ethnic com-
munity and can thus again find their natural place after a proper process of
‘re-Flemification’.
The VB is fairly critical of the Flemish people. The ‘Flemish Sancho Panza’
(Vlaamse Lamme Goedzak) is regularly described as passive and easily
appeased by promises of the ‘wallingants’ and Belgicists. In an exceptionally
harsh criticism, it once wrote: ‘Already a long time ago our party has come
to the conclusion that the reason that an independent Flanders still does not
exist is the character of the Flemish people rather than the obstinacy of the
French speakers in this country’ (VLB 5/87). All in all, the party paints a
remarkably negative picture of the cohabitation of the two main ethnic com-
munities in Belgium: ‘A cheat (Walloon) and a dope (Fleming) cannot play
cards together’ (VLN 10/80). Hence it should come as little surprise that the
VB is not chauvinist, often considered a core feature of nationalist parties.
Originally, the ‘immigration problem’ was addressed entirely as part of the
Belgian problem. Already the first issue of the paper featured a large article
in which the guest workers were pictured as playthings of higher and darker
forces. In a later article the conspiracy was unfolded further: the guest work-
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ers were brought to Flanders by Belgicist big business to replace the Flemish
workers, so that the wages would not have to be raised. This was supported
by Walloon politicians, as they were either servants of big business or saw the
guest workers as a way of enlarging their political power. This latter moti-
vation also explained the support of the labour unions, which saw the for-
eign workers as potential supporters.7 The party claims a historical analogy
in its opposition to the settlement of immigrants in Flanders.
For years Flanders has fought for its own existence, for self-government with-
out interference of others. After years we more or less succeeded in silencing
those other foreigners, the French speakers, in a large part of Flanders. We do
not at all like having to start another battle against other influences in our ter-
ritory that are alien to our ethnic community. (VLN 7/79)
Though the first Belgian political party to address the issue of immigration
as a problem, the VB saw it primarily as an issue for the future at that time.8
However, the immigration problem became more pressing for the party over
time. Already one year later the party congress decided that a start should be
made on ‘making the over abundant foreigners redundant, especially the
non-European’ (VLN 4/81). That same year the party began to address
immigration in a xenophobic manner; suggesting, for instance, that the day
‘that the guest workers will – literally – face us with drawn knives is really
not that far away’ (VLN 6/81). Since the mid 1980s, under the influence
most notably of Dewinter, opposition to immigration was voiced not only
more prominently, but also differently.9
Most importantly, the standpoint on immigrants toughened considerably.
The separation between Europeans and non-Europeans became decisive in
the choice between repatriation and assimilation. Originally the propaganda
had been directed primarily at Italians and Portuguese and their repatriation.
Under the (perceived) pressure of the growing number of non-Europeans,
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7 This strange coalition of big business and labour unions was seen to be the result of their
shared Belgicist ideology, which, like the immigration policy, was anti-Flemish.
8 ‘The extremely complex problem of the politics on foreigners also came up. This problem
will have to be elaborated further. However, we must not bury our heads in the sand here, if we
want to avoid that in due time the immigrants will dictate the law. A clear end to immigration
forces itself upon us. Also the repatriation of those elements that are not willing to work or that
are criminal’ (VLN 10/80).
9 This is not to say that this issue had not featured within the party propaganda before that
time. The 1981 parliamentary election was contested with the slogan: ‘400,000 unemployed,
so why then guest workers?’. The next year, the VB fought the local election in the Antwerp
region primarily on the issue of immigration. Nor is it correct to suggest that the VB’s sixth
party congress of 1984, which was devoted solely to the issue of guest workers, was the start-
ing point of its xenophobic propaganda (as does Gijsels 1992). In fact, it was not until 1987 that
it became a central issue in all party literature, both externally and internally directed. It was
also in this year that the unofficial sub-title of the party was changed from ‘the Flemish nation-
alist party’ to ‘Our own people first’.
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European immigrants were allowed to remain if they assimilated. This was
accompanied by the uprooting of two new groups as prime targets of the
xenophobic propaganda: first and foremost the Muslims (predominantly
immigrants from Morocco and Turkey), and second (non-European) asylum
seekers. While the guest workers had originally been portrayed primarily as
naive slaves at the hands of big business, they featured increasingly as the
cause of all problems. The term ‘guest worker’ was more and more replaced
by the term ‘immigrant’, which indicated that they had come out of their
own free will and had come to stay. The immigrants were more and more
portrayed as a financial burden (‘guest unemployed’) and as a threat (‘guest
terrorists’).
The most important aspect of the party’s xenophobic propaganda, how-
ever, is Islamophobia. Fundamentalism is seen as the logical consequence of
Islam: ‘a doctrine, which preaches holy war, assassination, forced conver-
sions, oppression of women, slavery and extermination of “infidels”, will
automatically lead to what we now call fundamentalism’ (VLB 6/93). Mus-
lims are portrayed as the fifth column of a cruel and expansionist religion.
As a consequence of the Gulf war, for instance, the VB called upon the gov-
ernment to immediately make a list of repressive measures which it consid-
ered necessary to keep Belgium (and thus Flanders) from being Islamicised
and Brussels from becoming ‘the most Northern town of the Magreb’ (VLB
2/91). As a prime example of the ongoing Islamisation of Flanders, the VB
usually points to the Antwerp district of Borgerhout, which it refers to as
‘Borgerocco’.
Though less prominent, asylum seekers have also grown into a target of
the xenophobic propaganda. In general, the VB portrays them as either ‘gold
diggers’ or cowards. The first term is used to describe the economic refugees,
who according to the party constitute the vast majority of all asylum seek-
ers. The genuine political refugees, on the other hand, are often accused of
cowardice, as their political struggle is in their own country (VLB 10/86).10
More and more, refugees are integrated into the xenophobic picture of the
‘time bomb’, which has different applications: on the one hand, the threat
of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism in Western Europe, and, on the
other hand, the demographic time bomb, i.e. as a consequence of birth fig-
ures Flanders will be inhabited primarily by immigrants in the not too dis-
tant future (e.g. De Man 1991).
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the party had always been extremely sympathetic towards refugees from (European) commu-
nist regimes; referring to them as ‘driftwood of collapsing political systems, of which they bear
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Socio-economic policy
One of the few topics on which the VB expresses a somewhat ambiguous
position is socio-economic policy. Whereas the party paper, and to a lesser
extent the election programmes, mainly features neo-liberal rhetoric and
preoccupations, the party programme seeks its inspiration in so-called soli-
darism.11 Solidarism is an ideology composed of a ‘social-ethical triptych’:
the idea of solidarity, the principle of subsidiarity and tolerance (VB 1990:
9). A solidarist system is an organic structure of smaller and larger commu-
nities that blend into one harmonious entity. Without using the term the VB
seems to aspire to a ‘third way’, i.e. an alternative societal system to ‘both
the liberalistic capitalism of exploitation [and] the Marxist and communist
systems of compulsion’ (VB 1990: 10). However, it is not able to provide a
concrete description of this alternative system: ‘A solidarist community is an
achievement-oriented community, which the Vlaams Blok sets consciously
against the delusion and blurring of the modern welfare state’ (VB 1990:
10).
In contrast to the party programme, socio-economic policy has for a long
time played an almost negligible role in the party paper. Originally the topic
had the interest of only a few authors, most notably Truyens and Smout, who
tried to elaborate an ‘ethnic economy’ (volkse economie) based on solidarist
principles. One of its central principles is the duty to work. Social security is
seen as an emergency situation for those members of the ethnic community
that, through no fault of their own, are willing but unable to perform their
task towards that same community (VLN 6/81). Indeed, those that are phys-
ically able to work but cannot find a job will have to do compulsory com-
munity service in return for unemployment benefits (VLB 3/87). Another
solidarist trait is the stress on the role of the family within the socio-eco-
nomic system. ‘In our current neo-capitalist society the problem of unem-
ployment is considered a problem of the individual: the unemployed.
However, as the family is the smallest organic cell in the society, one can
safely say that unemployment is a family problem’ (VLB 1/87). In line with
this vision the party’s call for full employment does not mean that every indi-
vidual should have a job, but rather that within every family at least one
member should have a job.
Throughout the years, socio-economic policy was increasingly presented
in a neo-liberal style. The VB now primarily demands less state involvement
in the economy, arguing for the privatisation of certain state tasks or at least
a limitation of the role of the state. Real jobs can be created only by a climate
of investment that is friendly to businesses, not by ‘artificial injections of the
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11 Solidarism has its roots in the Papal Encyclical of 1931, the Quadragesimo anno, and the
‘new order’ movements that preceded the Second World War (in the case of Flanders, the VNV
and Verdinaso).
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state’ (VLB 6/93). It further wants a reduction of the welfare state, including
a ‘reasonable financial hurdle’ on all medical performances (VLB 2/93) and
more individual responsibility for pensions (VLB 3/93). The party favours
free transfer of goods within the EU, though rejecting the ‘European
Moloch’ with its excessive body of restrictive rules (e.g. VLB 3/93). 
Rather, it seeks salvation in reducing social expenses, easing the economic
structures and promoting technological innovation. In typical neo-liberal
discourse, the VB wants to give the ‘European genius’ its breathing space
back by replacing the ‘Eurocratic palaces and their extravagant lackeys’ 
(VLB 6/94).
In the early 1990s the VB started working on a more social image, taking
up issues such as employment and poverty. In December 1993 the VB organ-
ised the thematic conference ‘Poor Flanders’ which was considered a first
step in ‘building the natural bridge between nationalism and social revival’,
which socialism has always prevented (VLB 1/94). This led to an increase in
attention to socio-economic policies within the party paper, as well as in
brochures and election programmes. Under the guidance of Jan Penris, the
VB has tried to modernise its solidarism. In November 1996 the party organ-
ised a special conference under the title ‘Flanders works’ to elaborate its
socio-economic programme (VB 1/97). In addition, in an attempt to consol-
idate its strong support among workers, the party started to organise large
celebrations on Labor Day – to the embarrassment of the SP and the trade
unions (e.g. VBM 4/99). In line with the new position, the election pro-
grammes proclaim that ‘social security is much needed’ and include the
(costly) goal ‘to save and even increase the pensions’ (VB 1997).
This notwithstanding, socio-economic policy has always held and had a
clear and dominant nationalist and welfare chauvinist component. On the
one hand, the party uses nationalist arguments to proclaim that the policies
have to benefit (exclusively) their own ethnic community. On the other
hand, economic arguments are used to corroborate the claim for an inde-
pendent Flemish Flanders. The party criticises the so-called ‘North–South
transfers in Belgium’, claiming that Flanders (including Brussels!) trans-
ferred 418 billion BF to Walloon in 1992; which means that each Walloon
received almost 130.000 BF from Flanders (Annemans and Smout 1993:
15). Consequently, the party calls for Flemish independence to overcome
this injustice. In preparation for Flemish independence the VB wants a split
of the Belgian social security system into an independent Walloon and a
Flemish system.
In a somewhat similar vein the party presents economic arguments against
the presence of immigrants (e.g. Annemans and Dewinter 1991; Dewinter
and Penris 1993). Given the high unemployment Belgium/Flanders cannot
afford (illegal) guest workers. The VB has expressed this belief since the
1981 election in its slogan ‘400,000 unemployed, why then guest workers?’.
It wants the guest workers to get a golden handshake and to go home: ‘Work
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in the own area!’ (VLN 6/79).12 At the same time, however, the VB points to
the high percentage of unemployed immigrants (‘guest unemployed’), stress-
ing the high welfare costs of this group. According to the party immigration
costs the Belgians annually over 120 billion BF (Dewinter, Huybrechts and
Penris 1992: 3).
Ethical values
A theme that plays an important role in the whole party literature is that of
ethical values. This theme has always featured prominently in the party
paper and, especially in the early 1990s, the VB devoted several brochures
to it. The core of the party’s view on ethical values is its vision of man, which
is purely ethnic nationalist: man cannot be separated from tradition, which
‘reflects the true nature of an ethnic community’ (VB 1990: 11). This indi-
cates an organic vision on the ethnic community, made explicit in the remark
that ‘the dead live on in future generations’ (VB 1990: II).
There are three topics on which the VB has expressed its ethical views
most prominently: abortion, the family and AIDS. In 1989 the party issued
its first brochure on abortion, in reaction to the ongoing debate on its liber-
alisation (Annemans 1989). The VB explicitly portrays itself as the only
defender of the unborn child against the onslaught of the left-wing pro-abor-
tion lobby. It believes that human life starts with conception and that abor-
tion is permitted only when the life of the mother is in danger. In addition
to the complete rejection of abortus provocatus, it calls also for the cultiva-
tion of a new mentality towards the unborn life, for making the adoption of
Flemish children both easier and cheaper, and for a renewed and radical
family policy to fight (the need for) abortion (Anhemans 1989: 26). The
party holds similar views on euthanasia, which it links to the position of the
National Socialists (Annemans 1992: 5), but the topic is addressed far less
frequently.
In May 1991 the VB organised a thematic conference on the family, which
led to the brochure ‘The Family Party’ (Annemans et al. 1991). The foun-
dation of the VB family policy is sketched as follows: ‘The family, as it exists
in our European civilisation, emerges as a highly developed and stable basic
cell, within which the responsibility (towards the next of kin and towards
the ethnic community) is central’ (Annemans 1991: 12). The ‘European
family model’ is based on the marriage between man and woman and a par-
ticular sexual ethos (i.e. monogamy, loyalty, equivalence of man and woman,
respect for physical integrity). This combination is explicitly opposed to
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labour into the tradition of the historical struggle of the Flemish Movement, which had used
the same slogan to oppose the nineteenth-century situation, in which the Flemings had to find
work in Walloon and even France, because Flanders was an underdeveloped, primarily rural
area (and was kept that way by the Belgicists).
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non-European models, such as to Arabian polygamy, and to (European)
anomalies like homosexuality and, to a lesser extent, living together and
divorce (referred to as serial polygamy).
All topics within the ethical value discourse are seen as proof of the claim
that Flanders, as well as the whole of (Western) Europe, is in a process of
moral decay. The ‘progressives’ have created ‘a world in which the tearing
into pieces of millions of children is legal’ (Annemans 1989: 4). To overcome
moral decay the VB wishes the state to play ‘an ethical educational role’ in
the promotion of traditional values (Annemans 1989: 19). The state has to
provide a favourable environment for families, though without interfering
with(in) the family itself. Hence, it should support organisations and educa-
tional programmes that are pro-family and anti-abortion, and help to create
a family friendly economy, chiefly through tax reductions for (large) families
and through a split of the Belgian system of social security. The VB consid-
ers attention to the issues of AIDS and drugs, which feature prominently in
the more recent party literature (e.g. De Man 1993), as the means of reach-
ing the youth with its call for a new morality. Both are linked to immigration
and the general process of moral decay and can be overcome only by a
change in morals, not by more permissiveness.
Within this moral order the woman is expected to perform first and fore-
most the traditional role of mother, and only secondarily that of worker.
Though the VB does its best not to limit the role of educator to the woman
and has certainly become less traditional in this respect after the rejuvena-
tion of the party leadership, it nevertheless tends to equate the two. This is
clearly demonstrated in the otherwise quite progressive plea for career
breaks:
One of the parents with one or more children of three years old or younger has
to have the legal right to career breaks. During this period this woman will
enjoy an educators fee in accordance with her family situation and with the
retention of pension rights. (VLB 5/81; my italics)
The party further wants the state to be more vigilant against the influence of
Anglo-Saxon culture and language. Many articles point to the ‘Cocacoloni-
sation’ of Flanders (and the West), which stands for materialism, con-
sumerism, hedonism and multi-culturalism (e.g. VLB 5/94).
The strong state
A core aspect of the party ideology is the belief that human life is possible
only in a well-ordered community. However, strong authority should never
become tyranny, but should remain between the two extremes of an
omnipresent collectivist state and an anarchic profligacy (e.g. VB 1990: 14).
To ensure this the VB has always called for a strong level of law and order.
With the increasing salience of the immigration problem crime was linked
more and more to that problem and, consequently, has become a major issue
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in the party literature. Many articles deal with the increase in crime and the
fact that the true figures are hidden by the government to mask its failure
(e.g. VLB 3/94). Moreover, the occasional honest researcher (read the VB)
‘comes up against a wall of resistance and refusals’ in the quest for the truth
(Dewinter et al. 1992: 3).
In April 1993 the VB organised a thematic conference entitled ‘Crime:
The Tough Approach’ to develop its programme on this topic (e.g. VLB
5/93). In its resolutions the party calls for various law and order measures to
prevent and punish crime (De Man 1993). In 1999 the issue of crime was
put at the centre of the VB’s election campaign. New figure-head Demol,
illegally wearing his police chief uniform, demanded on posters the ‘right to
security’. In addition, the VB had elaborated upon its law and order pro-
gramme, bundling the demands in a special ‘Security Plan’ (VB 1999b), 
and calling for a ‘zero-tolerance plan’ on the basis of the American (i.e. 
New York) example. The programme is fully in line with earlier convictions
of the party. Both crime and drug abuse (always linked in the literature) 
are considered first and foremost the outcome of the ongoing process of
moral decay, and thus the VB calls for a stronger sense of values. And 
since the moral decay among immigrants is the direct result of their being
uprooted, the party calls for their repatriation as part of its crime 
prevention plan.
Another main feature of its law and order policies is the demand for vigi-
lance on the part of both the state and the population. The VB calls for
meting out harsher punishments and easier possibilities for investigation
(especially regarding drugs dealers), increased funding for the police and
gendarmes, the immediate deportation of foreign criminals, and the aboli-
tion of the Lejeune act on the reduction of sentences (e.g. VB 1991). This
can only be accomplished if the judicial system is purged of all progressive
people, who hold the ‘perverse position that the perpetrator is the victim of
society’ (VLB 5/93). For the VB the real victim should be at the centre and
should be given a far better position in both the legal and help system.
Originally the VB opposed the death penalty, probably as a consequence
of the legacy of the post-war ‘repression’ (the period of ‘denazification’
directly after the end of the Second World War). It was mainly party leader
Dillen who had held the party back in this respect.13 It was therefore sur-
prising that in 1987 the party (through Annemans) proposed a parliamen-
tary bill in which the introduction of the death penalty for drug dealers was
demanded. Even though the party later stated that such sentences would not
be carried out, it looks like the death penalty can count on a more favourable
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response from the younger party leaders (e.g. VBM 3/99).14 Nevertheless, the
call for the death penalty has not yet found its way into the party pro-
gramme: the most recent election programme speaks vaguely of toughening
the sentences ‘up to the most severe sentences’, which mean life-long impris-
onment without the possibility of parole (VB 1997: 26).
In contrast to the position on law and order, the VB’s standpoints on
defense are quite moderate. Military matters feature very scantily in the
party literature, and, even then, the party shows no signs of glorification of
either the army or martial values. Nevertheless, the VB believes that ‘(p)eace
is unthinkable without vigilance’ (VLB 2/85). Hence it supports the institu-
tion of a well-trained and equipped army, though with a relatively small per-
sonnel of some 40,000 people including 5,000 civilians (VLB 1/93). The
main task of this army was for a long time to keep Flanders and Europe free
from both ‘totalitarian Soviet imperialism’ and ‘omnipresent American
dollar-imperialism’ (VLB 7/81). As long as Europe is not able to defend itself,
the party accepts NATO as the lesser of two evils. With the downfall of com-
munism the VB saw a new task for NATO in defending against the threat of
Islam (e.g. VLB 8/90). At the same time it became more and more anti-Amer-
ican, claiming that US presidents use foreign wars (like the Gulf war and the
invasion of Somalia) for internal political benefits. European leaders were
accused of slavishly following the US instead of creating an independent and
strong European force (within the structure of the WEU). Moreover it wants
to limit the deployment of European forces to the European continent. The
only exceptions to this rule are when European interests are very seriously
threatened or when countrymen are in danger (e.g. VLB 9/93).
Rather than a vigilant army the party is concerned with creating a vigilant
‘state of mind’, which it considers to be one of the cornerstones of its nation-
alism (VLB 7/81). This is also at the heart of the party’s opposition to con-
scientious objection to military service. Dillen’s first speech to the European
Parliament was devoted to this topic, in which he described it as a result of
left-wing decay, though accepting the odd exception of a genuine conscien-
tious objector. His opposition was primarily argued on the basis of the
nationalist belief that members of the ethnic community are obliged to
defend their community. Moreover, when people are not prepared to per-
form all duties, they should also not be allowed to enjoy all rights (e.g. VLB
2/85).
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Populist anti-party sentiments
Another important strand in the party literature is constituted by the criti-
cism of the established parties. Originally the VB primarily attacked the
party it derived from, the VU. This ‘enemy number one’ was accused of
having squandered its legacy of Flemish nationalism in order to be accepted
by the established parties and subsequently to profit from the Belgian flesh-
pots. Throughout the years, the VB became more and more detached from
its VU past, and was able to create an identity of its own, only partially
linked to the VU. One of the results of this development was that the party
increasingly directed its anti-party sentiments towards all other parties.
The main point of criticism of the established parties is their alleged anti-
Flemish character. This is linked, on the one hand, with ‘old-fashioned’
Flemish nationalist propaganda, in which the established Flemish parties are
presented as the lackeys of Walloon parties – particularly the all-powerful
Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party, PS). Flemish parties are accused of ignoring
Flemish interests and serving only Belgian, that is Walloon, interests. On the
other hand the critique is connected to the immigration problem, whereby
the established parties are charged with discriminating against Flemings in
favour of (Muslim) immigrants. Thereby they degrade them to third-rate cit-
izens, behind French speaking Belgians and immigrants.
According to the party, the ‘mass invasion’ is caused by a sinister interplay
of big business, political parties and trade unions: the first wanted cheap
labour, the second have acted as ‘water-carriers’ of the first, and the third
hoped to either destabilise the system or to win new members, thereby
increasing their own power (Annemans and Dewinter 1989: 8). To cover up
their own failure the established parties were accused of having launched a
massive propaganda offensive with a torrent of falsified information through
the loyal press. In addition, any opposition to the official gospel is silenced
by accusations of racism, neo-Nazism or fascism (e.g. Annemans and Dewin-
ter 1988). Throughout the years, the topic of the ‘witch hunt’ against the VB
has received more and more attention in the party paper (e.g. VBM 1/99);
the VB even created a ‘media cell’ which reports on anti-VB features in the
Belgian media. Most articles carry reactions to recent events in which the
party is ‘opposed’ by the ‘Establishment’ and its helpers (e.g. Ceder and
Dieudonné, 1994).
Ever since its foundation the VB has attacked the alleged immoral behav-
iour of the established Flemish parties. It accuses them of only furthering
their own interests and of betraying the interests of the Flemish people,
using epithets such as ‘Gang of Four’, ‘political banditry’ or ‘political Mafia’.
No distinction is made between the various Flemish parties; all have ‘dirt on
their hands’ and all are inimical to the VB.15 The direct competitor, the VU,
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ties, even though there is bad, worse and worst’ (Kaderblad 29/91).
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comes in for extra heavy flak, as it used to be a good and clean political party.
The ‘decline of politics’, the VB suggests, can be halted only by an hon-
ourable and idealist party. In this context the party pursues a strategy of
polarising the electorate along the lines of ‘one against all’. While the other
parties purportedly pursue only their own egocentric interests by making all
sorts of compromises, the VB puts the interests of the Flemish ethnic com-
munity above those of the party.
In the 1990s the party changed its self-definition. As the political arm of
the (radical wing of the) Flemish Movement, the VB had seen itself as simply
a tool of others. Consequently, it could not compromise itself by becoming
part of the (Belgian) political establishment, as that would compromise the
whole Movement. The VB therefore operated as a zweeppartij (literally
‘whip party’): ‘a party that puts the other parties under electoral pressure to
adjust their policies to the wishes of the people, to the citizen’ (Vlaams Blok
1992: 12). However, under the pressure of its own electoral success, the VB
has moderated this position. Its electorate might no longer expect only
words but also actions. Yet, at the same time, it also holds deep grudges
against the established parties and politics. This has led the VB to change its
strategy in those cities where it has (or probably will) become the biggest
political party. There the party will
on the basis of a clear and profound programme have to prove that it is not only
willing, but also able to take its responsibility. The other parties that say they
choose for ‘renewal’ have to be given the choice: either with the Vlaams Blok
or together with the other traditional parties against the Vlaams Blok. (VLB
4/93)
According to the party, politics should be withdrawn from ‘the climate of
petty-mindedness, the spirit of cliques and of base calculation’ (VB 1990:
18). This can only be accomplished by the VB as this party is ‘different in
programme, actions and attitude from the shameful business of the current
traditional political parties’ (VB 1990: 18).
While the VB is clear and explicit in its populist anti-party sentiments, it
is nevertheless ambivalent towards party politics per se. On the one hand, it
seeks to bring about a ‘clean sweep’ in politics; in its literature the VB is
almost exclusively negative about (other) political parties (and organised
interest groups). Yet, on the other hand, the VB presents itself as a true polit-
ical party and considers itself part of the same political system as the other
parties. All in all, therefore, it is impossible to find truly extremist anti-party
sentiments in the party paper. Even though the party wants to limit the
power of political parties considerably, particularly by abolishing the system
of political appointments in the civil service and state-owned organisations,
it does not actually attack the institution of the political party itself. More-
over, it fiercely rejects the label of being simply a single-issue party, claiming
instead to be ‘a party of full value’ (VLB 10/93).
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Democracy
The literature hold many derogatory references to the political system, such
as ‘the hopeless Belgian political mess’ and ‘the Belgian nest of vipers’ (Bel-
gische adderkluwen). The party programme even states that ‘(a)s a solidarist
party the VB demands the restoration of a constitutional state in place of the
dictatorship of political parties, pressure groups and individuals’ (VB 1990:
10). Condemnation is also directed at parliament, described as a ‘talk shop’
full of incompetents who sacrifice the interests of the people ‘on party
orders’ (VLB 7/81). At times the comments seemed to indicate a rejection of
not only the practice of parliamentarianism, but also its theory. The party
programme, for instance, speaks of ‘false democratisation and the poisoning
of parliamentarianism’ (VB 1990: 18).
Especially in early publications leading party members had propagated
highly elitist views, devoid of any faith in the judgement of the ordinary cit-
izen. The most active writer in this respect, Eric de Lobel, wrote several arti-
cles in opposition to compulsory voting, disclaiming it as a Trojan horse in
which the ‘intellectual proletariat’ is bought off by drinks in order to bring
certain parties to power (VLB 6/83). In a more ‘academic’ style, he wrote:
On the one hand, our residual freedom is limited by having to vote, while, on
the other hand, the community falls prey to the decisions of a totally unqualified,
manipulable mass, which is forced to vote. That way the democracy will bring
itself down, in the words of Plato, by… a surplus of democracy. (VLB 1/85)
Except for the abolishment of compulsory voting, he also proposed ‘the
introduction of a minimum level of competence for the aspiration to politi-
cal responsibilities (and voting is one of them)’ (VLB 6/83). This elitism was
shared by others, for instance at that time party secretary Jaak Peeters, who
wrote: ‘We reject being guided by “the average man”, by Mr Average. The
rights that are defended by the average equal the right to decay’ (VLB 2/84).
In a similar vein the VB rejected the plea for a referendum on the deployment
of cruise missiles in Belgium, arguing that the people ‘are blinded by the one-
sided pacifist hysteria, especially by radio and television’ (VLB 9–10/83).
Under the influence of the ‘Dewinter group’, the party literature has pre-
sented a more populist image. Since 1990 the VB no longer presents itself as
the voice of a specific group, but as the vox populi, caught aptly in the slo-
gans ‘We say what you think’ and ‘The VB: that is you!’ (e.g. VLB 9/90). The
newly defined party goal is, in the words of Staf Neel, ‘to express the voice
of the small man’ (VLB 10/92). This does not mean that the party maintains
to follow the man in the street indiscriminately. It merely claims to say things
that the man in the street also thinks (though often does not dare to voice).16
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up to the voters. As, in some cases, it requires a lot of arguments and persuasive power to con-
vince the population that we are right’ (VVBM-Nieuwsbrief 8/92).
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This has also led to a revaluation of the instruments of direct democracy. In
1993 the party proposed the introduction of a decisive referendum, thereby
explicitly disclaiming the argument that the people would not be able to
judge in difficult matters (VLB 10/93).
One of the most interesting publications of the VB to date is the ‘Proposal
for a Constitution of the Republic of Flanders’ (Verreycken 1991: 106–32).
The first section of the ‘constitution’ addresses the basic rights of the future
Republic, entailing a largely familiar plea for a liberal constitutional state.
The only major deviation from most other West European constitutions is
the choice for a strict jus sanguinis over a jus soli: ‘A Fleming is someone who
has been born of a Flemish pair of parents’ (Verreycken 1991: 108). In the
commentary the author already nuances this point by stating that a special
workgroup will have to add a formulation to include the possibility of chil-
dren of one Flemish and one Dutch parent, ‘to name but one example’ (Ver-
reycken 1991: 108). The sections on the different organs of the future
Flemish state contain few new ideas.17 Even though the whole constitution
is based on the democratic ideal – article 24 explicitly states that ‘(t)he Flem-
ish republic is a democratic state’ (Verreycken 1991: 115) – the VB remains
sceptical towards the way this ideal has been put in practice. ‘Democracy
should not be confused with endless talking, without saying sensible things’
(Verreycken 1991: 115); a traditional form of anti-parliamentarism. Accord-
ing to the proposal, ‘(d)emocracy should lead to the situation in which the
whole ethnic community can control and sanction the government’ (Ver-
reycken 1991: 115). This is also why political parties will have to be incor-
porated. Yet, on the other hand, it stipulates: ‘The founding of political par-
ties is free. These contribute to the people expressing its political will …
exclusion of political parties should be impossible’ (Verreycken 1991: 115).
The most radical change that the party wants to make to the regular model
of parliamentary democracy, however, which has not found its way into the
constitution proposal, is the representation of children. The VB argues that
the democratic principle of ‘one man, one vote’ is not upheld in present-day
democracies, as children are not represented. Hence, it proposes that chil-
dren will be represented by their parents until they are themselves eligible to
vote: the mother gets an additional vote for the first child, the father for the
second, etc. (Annemans 1991: 25). The party believes that this will give the
family a distinct impact in the political arena and, moreover, will encourage
parents to vote more consciously as parents, thereby promoting the family
(Annemans 1991: 22).
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Revisionism
Amnesty has always been a core issue for post-war Flemish nationalists, and
not only those of the extreme right. The early issues of the paper in partic-
ular featured bitter articles on the way the Flemings were treated by the Bel-
gian state during the post-war ‘repression’. Originally it had been the VU
that almost annually submitted bills to parliament calling for amnesty. After
1978 the VB took over this highly symbolic task. The party has always
devoted attention to the topic, especially in relation to specific occurrences
and dates, and even in the 1990s deemed it important enough to publish a
special brochure (see Verreycken 1993).
The most interesting quality of the brochure is the insight it provides into
the reasons for the plea for amnesty, i.e. the way the VB evaluates the Second
World War and the controversial role of the Flemish Movement during that
period in particular. According to the party there are too many different, and
even opposed, forms of collaboration and resistance to speak of ‘the’ col-
laboration or ‘the’ resistance. Moreover, good and bad were on ‘both sides
of the barricades’ (Verreycken 1993: 5). The sole criterion for the VB to
decide between good and bad was and still is whether one acted in the inter-
est of Flanders (or the Low Countries).
What mattered was the declaration of solidarity with all those, who, coming
from the Flemish Movement, acted for the sake of Flanders and were punished
because of Flanders. Again, that means no approval or disapproval of what has
happened on the Flemish side during the Second World War. (VLN 5/81)
Collaboration and the post-war ‘repression’ are judged from a purely nation-
alistic perspective by the VB. On the one hand, the party speaks of ‘those
who, for the good of the population, have held a political or administrative
office during the Second World War’ (Verreycken 1993: 16), and refers to
the former Eastern Front combatants as ‘soldiers … who, fifty years ago,
driven through idealism, wanted to fight the madness of communism’ (Ver-
reycken 1993: 8). On the other hand, it portrays the repression as ‘blind per-
secution [by] anti-Flemish magistrates’, who wished to defend their Belgicist
views (Verreycken 1993: 9).
Another indication of its revisionist view on the collaboration of Flemings
in both World Wars can be taken from the self-definition of the VB. The
party sets itself up as the latest political representative of the Flemish Move-
ment, placing itself in a long tradition of Flemish nationalist ‘heroes’, includ-
ing leading members of the Raad van Vlaanderen (such as Dillen’s personal
hero August Borms) during the First World War, as well as Cyriel Verschaeve
(poet and priest) and Verdinaso leader, Joris Van Severen, who both collab-
orated with the Germans during the Second World War.
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Conclusion
The VB is a party with an elaborated ideological programme built around
the core of Flemish nationalism. It considers the ethnic community as the
main organisational unit of groups of people. Each ethnic community should
live according to its own nature, that is, they should live separately in their
own states. Regarding their own country this means that the multinational
state Belgium is rejected. The Flemings should get their own Flemish state,
which will become part of some form of federation with the Netherlands, as
the Flemings are considered part of the Dutch ethnic community. In line
with the party’s ethnic nationalism, it demands the return of Flemish terri-
tory and people that have been Frenchified by the Belgian state. Foreigners
are perceived in a xenophobic way, i.e. as a threat. They are to repatriate to
their own countries, though an exception is made for European immigrants,
which are believed to be related to the Dutch culture and have the option of
assimilation. A belief in collective order, either through the family or ethnic
community, is at the core of the party’s view on socio-economic policy and
ethnic values. The economy should support the whole community and the
whole community should support the economy. In general, rights are only
granted if duties (to the ethnic community) are performed. The strong
emphasis on ethical values and law and order are also in accordance with the
nationalist belief: the rejection of abortion and euthanasia, the support for
the family, and the tough law and order policies are all to ensure the healthy
development and future of the ethnic community. Finally, ethnic nationalism
is at the core of the VB’s anti-party sentiments, view on democracy and revi-
sionism. What matters first and foremost is loyalty to the (Flemish) ethnic
community.
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The extreme right in the Netherlands, 1945–84
Following the end of the Second World War the Dutch process of denazifi-
cation began with the internment of some 100,000 collaborators. Several
former members of the Nationaal Socialistische Beweging in Nederland
(National Socialist Movement in the Netherlands, NSB), the only legal
Dutch political party during the German occupation, and of the (Waffen-) SS
lost their political rights, mostly for several years (see Bank 1998). The
‘Besluit Ontbinding Landverraderlijke Organisaties’ (Resolution concerning
the Dissolution of Treasonable Organisations), which was signed by Queen
Wilhelmina in London on 17 September 1944, led to the ban on the NSB
and some thirty other (National Socialist) organisations (Van Donselaar
1993: 88). The decree was also supposed to keep the country free from the
extreme right by explicitly stating that future organisations which sought to
promote the goals of the banned organisations would also be banned (Bank
1998).
Attempts to build extreme right groups were not completely prevented
(see Iddekinge and Paape 1970; Van Donselaar 1991, 1993). In 1951 some
100 former internees organised themselves in the Stichting Oud Politieke
Delinquenten (Foundation of Former Political Delinquents, SOPD), a sup-
port movement for those who felt harmed in the post-war years. Though the
SOPD did not have any political ambitions, it served as a test case for lead-
ers of later extreme right parties in respect of the validity of the government
decree. One of them, former Waffen-SS Untersturmführer Paul van Tienen,
was a member of the party executive of the Malmö-based European Social
Movement, an international extreme right organisation led by the Swede Per
Engdahl, which despite its notoriety was never politically active or impor-
tant. In 1951 Van Tienen founded a Dutch section, the Werkgemeenschap
Europa in de Lage Landen (Working Community Europe in the Low Coun-
tries, WELL), which never extended beyond a dozen of activists. Two years
later the WELL and the SOPD merged into the first post-war extreme right
party in the Netherlands: the Nationaal Europese Sociale Beweging
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(National European Social Movement). Originally, Van Tienen had favoured
the name Nederlandse Sociale Beweging (Dutch Social Movement), but this
resembled the NSB of the pre-war era too much, especially in name and
acronym. The small adjustment did not rescue the small party (between 100
and 400 members, primarily ‘alte Kameraden’), which was banned in 1955
on the basis of the 1944 decree (see Van Donselaar 1991: 51–79).
The ban led to the development of a new strategy by the old extreme
right. Since it had become clear to them that the authorities would never tol-
erate a right-wing extremist party in which former members of the NSB and
SS would play a leading role, Van Tienen and his comrades decided to ally
themselves with people of the non-discredited political right. In 1956 they
joined the Nationale Oppositie Unie (National Opposition Union, NOU), an
electoral list of right-wing and extreme right individuals and (splinter) par-
ties, which received a mere 0.34 per cent of the votes in the parliamentary
election of that year. This result meant the political end of both the NOU
and Van Tienen, who spent his later life in his ‘Dutch Archive of the Con-
servative Revolution’, a revisionist book shop with a related study centre.
In 1958 the Boerenpartij (Farmers Party, BP) was founded as the party
political representative of a sub-culture of dissatisfied so-called Vrije Boeren
(Free Farmers), which had developed in protest against the forced introduc-
tion of a corporatist structure in Dutch agriculture in 1950 (see Nooij 1969;
Van Donselaar 1991: 121–33). The movement as well as the later party were
led by Hendrik Koekoek, who became (in)famous as Boer (Farmer)
Koekoek, and who had also been part of the NOU. Where the latter had
remained unsuccessful, the BP was one of the most successful newcomers in
Dutch postwar politics (see Lucardie 1996). After a failed attempt in 1959
and some initial positive results in the provincial election of 1962, the BP
entered Parliament with three (out of a total of 150) seats in 1963, increas-
ing to seven four years later. Although the BP was not an extreme right party,
its diffuse national-conservative programme exercised a strong pull toward
not only free farmers but also other groups of dissatisfied people. Among
them were former members of the NSB, some of whom fought elections for
the party, leading to fierce internal debates. The BP was stigmatised in the
media through parallels with the German NPD and the French Poujadists.
After 1968 the party was plagued by internal splits, which led to its rapid
demise – though Koekoek was able to retain his parliamentary seat until
1981, when he competed unsuccessfully under the name Rechtse Volkspartij
(Right-Wing People’s Party). At the end of the 1960s the BP had also lost its
attraction to extreme right activists, and the connections between the right-
wing and extreme right came to an end.
In the 1970s the Nederlandse Volks-Unie (Dutch People’s Union, NVU)
dominated the extreme right spectre in the Netherlands (Bouw et al. 1981;
Van Donselaar 1991: 142–71; Bank 1998). The NVU had been founded on
27 March 1971 by former members of the NSB, although it tried to present
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a modern outlook. In the first three years of its existence the party was vir-
tually unknown to the general public and was preoccupied with internal
struggles. This changed in 1974, when Joop Glimmerveen entered the scene
and put the NVU on the political map. His openly racist campaign for the
local election in the Hague of that year, under the slogan ‘The Hague should
remain white and safe’, won him and the party substantial publicity. The
NVU did not win a seat in the local council, but its name was established as
was the position of Glimmerveen as the new party leader.
Johann Georg Glimmerveen, born in 1928, was a rabid anti-communist
veteran of the Korean War, who afterwards worked as a clerk at a NATO
office in the Netherlands (see Bouw et al. 1981). Though too young to have
a ‘brown past’, his open admiration of Hitler and National Socialism went
beyond what several of the ‘alte Kameraden’ within the NVU deemed
acceptable. However, by combining his admiration of the past with the
modern theme of mass immigration, Glimmerveen made the NVU into a
reservoir of both new and old right-wing extremist persons and ideas,
though it always remained a small political party with probably only a few
hundred members in its heyday. It never achieved an electoral breakthrough,
its best electoral result in a parliamentary election being 0.4 per cent in May
1977. This notwithstanding, the NVU was to some extent an influential
political party in the Netherlands. Through carefully directed actions of dis-
tributing pamphlets, it spurred already slumbering tensions between differ-
ent ethnic groups within the population and gained extensive media
coverage.
Both Glimmerveen and the NVU had to pay a price for their radical,
aggressive campaigns and provocative actions. Several anti-racist organisa-
tions were founded in the 1970s, predominately as a reaction to the NVU’s
openly racist propaganda. These groups fought a fierce battle with Glim-
merveen and the NVU, both verbally and, once in a while, violently. Even
more destructive to the party, in political terms, was the increasing legal
threat. After several years of discussions and preparations, the NVU was
finally characterised as a criminal association by the Amsterdam court in
March 1978. Because of legal technicalities and flaws, this meant that the
party was excluded from the local election of 1978, though without being
banned (see Van Donselaar 1993: 95). Thus the NVU still existed as a legal
political party, but was at the same time characterised as a criminal associa-
tion and excluded from openly functioning as a political party. This schizo-
phrenic situation was ended by the Dutch Supreme Court one year later,
when it decided that as long as the NVU was not banned, the party could not
and should not be obstructed from functioning as a political party in any
way. The exclusion from the local election was ruled unlawful, even though
this did not have any practical consequences for the party. Moreover, the
legal rehabilitation could not save the NVU from a rapid demise.
The radicalisation in both ideology and style of the NVU went too far for
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several members. Already in the 1970s it had led to internal conflicts, even
leading to the temporary ousting of Glimmerveen as party leader. After his
return, and the consequent legal troubles, several of the ‘moderate’ members
left the NVU and founded other, more or less moderate extreme right par-
ties. One of these was the Nationale Centrumpartij (National Centre Party,
NCP), founded on 28 December 1979. The NCP lived a short life: after a
meeting in February 1980 – the first meeting of the party after its founda-
tion – some of the youth that had attended the meeting (among whom some
leading members of the party) attacked ‘illegal’ foreigners who took shelter
against expulsion in an Amsterdam church. One week later the NCP dis-
solved itself. Already the next day, on 11 March 1980, the Centrumpartij
(Centre Party, CP) was founded by one of the NCP-founders: Henry Brook-
man, a social scientist at the Free University of Amsterdam, who had been a
prominent member of the NVU.
The CP was the first ‘successful’ party of what was to become the so-called
centrumstroming (centre movement), the collective term used for the CP and
its successor parties (see below), in which several former members of the
NVU would find a new political home (see Brants and Hogendoorn 1983;
Hirl 1987; Van Donselaar 1991). The party presented a manifesto, similar
to that of the NCP, marked ‘not left, not right’. It contained ten points which
were a remarkable combination of right-wing (law and order), left-wing
(protection of social benefits), and green (protection of the environment and
animals) standpoints (see Mudde 1998). It was the tenth point, however,
that would be the centre of attention in the following years: ‘The Nether-
lands is not an immigration country, so put a stop to the stream of foreign-
ers.’ This, together with the political history of some of its early members,
was the main reason that the media portrayed the CP from the outset and
consistently as an extreme right party, despite the party’s fierce rejection of
any accusations of racism and fascism.
At the parliamentary election of 1981 both the CP and NVU gained a
mere 0.1 per cent of the votes. It seemed that both parties were destined to
disappear into oblivion. As a consequence of the fast fall of the government,
both parties could contest another parliamentary election one year later. For
the NVU the 1,632 votes (0.0 per cent) it received signalled the end of its
electoral existence; it disappeared completely from the political scene,
though it was not disbanded officially until 1991 (and refounded in 1998).
The CP, on the other hand, gained 0.8 per cent of the votes and thereby one
seat in the Second Chamber. It was the first parliamentary seat won in the
post-war period by a party that was generally considered to be right-wing
extremist. Party leader Hans Janmaat became the Member of Parliament for
the CP.
Johannes Gerardus Hendrikus Janmaat, born in 1934 and a political sci-
entist by training, had a history of various short-lived and failed professional
and political careers (see Van Ginneken 1994; Van Holsteyn 1998). In ear-
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lier days he had been a (active) member of the Katholieke Volkspartij
(Catholic People’s Party) and the Democratische Socialisten ‘70 (Democratic
Socialists ‘70) – he might also have been a member of the left-wing liberal
Democraten’66 (Democrats’66) and the right-wing liberal Volkspartij voor
Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy). After
reading an interview with Brookman, he joined the CP (allegedly as its sev-
enth member) and within a short time had taken over the leadership of the
party. This was largely facilitated by the small membership, his ‘clean’ (i.e.
non-extreme right) political history, and the fact that Brookman had to move
more into the political background after pressure from his employer.
During the first years following its electoral success of 1982 the CP grew
steadily, claiming some 3,500 members in 1984. During that time it had
some remarkable electoral results, of which the most significant were the
almost 10 per cent in the local election in the new city of Almere in 1983
and the (nationwide) 2.5 per cent in the European election of 1984. As the
NVU before, the CP received its highest scores in the urbanised western part
of the country, the so-called Randstad, especially in the four main cities of
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague and Utrecht. Consequently, its electoral
success was primarily seen as a protest against the presence of foreigners,
and some commentators even spoke of a ‘racist electorate’ (Van Donselaar
1982: 134; Brants and Hogendoorn 1983: 42).
The success led to serious conflicts between the party leadership, led by
chairman Nico Konst and vice-chairman Henk de Wijer, and the ‘parlia-
mentary party’, i.e. Janmaat and his assistants (see Schikhof 1997). The
fighting factions were given much space in the media to slander each other.
There followed weeks of public counter-accusations in which the party lead-
ership accused Janmaat of financial and personal improprieties and in which
Janmaat reacted by accusing the party leadership of neo-Nazi sympathies
and political and organisational incompetence. In the autumn of 1984 the
party leadership decided to expel Janmaat (and a few of his followers). Jan-
maat refused to give up his seat in the Second Chamber and stayed on as an
independent MP. The end of the CP was but a matter of time.
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Janmaat – right or wrong!
At ten o’clock in the morning of 7 November 1984 four people walked into
a notary office in The Hague. Eleven minutes later they left again, having
created the Centrumdemocraten (Centre Democrats, CD). Three of the
founders were former (low-key) members of the CP. The same evening the
party gained two more members, yet it would take four weeks before the
seventh member, Hans Janmaat, would join the party. On 5 December 1984
Janmaat announced his new affiliation to the chairman of the Second Cham-
ber. Because of legal technicalities Janmaat remained officially an indepen-
dent MP.
From the moment Janmaat joined, the CD was identified as his party.
Most journalists and scholars even (incorrectly) mention him as the founder
of the CD. But even though the new party received extensive media cover-
age during its first years, mainly as a consequence of Janmaat’s reputation,
its membership remained well below 100. The party contested its first elec-
tion in May 1986, trying to defend Janmaat’s seat in the Second Chamber.
It used the name Lijst Janmaat/Centrumdemocraten to profit from Janmaat’s
profile, which was far higher than that of the virtually unknown CD. How-
ever, the 1.5 million pamphlets that the party had claimed to have distrib-
uted prior to the election could not undo the damage of the years of internal
fights in the ‘centre movement’. The CD gained a disappointing 0.1 per cent
of the votes, partly as a result of the competition with the old CP, which
gained 0.4 per cent. It appeared that the CD was to finish like most new par-
ties, particularly splinters of (small) parties, in political oblivion. This expec-
tation was strengthened by the results at the provincial election the next
year, where the CD unsuccessfully stood candidates in the three provinces of
the Randstad, i.e. North and South Holland and Utrecht.
During this time the CD had received large media attention on two occa-
sions. The first and most widely covered story was an ‘anti-fascist’ attack on
a hotel in Kedichem, in which members of the CP and CD had convened, in
March 1986. Within extreme left circles it was believed that they were plan-
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ning a fusion of the two parties. Some anti-fascists thought that this should
be stopped by all means necessary, including fire bombing the hotel. In the
consequent panic CD party secretary Schuurman lost one of her legs after
jumping out of a window of the burning hotel. The second occasion was Jan-
maat’s attempt to win reinstatement as a teacher at his old school. The
school did not want to take him back for fear of his reputation as a racist (as
some students and parents had protested). Janmaat claimed his right to
return to his old job after having served as MP, a claim supported by the
Dutch court. However, the court also acknowledged the school’s claim that
the relations between Janmaat and the school had become unworkable, and
Janmaat was bought off. As nothing else remained for him, he returned to
politics.
The 1989 parliamentary election was well prepared by the CD, which
again contested the election under the official name of Lijst Janmaat/Cen-
trumdemocraten, also because the CD was often confused with the CP. As
the party stood candidates in all nineteen voting districts of the country, it
won the right to state supported television and radio time. Opponents of the
party had tried to contest the legality of the signature lists, which is required
of all parties that are not represented in the old Parliament in order to con-
test elections within a voting district. The ‘anti-racists’ were not successful,
however, as the CD had been able to provide all signatures by genuine party
supporters (see DNPP 1990). Although the CD at that time counted a mere
300 members, it was able to distribute thousands of pamphlets and gain a lot
of media attention. Eventually the party got what it had worked for, Jan-
maat’s return to the Second Chamber (with 0.9 per cent of the votes).
In the local election of 1990 the CD continued its success, securing eleven
seats in eight (big) cities in the Randstad (see Husbands 1992). These were
also the strongholds of the provincial election the next year, when the CD
gained three seats (in North and South Holland as well as Utrecht). The elec-
toral success also led to a short-lived impulse to develop the organisational
side of the party. At the party conference of December 1991, party secretary
Wil Schuurman claimed a weekly increase of 100 members in the last
months of the year. Even though this will have been an exaggeration, the CD
no doubt underwent one of its biggest gains in membership and probably
counted some 2,000 (paying) members at the end of 1991. Still, the number
of active members remained small, a mere 100 at best, and constituted
almost exclusively by party representatives at the various levels. This was
also why the party was only ‘visible’ at the level of representative bodies,
although some party delegates were reported to be frequently absent from
council debates (see Van Riel and Van Holsteyn 1998).
The super election year of 1994 was approached with much optimism by
the CD. Opinion polls had predicted large gains throughout 1993 (see
Mudde and Van Holsteyn 1994; Van Holsteyn 1995) and within the party
this had led to wild speculations. The first test was the local election in
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March, which substantiated the optimism. The CD had put forward candi-
dates in only forty-three (of over six hundred) municipalities and gained sev-
enty-seven seats (an increase of sixty-six). In almost every city where the CD
had participated, it had gained representation. Both within and outside of
the party it was expected that the CD would gain more than five seats in the
parliamentary election of May. Some people, among them Janmaat, even
predicted that the party could get as many as ten seats.
This optimism was harshly tempered by the many scandals in which the
CD then became involved. Directly after the local election the party became
the victim of its bad organisation and lack of active members. Several local
seats were either not filled by the party, as those elected did not take up their
seats, or were taken by people who left the party soon afterwards. Some of
these joined or founded another party, others kept their seats as independent
council members, and yet others left politics altogether (see Van Holsteyn
1995). The party had also been infiltrated by no less than three undercover
journalists, who in their publications portrayed the CD as ‘a party of fascists,
criminals and scum’ (Rensen 1994a; also Kooiman 1994; Van Hout 1994).
Particular emphasis was put on members that were known for their (former)
neo-Nazi links, such as the council member in Purmerend, Richard van der
Plas. The biggest impact was caused by the television program Deadline, in
which a newly elected Amsterdam council member (Yge Graman) was filmed
by a hidden camera bragging about having started several fires in centres
providing services for foreigners in the early 1980s. The program was broad-
cast the weekend before the parliamentary election and led to a public
outcry (and later conviction of Graman).
The CD gained only 2.5 per cent of the votes, securing three seats in the
Second Chamber. Even though this meant an increase of 1.6 per cent (and
two seats), it was well below what was feared by opponents and hoped for
by party members, especially given the fact that the election had been one of
the most dramatic of the century, with a record number of seats changing
hands (Irwin 1995). Moreover, in almost all municipalities where the CD
had submitted candidates in March, it received only half the number of votes
in May. Nonetheless, even these relatively poor results dismayed some com-
mentators and politicians. Wim Kok, leader of the social democratic Partij
van de Arbeid (Labour Party, PvdA) and premier-to-be, spoke of ‘a black day
in Dutch history’ (Mudde and Van Holsteyn 1994: 132). Most disappointed,
however, was Janmaat himself, who blamed the result on the anti-CD cam-
paign in the media, which was (as usual) claimed to be part of a larger con-
spiracy against the party (directed by the BVD and PvdA).
One day after the parliamentary election, Janmaat, Schuurman and the
CD were convicted to a series of fines, ranging from 1,000 to 10,000 Dutch
guilders, for incitement to racial hatred (IJA 1994). Although the amount of
negative publicity decreased sharply after the election, defections of local
council members of the CD remained the order of the day until the Euro-
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pean election of June. In that election the CD saw its support fall to a mere
1.0 per cent (against 0.8 per cent in 1989), which was well below the
required result to obtain a seat. Because of the record low turnout (35.6 per
cent), this meant that only 43,300 people had voted CD, against some
250,000 in May. This time the CD lost in all corners of the country, even in
the newly conquered territories of the Southwest.
The rest of the year it remained relatively silent around the party, though
reports on scandals with (former) members and on the exodus of local coun-
cil members kept appearing from time to time. At the end of 1994 the CD
acknowledged that ‘twenty odd’ of its seventy-seven elected council mem-
bers had left the party.1 This notwithstanding, the party mentioned that its
tenth anniversary had been celebrated in good spirits. The electoral losses
were taking their toll on the party though, as members left or looked for
cooperation with other extreme right parties (Lucardie 1998). As always,
Janmaat remained sceptical towards any initiative outside of his control. In
May 1996, for example, he expelled four members of Rotterdam city and
district councils for being too closely linked to the local branch of the CP’86
(JPR 1997). Eventually, however, Janmaat gave in and even agreed to coor-
ganise several demonstrations with the CP’86; the most notable were in
April 1996 in Zwolle, where some 130 people demonstrated against multi-
culturalism, and the remembrance of the ‘Battle of Kedichem’ by some
eighty people one month earlier (see JPR 1997). This increased activity led
not only to a wave of publicity, but also twice to Janmaat’s arrest and later
conviction for discrimination and ‘inciting racial hatred’ (e.g. JPR 1997;
DNPP 1998). The cooperation would again not last long, in part because of
resistance within the CP’86 (see chapter 6), in part because of distrust by
Janmaat. In the approach to the election year 1998 Janmaat distanced him-
self increasingly from the ‘extremist’ CP’86, trying to present himself as the
‘decent’ nationalist alternative.
The 1998 elections became the CD’s waterloo. This was not unexpected,
as the party had already lost all its seats in the local councils of the province
of Brabant in the by-election of November 1996. In the regular local elec-
tion of March 1998 the party participated in only twenty-two municipali-
ties, against forty-five in 1994, losing all but one of its seventy-seven seats
(DNPP 1998: 23). With the one seat in Schiedam the CD was as successful
as the NB of arch rival Vreeswijk, which was able to hold on to its seat in
Utrecht. Two months later the CD lost all three seats in parliament, gaining
just 0.6 per cent of the vote. This meant that after nine consecutive years in
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parliament, as well as an earlier period of four years, Janmaat was no longer
an MP. The dramatric losses were in part caused by new legislation, by and
large directed against the extreme right, which had raised the number of
required signatures per district from ten to twenty-five. As a consequence,
the CD was not able to contest the election in all nineteen districts, despite
buying signatures from homeless and addicts with drugs and money, losing
valuable percentages. However, the result was also a consequence of a
change in political mood as well as the payment for years of internal (and
external) bickering and the lack of (positive) political actions.
Janmaat reacted furiously to the electoral results, accusing the state of
manipulating the voting computers. He even went as far as to submit a com-
plaint against the Dutch Election Council to the Council of Europe,
demanding either new elections or twenty million guilders (his estimate of
lost income and subsidies of the party). As so often before, he pointed to a
conspiracy by the BVD and PvdA to keep him from power. At the same time,
Janmaat grew increasingly worried by the legal pressure, believing the CD
would be the next target after the CP’86. To ‘outsmart’ the state, Janmaat
founded the Conservatieve Democraten (Conservative Democrats), which
was to succeed the (other) CD if it were to be banned. In March 1999 the
party lost its two seats in the provincial councils of North- and South-Hol-
land, even though it almost held on to the latter. Three months later, the
party contested the European election as the Lijstverbinding Centrumde-
mocraten/Conservatieve Democraten, an ‘electoral list’ of two names which
represented the same one party. The 0.5 per cent the list were able to gather
were widely considered to have been the last cramp of a dying party.
For years the CD claimed a membership of some 3,000, despite the fact that
it also claimed a rapid increase for years. Journalists and scholars have gen-
erally taken this number to be an exaggeration, placing the ‘exact’ number
generally between 1,000 and 1,500 (Buijs and Van Donselaar 1994: 8; Van
den Brink 1994: 211–12; Van Donselaar 1997: 9), though some claimed
2,700 (Rensen 1994b: 122, 126). As a consequence of the dramatic 1998
elections, the membership went down rapidly and is now estimated at some
900 (Van den Brink 1998: 237). The group of active members has always
been very small (even in the party’s heydays counting not more than one
hundred) and narrow in terms of composition (mainly party delegates in the
various representative bodies). More importantly, Janmaat has built the CD
into a family business, being either personally or through his wife (Wil Schu-
urman) involved in virtually every major and minor party decision (see
Lucardie 1998). To Janmaat’s big frustration, the CD has never been able to
attract many youths or even establish a functioning youth organisation; most
extreme right youths were active within the CP’86. The Jonge Centrumde-
mocraten (Young Centre Democrats) were originally founded as a youth
wing of the old CP in the early 1980s. Except for some small scandals the
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group never came into the spotlight. Today, the youth wing, also called CD-
Jongeren (CD Youth), has only few members who, moreover, come virtually
all from the Haarlem area.2
Despite the fact that the CD sees itself as being related to other (success-
ful) ‘patriotic parties’ (CDi 7/94), it holds official contacts only with the
DVU, FN and VB. Ever since the DVU awarded the Andreas Hofer prize to
Schuurman, the CD has been a regular visitor at the annual party meeting in
Passau. In 1995 Janmaat was even one of the key speakers, accompanied by
a party delegation of some ten members (including Schuurman). The con-
tacts with the FN are basically limited to visiting its annual meeting in Paris,
though Janmaat has at times boasted about his good personal contacts with
FN-leader Le Pen. The relationship with the VB has always been trouble-
some, partly because the VB had (better) contacts with rival CP’86 and
partly because Janmaat has been frustrated by the fact that he is always con-
trasted unfavourably to Dewinter in the Dutch press. 
Finally, the party has always maintained official contacts with the CP and
later CP’86, mainly through its special fusion commission (under the lead-
ership of Schuurman). Relations with other splinter parties at the extreme
right fringe have been rare, as most of them had broken away from the CD
(such as the NB and BPN). In general, Janmaat pursues a politics of divide
and rule towards the different groups, offering favourable conditions for a
return (or merger) to some leaders within a group, which, when agreed, he
will then make public and retract thereby increasing the already difficult
relations within and between these small parties. As far as fusion is genuinely
acceptable to Janmaat, it can only be as a take-over of the smaller parties by
the CD under his leadership.
Profiling the literature
Externally oriented: election programmes
The CD published three election programmes in the period 1984–99. Until
1989 the party had issued neither a party programme nor an election pro-
gramme, even though it had (unsuccessfully) contested the 1986 parliamen-
tary election.3 During this period the CD was known by the reputation of its
party leader Janmaat and by some scarcely distributed pamphlets, which
were almost exact copies of the ten-point pamphlets of the old CP. The pic-
ture of the CD changed probably only to a limited extent with the publica-
tion of the CD Partij Programma voor de verkiezingen van 6 september 1989
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van de Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal (CD Party Programme for the
Election of 6 September 1989 for the Second Chamber of the States Gen-
eral, CD 1989). This election programme is an unkempt document of fifteen
A4 pages, which primarily shows the lack of professionalism of the CD. It
includes several language and typing errors, with, for instance, two chapters
XII. The programme opens with two short general sections: the preamble
and the points of departure. Thereafter, the party presents its programme,
which is a collection of (122) demands classified in nineteen policy areas.
The second programme was made for the 1994 parliamentary election
and had the title Oost West Thuis Best (East West, Home Best, CD 1994). It
was published under the responsibility of the scientific bureau of the party,
the Thomas Hobbes Stichting, named after Janmaat’s favourite philosopher,
and is an elaborated version of the 1989 version containing thirty-two A4
pages. The fact that the programme includes only one new section and an
increase of a total of twenty-seven demands, shows that the increase in pages
is larger than that of ideology or policy (and is primarily caused by a differ-
ent lay-out). One of the few interesting new features is the introduction writ-
ten by Janmaat, which starts with a short history of the development of the
programme; the concept was developed by a special programme commission
under the leadership of Wim Elshout (council member in Haarlem and party
treasurer), which was then amended and approved by the party congress.
When the final version of the programme is compared with the ‘list of new
articles for the 1994 party programme of the Centre Democrats’, one can
only conclude that the congress was not critical of the concept. From the
twenty-seven new articles that were proposed by the commission only three
were rejected by the congress.4
The third programme was developed for the 1998 parliamentary election
and was given the mainstream title Trouw aan Rood Wit Blauw! (Loyal to
Red White Blue, CD 1998), referring to the colors of the Dutch national
flag. It counted thirty pages and was again almost identical in style and con-
tent to the earlier programmes. This said, there were some remarkable new
points, which were even completely novel to the party literature, as they had
not even been touched upon in the party paper.
Internally oriented: party papers
The party paper of the CD was originally called Centrumtaal (Centre
Speech) and was first published in January 1986. It was distributed under the
auspices of the scientific bureau of the party, at that time called Stichting
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Wetenschappelijke Onderbouwing Centrumdemocratische Ideologie (Foun-
dation for the Scientific Elaboration of the Centre Democratic Ideology,
SWOCI), and counted some thirty A5 pages. Centrumtaal was meant to
inform the membership every month of the activities of the party, especially
of those of Janmaat in the Second Chamber, and to be readable and under-
standable for all members. For the more intellectual readership, the CD
started another paper, Middenkoers (Middle Course), also published by
SWOCI. Middenkoers was published only three times in 1986, generally
consisting of under twenty pages. The intellectual level of the paper did not
really surpass that of Centrumtaal and both were soon to disappear.
Soon afterwards the CD started to publish two new party papers: CD-
actueel (CD-Up-to-Date, CDa) and CD-info (CD-Information, CDi). CD-
actueel has been published as a quarterly since February 1987, and seems to
be the successor to Middenkoers. Originally it was the official paper of the
party itself, sent free of charge to all party members (and donors), compris-
ing over thirty A4 pages (since 1991 almost constantly twenty). The articles
in the paper were written predominantly by the few better educated mem-
bers – though primarily by Janmaat, who writes under a wide variety of
pseudonyms, and mr. H. Eerlijk (literally mr. H. Honest, a pseudonym for
‘party lawyer’ L. van Heijningen). Since 1989 CD-actueel has been pub-
lished by the scientific bureau of the party; the SWOCI was renamed
Thomas Hobbes Foundation in 1992.
Since 1991 CD-actueel is no longer sent free of charge to all party mem-
bers. Everyone, member or not, has to take out a separate subscription to the
journal. However, in January 1988 the party introduced CD-info, seemingly
as the successor of Centrumtaal, although it is unclear whether this latter
paper was still published in 1987. Originally the new party paper was also a
quarterly but within one year it grew into a monthly; normally it entailed
between ten and twelve issues annually. CD-info was published by the Sticht-
ing Politieke Kadervorming der Centrumdemocraten (Foundation for the
Political Training of the Centre Democrats) and numbers some ten A4 pages.
It was more sketchy and up to date than CD-actueel, as well as more sloppy
in language and typing errors. The main difference, however, is in goal and
substance: only CD-info carries information on internal party matters (like
appointments to and meetings of national, regional and local party
branches). Except for this routine business, CD-info contains mainly articles
on current political issues and on the discussions of fusion with the CP’86.
In the mid 1990s the two party papers were distributed less and less fre-
quently. In 1994 CD-Info was published eight times, the next year five, and
in 1996 only twice; CD-Actueel has not been distributed since 1993. In April
1997 CD-Info was renamed CD-Nieuwsbrief (CD-Newsletter), which was
also the only change made. In terms of counting, lay-out, content, and irreg-
ular publishing the paper is identical to its predecessor.
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The Netherlands for the Dutch first!
State nationalism
The main ideological feature of the party ideology of the CD is nationalism,
aptly caught in the (old) party slogan ‘The Netherlands (in the first place) for
the Dutch’. Above all, the CD wants a Dutch Netherlands, which it sees
being threatened by mass immigration and the state policy of multi-cultur-
alism. However, contrary to ethnic nationalist parties the CD does not
exclude people on the basis of an ethnic criterion. It hardly ever speaks in
terms of the Dutch ethnic community, but almost exclusively in terms of the
Dutch population. It is a state (or civic) rather than an ethnic nationalist
party.
Both forms of nationalism strive for the congruence of state and ethnic
community, but the ethnic nationalist works from a closed concept of the
ethnic community, using an ethnic criterion, whereas the state nationalist is
based on a more open concept, using a civic criterion. According to an ethnic
nationalist one is born into an ethnic community for life and is bound to it
by life. As each ethnic community should determine its own policies, in
essence have its own state, people are bound by birth to one state and can
not change their nationality. Within a state nationalist view the state pre-
cedes the ethnic community (they generally use the term ‘nation’), in the
sense that the nation is not a fixed entity. One can either be legally born into
it, by being born on the territory of the state or by having two (or one) par-
ents with that nationality, or one can become a member of the nation.
The CD allows foreigners to become part of the Dutch nation, normally
referred to as the Dutch citizenship or Dutch population. In fact the party
gives them the principal choice between either repatriation or assimilation.
In the words of the election programme: ‘Foreigners and minorities either
adjust to the Dutch ways and customs or leave the country’ (CD 1989: II.2).
When foreigners assimilate they stop being foreigners and become equal
parts of the Dutch population (CD 1989: XII.9).5 As the party is not ethnic
nationalist, it does not exclude any group from this process on a priori
grounds.
The CD wants to achieve its nationalist goal of internal homogenisation
further by reversing state policy. This is clearly stated in the points of depar-
ture of the election programmes: ‘non-Dutch influences are [to be] pushed
back’ (CD 1989: 1) and ‘stop the anti-Dutch policy’ (CD 1989: 2). This
would enable a return to the old Dutch society in which there was only one
culture, the Dutch one.
The core of this [centre democratic] ideology contains, on the one hand, the
struggle for the preservation and development of the Dutch political and cul-
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tural identity and, on the other hand, the promotion of national solidarity in
our country by trying to prevent unwanted discrepancies between distinctive
sections of Dutch society, or to come to a harmonious solution to these dis-
crepancies, in which we begin from the complete equality of these social sec-
tions. (CD 1989: 1)
One of the few new statements in 1994 was that ‘(t)he programme of the
political party Centre Democrats begins from the indissoluble unity and sol-
idarity of the Dutch ethnic community. It is based on the common history
and the culture that originated from that history’ (CD 1994: 6). This sounds
like a shift towards a more ethnic nationalist position, including an organic
view of the ethnic community. There are a few other indications in this
direction, for instance the demand that government positions should be
open only to people that hold Dutch citizenship in the third generation (CD
1989: I.7). Moreover, in a surprising turn to external exclusiveness, the
1998 programme included the wish for ‘the reunification with Flanders and
other Dutch speaking territories’ (CD 1998: XX.4). However, the same pro-
gramme introduced the not less surprising point: ‘An overarching culture is
to be formed through the amalgamation of different cultural features. Pre-
condition for this amalgamation is that the cultural features which are con-
tributed by the minorities are not opposed to characteristic features of the
Dutch culture’ (CD 1989: III.2b).
This notwithstanding, by and large both the programme and the papers
maintain their state nationalist character centred around the choice between
assimilation and repatriation. The simple fact that the CD sees assimilation
as a possibility suggests that it does not hold a static view on the nation.
Moreover, the CD wants Dutch citizenship to be acquired by passing a state
exam, testing the applicant’s general knowledge, knowledge on constitu-
tional matters, and command of the Dutch language. This is more or less
comparable to that of the US, which does not point to a particularly high
barrier. What the party does have in common with ethnic nationalists, how-
ever, is that it also has a problem with the presence of (large groups of) for-
eigners and that it considers repatriation as an option (but not the only one)
that is to be strongly stimulated (CD 1989: XII.1). As Janmaat formulated
this point of view in his 1989 advice for the cabinet formation:
The cabinet will implement a responsible policy on minorities and migration,
which is expressed in implementing, among other things, the following mea-
sures: a) an end to the policy on family reunion of members of the ethnic
minorities that reside here; b) an end to the policy of affirmative action for
ethnic minorities; c) the exclusion of economic refugees; d) the forceful adop-
tion of the policy of repatriation of minorities. (CDi 5/89)
The opposition of the CD is therefore primarily directed against the multi-cul-
tural society and not against the multi-ethnic society. It wants all people that
live within the Dutch state to be(come) Dutch citizens, members of the Dutch
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community. This is to be done, on the one hand, by giving foreigners the
choice between assimilation and repatriation, and, on the other hand, by state
support of native culture and the cancelation of support for the development
of alien cultures (CD 1989: II.2). The only exception to this latter rule is made
for education in their own language and culture to foreigners and minorities
that have signed a declaration that they will repatriate (CD 1989: IV.1).
In recent years the party’s nationalism is increasingly linked to the theme
of European integration. The CD has always been sceptic towards the
process of European integration. It opposes any limitation of sovereignty of
the Dutch state and sees the Maastricht Treaty consequently as one of the
many international defeats of the Dutch government. The Treaty was the
main inspiration for the new section on territory in the 1994 election pro-
gramme, in which the CD demanded a constitutional guarantee of the sov-
ereignty of the Dutch state (see also CD 1989: XX.3) and argued that the
devolution of national competencies should be made dependent upon the
support of both a referendum and of a two-thirds majority of the two cham-
bers of the State General (CD 1989: II.1). The syphoning of national com-
petencies to the European Union is even considered high treason. Mockingly
the party states that ‘our country is not preserved by our own government,
but by other European governments. Because they do not want to follow the
Dutch proposals to come to a restriction of their own authority’ (CDi 6/92).
Exclusionism
There are some articles in the party literature in which signs of an ethno-
pluralist reasoning can be detected. The first is a point in regard to multi-cul-
tural marriages:
The Government is partly responsible for the consequences of multi-cultural
marriages. Because of its inconsiderate policy many of the Dutch young people
have in their youth been put before irresponsible choices regarding their life
partner. The Government should provide all possible facilities to end these mar-
riages, at the will of the Dutch partner, and to send the partner as often as pos-
sible back to their country of origin. (CD 1989: II.3)
The second instance is the demand for special attention for the ‘interests in
the broadest sense’ of those Dutch people that live in areas with high con-
centrations of ethnic minorities, ‘because of which’ they have come (or
threaten to come) to a disadvantaged situation (CD 1989: X.9). This seems
to imply that the living together of different cultures leads to a degeneration
of the better (off), a rare instance of an ethnopluralist conviction within the
CD literature (albeit one that did not return in later programmes). In gen-
eral, however, the CD’s ‘ethnopluralist’ remarks seem to be mainly inspired
by the lack of integration in practice rather than ideology. This can best be
seen in the party paper’s reaction to a television program on the problems
of Moroccan youth in Amsterdam:
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This program shows that one cannot be lenient towards the inclusion of people
of a different culture into the Dutch society. It causes substantial problems, for
both the Dutch and the people from the other cultures, in particular for their
children. Culture is an important binding element for a country. Cultural dif-
ferences can to some extent exist, as long as there are sufficient binding ele-
ments, so that the people of the different cultures still feel themselves citizens
of one country. (CDa 3/90)
In line with its nationalist thinking, the CD strives for a limit in the number
of new foreigners admitted to the Netherlands. The programme includes
demands that only asylum seekers that face long-term sentences for political
reasons should be allowed to enter the country (CD 1989: XII.6). It further
wants to limit the possibilities for the adoption of children from the Third
World (CD 1989: XII.7). At first sight this seems to indicate a racist or at
least Eurocentrist bias, but the CD explicitly includes also people from
within the European Union in its demand for stricter norms for the admit-
tance of foreigners (CD 1989: XII.8). However, as this group cannot be
refused entry into the country because of European legislation, the party set-
tles for a restriction in their rights. It wants to exclude European foreigners
from social services, to discharge the state from any obligations to offer them
housing, and even to deport them when they lack means of livelihood (CD
1989: XII.9). As far as the party allows for new guest workers, they are to
be placed in a new social system, which is fenced off from the Dutch social
system (CD 1989: XII.4 and XII.5).
Xenophobia
The style in which the party paper in particular addresses the issue of immi-
gration is clearly and openly xenophobic. The multi-cultural society is
depicted as a society full of crime and confusion in which the common
Dutchman has lost all feeling of belonging and of order. Immigrants are con-
sistently portrayed as a problem at the least and generally as a threat. They
do not want to integrate and create their own ghetto’s, thereby forcing the
native people either out of their own neighbourhood or into isolation within
their own area. Although the present situation is already described in a neg-
ative way, the CD’s portrait of the future in delineated in an even more
gloomy manner. A perfect example of this is the ‘Open letter to Amster-
dammers and other Dutch’ (CDi 2/89) in which a picture of multi-cultural
Amsterdam (as omen for the whole Netherlands) is painted in which Moroc-
can youth gangs rule the streets, churches are changed into mosques, almost
every street contains a coffee house in which foreigners live and terrorise the
neighbourhood, illegal aliens get a municipal home before hard working
Dutch people, and the police are helpless against the rising crime because of
the absurdly low sentences and the soft politics of the left. This apocalyptic
vision of a multi-cultural Netherlands is painted in almost every issue of the
paper. To prove that it can become reality the party regularly points to the
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race riots in Los Angeles and the civil war in Yugoslavia; the latter is
described as ‘a terrific example of a multi-cultural society that explodes. Los
Angeles in the large’ (CDi 7/92).
The topic that brings the CD to its xenophobic peak is Islam. This religion
is exclusively described in its fundamentalist version in the party literature:
‘veil, headscarf, no pork, the reversal of the emancipation of women and the
limitation of freedom of religion’ (CDa 1/91). This Islamic culture is juxta-
posed to the European culture, which means that a Muslim cannot integrate
into Dutch society without giving up his or her religion. Islam is always por-
trayed as an aggressive and expansionist religion. This can be seen, on the
one hand, by the Muslims in the West, which expand not only in number of
people (as they all have many children) but also of mosques and stores (such
as Islamic butchers with their barbaric ritual slaughter). On the other hand,
the CD points to the belligerent politics of Islamic countries in the Middle
East, for instance in the Gulf war (e.g. CDa 1/91). The position of the party
vis-à-vis the Islam can best be summarised in its own words: ‘Wherever there
is Islam on earth, there are problems’ (CDa 3/90).
Socio-economic policy
The CD devotes a lot of attention to economic and socio-economic issues,
both in its internally and its externally oriented literature. This is not to say
that the party has a clear and elaborated socio-economic programme, how-
ever. The election programmes in particular hold a potpourri of individual
demands, and where it is often difficult to see the underlying ideology. If the
socio-economic demands – as listed primarily in the sections on economy
(III), employment (V), social policy (X) and taxes (XI) – show any coher-
ence, it is in their welfare chauvinism. The rest is an ambiguous mix of 
social and liberal policies, ranging from rejection of ‘forced privatisation’
(CD 1989: III.1) and support for raising pension benefits (CD 1989: X.8) 
to calling for less (complicated) taxes (CD 1989: XI.1 and 3). The only 
substantive adjustments to the generally supported mixed economic 
system of the Netherlands (CD 1989: III.1) the CD seems to want is the
increase of indirect and direct state support for small businesses (CD 1989:
III.3 and 8).
The party papers further contain numerous (small) articles in which the
party targets various forms of state interference and the high tax burden (e.g.
CDa 3/90). A regular theme is that state intervention obstructs the realisa-
tion of the ‘American dream’ of the Dutch businessman. ‘Those who work
hard, work overtime or are a bit lucky with some small deal, can be squeezed
by the state: get packing or otherwise pay’ (CDi 6/93). Despite some of these
neo-liberal hobbyhorses, the CD is not a principal antagonist of state inter-
vention in the economy, as is clear from the many articles against cuts in spe-
cific state benefits (mainly for the elderly people) and in support of the
welfare state (for the Dutch people). Moreover, various articles call for state
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support for Dutch small business and agriculture, being the backbone of the
Dutch economy.
As with most other issues socio-economic policy is strongly linked to the
issue of immigration. The CD stipulates that in the Netherlands there is no
basis for the kind of tolerance that a multi-cultural society needs as ‘(t)he
basis [for a peaceful living together] is and remains a healthy economy’ (CDi
10/93). As a consequence of almost twenty years of bad policies the Nether-
lands has become ‘one of the most heavily taxed countries in the world and
one of the poorest in Europe in income’ (CDi 9/91). This provides the party
with the economic proof of the necessity of its welfare chauvinist argument.
In short, the CD argues that repatriation of a large number of foreigners and
prevention of new foreigners entering the Netherlands are vital conditions
to preserve the welfare state for the Dutch population. Jobs are to be given
by preference to Dutch unemployed (CD 1989: V.1) and minorities should
get jobs only when there are no more Dutch applicants left (CD 1989: V.2).6
In the introduction to the 1994 election programme Janmaat defends his
plea for ‘the Dutch first’ with the argument that ‘from a historical perspec-
tive we Dutch have the oldest rights’ (CD 1994: 3). Welfare chauvinism is
not only deemed relevant in national politics, but also in international poli-
tics. Confused by ‘an increasingly diffuse international world’ (CD 1994: 3)
the programme justifies the emphasis on Dutch national interests. Probably
referring to the (implications of the) Maastricht Treaty, Janmaat states that
‘(e)xactly because of that international entanglement it is more than neces-
sary that our own population is protected by its own government’ (CD
1994: 3). The 1994 programme further shows a trend towards more pro-
tectionism, especially in the field of economics, as well as some demands for
(partial) autarchy of the Dutch defense apparatus (CD 1994: III.3) and agri-
culture (CD 1994: VIII.3).
The strong state
Crime is one of the main topics in the party literature, often combined with
the (interlinked) issues of drugs and foreigners. According to the CD the
Netherlands has become one of the least safe countries in Europe (e.g. CDa
2/90). This is the consequence of the failed policies of the established par-
ties, whose reorganisation of the police has led to chaos in organisation and
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competencies. Moreover, the policy of affirmative action within the police
has introduced an irrelevant criterion into the selection process and thereby
decreased the standards of the force (e.g. CDa 1/92). And even when the
police capture criminals, despite the lack of resources and the opposition by
the political elite, these criminals are given ridiculously low sentences which
often do not even have to be served because of the lack of prison space. This
all has created a reverse situation in the Netherlands, in which the criminals
can walk the streets freely whereas the ordinary citizens increasingly lock
themselves in their houses and no longer dare to come out.
The only way to overcome this chaos is by introducing tough law and
order policies. The 1989 programme calls for higher sentences, which are to
be served under severe conditions (CD 1989: XIII.1 and 2), an expansion of
both the competencies and the capacity of the police (CD 1989: XIII.4 and
7), and the extradition of foreign criminals (CD 1989: XIII.2). In 1994 the
party expanded the section on justice with four new demands, of which the
introduction of the death penalty was the most extreme (CD 1994: IV.1b).
Further law and order measures that appear in the party literature are the
preservation of border patrols (also after the Schengen Treaty) and the build-
ing of more prison cells, so that all criminals have to serve their (full) time.
If the Dutch state fails to take these measures, the CD claims that it will lose
its right of existence as it can no longer protect its citizens against rising
crime (e.g. CDa 1/92; CDi 9/93).
Compared to its law and order policies, the party’s views on the military
are not that far-reaching. The CD wants the Dutch defense apparatus to have
at its disposal the best material, though it does not demand a substantial
increase in its capacity or competencies. The only new role the party desires
is training for combating terrorism and city guerrillas which might be a prob-
lem in the future. In the 1994 programme the section on defense is extended
and toughened, including the demand that the defense budget should not be
lowered. However, the fact that the CD wants to introduce a compulsory
waiting period of two years between secondary school and higher education
in which people have to make themselves useful to society through either
compulsory military or national service (CD 1989: IV.9), does indicate some
support for a strong state, but at the same time shows at best a weak mili-
taristic outlook.
Populist anti-party sentiment
Every issue of the party papers holds at least one populist anti-party senti-
ment. The established parties and politicians are accused of having squan-
dered the interests of the Dutch people and of misleading the voters with
their sloganising during the election campaign. Consequently, the party reg-
ularly states that it first and foremost holds the government, and not the for-
eigners, responsible for the disruption of society (that is, the multi-cultural
society).
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The various populist anti-party sentiments of the CD come together when
discussing the fight against their own party. It claims that the established par-
ties attack the CD so hard because it is the only genuine opposition party.
Moreover, it is the only party that puts the finger on the sore spot, the multi-
cultural society (e.g. CDa 4/93). To cover up their own failure in this area
the established parties use every trick in the book. For one, they ignore every
opposition to multi-culturalism, from the man in the street as well as from a
parliamentary party such as the CD. If ignoring the opposition does not help
the established parties demonise the opposition by accusing them of racism,
and linking them to fascism and so on.
In this battle for political life and death, the established parties are helped
by lackeys such as the media, which are dependent on the subsidies they
receive. The established parties even created a whole infrastructure of so-
called ‘anti-racist’ and ‘anti-fascist’ organisations which, with the help of
legal collectives, are full-time fighters against the CD and any other oppo-
nents of the multi-cultural society. As all these organisations have to justify
their large subsidies, they ‘exaggerate with all their will for the subsidy mill’
(CDi 3/93). According to the party the fight against the CD has already cost
the state a total of more than one quarter of a billion Dutch guilders (CDi
6/94).
The struggle is not only fought on the level of the media or politics. More
and more the established parties have sought salvation in legal measures. To
try and achieve the multi-cultural society even against the will of the people,
they have introduced a multitude of anti-discrimination laws, which in prac-
tice favour the minorities and discriminate against the indigenous people.
Most of these laws are primarily directed against the CD. According to the
CD this holds true also for almost every other change that might have a neg-
ative effect on the party, ranging from changes in the electoral law to the sub-
sidising of political parties.
At the same time the party papers are filled with articles in which the
major influence of the party on governmental policy and the public debate
is described (e.g. CDa 4/88). Almost every measure the government takes
regarding asylum seekers or minorities which (slightly) resemble policies
proposed by the CD, is seen as a triumph for the party (e.g. CDa 4/91). With
great regularity it proclaims a turn in the tide of public opinion or politics
favouring the party (e.g. CDa 2/92). Typical are also the articles, often writ-
ten by Janmaat, in which it is claimed that Janmaat had won a debate in par-
liament (if the ministers and MPs were courageous enough to debate with
him), or that the government is on the brink of falling (as a consequence of
the opposition by the CD). In similar vein the party always predicts an enor-
mous victory in coming elections. The fact that the expected results are far
above those in the opinion polls proves the fact that these latter are manip-
ulated to keep down the CD. When the party finally polled far fewer votes
than expected, it would blame the entire anti-CD conspiracy again.
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Democracy
The CD devotes regular attention to the issue of democracy. The bulk of
these articles address the alleged breaches of democracy in the Netherlands.
According to the CD the present Dutch state is not a democracy, as it does
not allow true opposition. The party even stated that ‘in its methods of
oppression our government seems to surpass the brutal methods of Stalin’
(CDi 8/91). This is not to say that the CD considers the political system itself
undemocratic or to be rejected. The party is an open and consistent sup-
porter of parliamentary democracy. It even sees itself exclusively as an elec-
tion party, believing that ‘victory in elections is the only way to go and to
exercise influence’ (CDa 4/91). However, it accuses the established parties of
having perverted the good system of parliamentary democracy to protect
(and prolong) their own power and jobs (e.g. CDa 1/89). They have even
fixed elections, which is why the CD claims to have asked the UN to send
observers for the 1989 parliamentary election (CDa 2/89). To make the
system function democratically once more the politicians of the established
parties have to be voted out of power and replaced (primarily) by CD mem-
bers.
In recent years the CD has found a new threat to Dutch democracy: the
European Union. The party had always considered international organisa-
tions, and the outside world in general, to be hostile towards the Nether-
lands. That is also why it argues for a modest foreign policy in which the
Netherlands do not interfere in the politics of other countries and vice versa.
Dutch membership in the main international organisations was accepted
with great reservation. Generally, the party speaks scornfully of such organ-
isations as the UN, describing them as superfluous, inefficient and profligate
bureaucracies. An exception to this was NATO, which had the goal of keep-
ing the West safe from communism and which was also deemed necessary
after 1989, as the Russians remained dangerous and a new enemy was also
easily found, international Islam.
Ethical Values
Originally the CD did not put much emphasis on ethical values. Topics like
abortion and euthanasia were virtually not discussed by the party. At times
there would be articles in the party papers in defense of traditional values,
mainly citing the family as the cornerstone of society. As part of this quest
the party opposed various ‘progressive’ organisations that would undermine
the family, such as the relief centres for runaway children (e.g. CDa 1/89).
One of the few shifts that could be detected in the 1994 programme was
towards a more conservative outlook, stressing law and order as well as tra-
ditional morals and values. The section on culture was elaborated by con-
servative pleas for the banning of hardcore pornography and a limitation on
the screening of violence on Dutch television (V.5) as well as limitations on
the possibility to divorce (V.6 and 7). This shift to a protection of traditional
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morals might also explain why the party dropped its plea for the inclusion
of condoms in the national health program. This development was contin-
ued in the 1998 programme, which put increasing emphasis on the protec-
tion of the family, including making divorce (particularly in case of families
with children) more difficult (e.g. CD 1998: III.6c and 7).
A topic in which the party’s concerns on values comes to the fore most
clearly is that of AIDS. Throughout the years AIDS has been a regular topic
within the party literature. The (large) section of the programme on public
health for instance, contains no less than three (of the nine) points that con-
cern this disease (CD 1989: XVI.4, 7 and 8). Moreover, one of the few
brochures ever published by the scientific bureau of the CD also addressed
the issue (Johnstone and Knappert 1994). The report AIDS: Ghost or Threat,
written by two members of the Unification Church of Sun Myung Moon
(Van den Brink 1995),7 paints a picture of a dangerous disease which is the
consequence of the present moral crisis. As AIDS is mainly caused by ‘spe-
cific behaviour’ (i.e. sexual promiscuity, homosexuality and drug addiction),
the disease can be stopped only through prevention. However, pressured by
‘the dictatorship of a minority’ (Johnstone and Knappert 1994: 16), by
which they mean the homosexual lobby, the medical issue has become a
political issue:
In fact, under the pretext of fighting against homophobia and turning zeropos-
itives into scape-goats, we are coming to the point of making the society feel
guilty and to make the zeropositive less responsible in regard to the risks that
they make others run, especially their sexual partners. (Johnstone and Knappert
1994: 17)
According to the CD, if we want to save ourselves from an AIDS explosion
in the West we will have to overcome the present moral crisis and moral rel-
ativism and return to traditional morality. In extremis, we should return to
no sex until marriage and to the family as ‘the school of love’ (Johnstone and
Knappert 1994: 31). Though the brochure is atypical for CD literature (in
that it is relatively well written, argued and researched), it fits well within the
party’s thinking. The main point is that a problem is not solved as a result of
a conspiracy of the political elite.
Conclusion
The CD does not possess a very elaborated ideological programme. The
party literature contains at best a shallow ideology, focusing on only a lim-
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ited number of themes. This holds true especially for the party paper CD-
Info, which by and large deals with four main (linked) themes: opposition to
the multi-cultural society, populist anti-party sentiment, the undemocratic
struggle against the own party, and (fighting) crime. And, although the elec-
tion programmes address a fairly wide variety of policy areas, the ideologi-
cal content again remains limited. It contains the idea that people should live
in a mono-cultural state which is not crowded by too many inhabitants.
Immigrants are given the choice between assimilation and repatriation. The
role of the state should not be too big, neither in national nor in interna-
tional politics, and the state should first and foremost take care of its own
population, ensuring a relatively generous welfare system without, however,
hindering private initiative (for instance, by high taxes) or overspending (for
instance, on subsidies). The state should play a strong and dominant role
only in strictly ensuring law and order. Within the world view of the party
this can be realised within the current political system, but only when the CD
is accepted within that system and when several current actors are ousted of
power (mainly the PvdA and BVD).
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1 German-born Hendrik Wladimir Albrecht Ernst (1876–1934) became prince of the
Netherlands after marrying Queen Wilhelmina in 1909. Hendrik’s only official child, Juliana,
succeeded Wilhelmina as queen in 1948.
Reservoir of the fringe
After the expulsion of the Janmaat group at the end of 1984 the troubles of
the Centrumpartij were far from over. Party leader Konst was put under
increasing pressure by his employer to resign as party chairman or lose his
job as teacher at a state school; vice-chairman De Wijer had already been
temporarily suspended as teacher at another state school (DNPP 1987;
Schikhof 1998). Only a few months after the split Konst resigned and was
succeeded by former party treasurer Albrecht Lier, (in)famous in the Nether-
lands for his claim to be an illegitimate son of prince Hendrik.1 In the 1985
by-election the CP gained one seat in the new province of Flevoland and one
in the new municipality of Leerdam. Despite the decreasing trend, the party
contested the local election of March 1986 with moderate success (winning
six seats). The last surge of optimism for the parliamentary election of two
months later was shattered by the defection of party leader Lier to the CD
(Lucardie and Voerman 1990). The eventual blow in winning just 0.4 per
cent of the votes was softened only slightly by the 0.1 per cent won by its
main rival the CD.
Lier’s successor, former party treasurer Danny Segers, was unable to turn
the tables for the rapidly disintegrating party. Since the split the membership
of the CP had fallen back to merely 100. Moreover, almost the whole top
echelons of the party had either left politics altogether or moved to the CD.
The situation became even more devastating as the CP had become involved
in a series of court cases as a consequence of its preparation for the local
election. A group of people who had signed the CP electoral list in Heerlen
later claimed to have been misled by the party, as they had been told that
they signed for something else. The court acknowledged their complaint and
fined the CP 50,000 Dutch guilders. As the party could not pay the fine, it
6
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was declared bankrupt on 13 May 1986 (DNPP 1988). The successor was
founded exactly one week later, conveniently named Centrumpartij’86
(Centre Party’86, CP’86).
Though its legal successor, the new CP’86 was no more than a weak copy
of the old CP. From the approximately 3,500 members the CP had claimed
in its heyday, only a mere fifty were willing to begin with the CP’86. Yet even
within this small group the internal disputes continued. In 1987 chairman
Segers withdrew from his position and was succeeded by Ema Bouman, a rel-
atively unknown member until she was elected as a council member in Ams-
terdam in 1986. At the end of 1988 she also suddenly left the CP’86, in
protest against the radicalisation of the party (Schikhof 1997), and was
replaced by Wim Beaux, then council member in both the municipality of
Almere and the province of Flevoland and a long-time leading member of
the CP. He was superseded shortly afterwards by another major driving force
of the new party, Wim Wijngaarden, also a long-time activist within the CP.
This time the succession was not the result of an internal dispute, and Beaux
remained part of the party executive.
Except for internal disputes, the CP’86 had several other problems to deal
with. For instance, election material of the party was confiscated at its
German printer (the same printer as was used by the North Rhine-West-
phalian branch of the NPD). Moreover, it was involved in a legal battle with
the CD over the legacy of the CP. The CP’86 won the case in the first
instance and was appointed the sole legal heir to the CP. This meant it could
profit from several publicity and electoral advantages, as the CP was rela-
tively well-known and represented in several municipal and provincial coun-
cils. However, the CP’86 could not make much use of it at the time, as
internal difficulties and a general decline prevented it from contesting the
1989 parliamentary election.
In the 1990 local election the CP’86 gained four seats, a disappointing
result compared to the eleven seats of the CD. There was good news for the
party as well, since it won its legal case over the heritage of the CP in the
second instance too, despite the fact that the CD had claimed before the
Council of State that it should also be considered and treated as a successor
to the CP (DNPP 1992). More important was the remarkable growth in
membership which the CP’86 experienced, with an influx of between 50 and
100 youths. They originated predominantly from the Jongerenfront Neder-
land (Youth Front Netherlands, JFN), at that time the largest right-wing
extremist youth movement in the Netherlands with some 200 members.
After a Breda court had labelled the JFN a criminal organisation (in a case
against two of its members in May 1990), leader Stewart Mordaunt called
upon his supporters to follow him into the CP’86, for which party he had
been elected to the municipal council of The Hague earlier that year (FOK
1992).
This expansion brought the total membership of the CP’86 to approxi-
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mately 300 at the end of 1991. In addition, the youth and activism of the
new members gave the party a new impulse. In particular, following an
almost hidden existence for five years the young activists brought the CP’86
back into the spotlight by distributing pamphlets. Favourite targets for the
young militants were young people and inhabitants of areas with a high con-
centration of foreigners and ethnic minorities or of areas where ethnic ten-
sions had recently erupted. In addition to the people that were directly
approached, the CP’86 also made its actions as provocative as possible in
order to spread its message to other people through the consequent (large)
media attention – a strategy that had already been the trade mark of the JFN.
The revitalisation of the CP’86 did not bring an end to the internal dis-
putes, however. After party secretary Egbert Perée had been ousted from the
party leadership in August 1990, his successor Wim Geurts experienced the
same fate in the beginning of 1991. The same year the party contested the
provincial election in four provinces, all without success. Shortly thereafter,
Wim Kock, who had been heading the election list in the province of South
Holland and had been the assistant of Mordaunt in the council of The Hague,
was expelled from the party. In most cases the veterans were replaced by
members of the former JFN. In early 1992 the party executive included five
people of which (the first) three came from the old CP and (the last) two from
the JFN: Wijngaarden (chairman), Theo Termijn (council member in Rotter-
dam), Beaux (vice-chairman), Mordaunt and Tibor Mudde (secretary).
The next three years were characterised by a remarkable unity and
growth. Through its large number of local actions the CP’86 was able to
steadily increase its membership to some 500 at the end of 1994. Among the
new members were former members of the CP (such as Segers), as well as
small groups of (former) neo-Nazis. This latter group was partly attracted by
the large autonomy the local branches of the party enjoyed. Especially in the
area of Rotterdam the (former) neo-Nazis were able to put their imprint on
the local party.
The election year 1994 was approached with much optimism by the
CP’86. Henk Ruitenberg, a relative newcomer to the extreme right and to
the CP’86, had succeeded the ill Wijngaarden as party leader in early 1994.
The party campaigned actively throughout the whole country, distributing
thousands of pamphlets, mostly in so-called disadvantaged areas. Despite
the fact that the CP’86 was overshadowed by the CD in the March local elec-
tion it more than doubled its number of seats, from four in 1990 to nine in
1994 (see Mudde and Van Holsteyn 1994; Van Holsteyn 1995). Though the
successes outside of the big cities were exclusively in municipalities in which
the CD had not contested the election, the leadership saw the result as proof
of the viability of their party (next to the CD) and anticipated its (re)entry
into the Second Chamber. This optimistic view was supported by some opin-
ion polls, which showed that the party was receiving sufficient support to
win a parliamentary seat (Van Holsteyn 1995).
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The final result in the parliamentary election, when it won just 0.4 per
cent, therefore signified a rude awakening. The party remained below the
score needed for one seat (0.67 per cent) and well behind its main rival the
CD, which increased its number of seats from one to three. After some soul
searching the party concluded that one of the main reasons for its poor
results was that it was too often mistaken for the CD by the voters. It had
tried to avoid this problem by stamping its election material with the text
‘Centre Party’86 absolutely not to be confused with Janmaat’s CD’. On 19
November 1994 the party decided on a more drastic measure, renaming
itself as Nationale Volkspartij/CP’86 (National People’s Party/CP’86, NVP).
There had also been another reason for this change of name, however:
legal pressure. The CP’86 had always been the target of anti-racist organisa-
tions and on several occasions attempts had been made to get the state to
start legal proceedings against the party to either convict or ban it for incite-
ment to racial hatred. In 1994 vice-chairman Beaux was convicted on two
occasions, once, together with five other members, for possessing and dis-
tributing racist pamphlets (IJA 1995). But most importantly, after years of
discussions and under mounting pressure from anti-racists organisations and
various political parties (most notably PvdA and D66), the state finally
started legal actions against the party itself. In 1995 an Amsterdam court
ruled that the CP’86 constituted a criminal organisation, as it consistently
spread racial hatred; in addition, five of its leaders were convicted of head-
ing a criminal organisation (e.g. JPR 1997).
The conviction hit the party hard, most notably the ‘moderate’ leader
Ruitenberg, who had tried to bring the party into a more acceptable posi-
tion. Feeling pressured by both the legal repression and the increasing inter-
nal opposition from the ‘radical’ wing, he sought a rapproachement with the
CD, offering something close to a full merger of the two parties on Janmaat’s
terms. In addition, the two parties cooperated in some high profile demon-
strations (e.g. Zwolle), where leaders of CP’86 and Janmaat marched and
spoke side by side. In May the cooperation came to a sudden end, when the
CP’86 membership by large majority rejected Ruitenberg’s fusion proposal.
In reaction, Ruitenberg resigned as party chairman, defecting to the CD
shortly afterwards, and was succeeded by party veteran Beaux. However, the
bitter struggle between the ‘moderate’ nationalist wing and the ‘radical’ neo-
Nazi wing continued to divide the party.
Officially, it was the open neo-Nazi behaviour and contacts of the group
around Rotterdam council member Martijn Freling2 which caused the ‘mod-
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2 Freling had returned to the Netherlands in the beginning of the 1990s after having lived in
Germany for several years. He originated, like Mordaunt, in the youth-wing of the NVU, the
Nationaal Jeugdfront (National Youth Front), but left after a dispute with Glimmerveen. In
1983 he co-founded the Onafhankelijk Verbond van Nationaal Socialisten (Independent
Alliance of National Socialists), which became the Rotterdam branch of the JFN, infamous for
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erate’ leadership headaches. However, several party leaders were at least as
worried about Freling’s party ambitions, as well as irritated by his defiance
of the official party line, which proclaimed that open neo-Nazism was not
allowed. At the same time the leadership was hesitant to split the tiny move-
ment even further. After much lingering Freling was finally expelled from
the party in October 1996; however, not by an unanimous party leadership
decision. To some surprise a disgruntled Mordaunt choose Freling’s side,
which led to his expulsion a few weeks later. In November Freling countered
by organising a meeting of loyal party members, in which they claimed the
party, elected Mordaunt as chairman and Freling as secretary, and expelled
the ‘moderate’ leadership (e.g. Kafka 1998; Lucardie 1998). After months of
confusing bickering, the Freling-Mordaunt group obtained the legal right to
the party, and changed the name back to CP’86. The ‘moderates’, on their
part, dismantled the NVP in February 1997 and founded the Volksnational-
isten Nederland (Ethnic Nationalists Netherlands, VNN).3
Both groups are just weak shadows of the old party; in 1998 their mem-
berships were estimated at some forty members per party (Van den Brink
1998). Various influential and active members, among them Mudde and
Marcel Rüter, had left party politics altogether, devoting all their energy to
the Dutch branch of Voorpost (see Kafka 1998; Van den Brink 1998). The
two successor parties were unable to make any impression in elections. In
the local election of March 1998 they lost all their seats and neither of the
parties has contested any elections since. However, the parties did make the
headlines on various occasions, particularly the CP’86 of Freling and Mor-
daunt. Freling has always held close contacts with journalists, who repaid
this privilege by (over)reporting his every move (see Van Donselaar et al.
1998). In 1996 the group organised various meetings which were also
attended by prominent neo-Nazis from outside of the party, most notably
NVU-leader Glimmerveen. At some of these meetings speakers threatened
prominent Dutch persons, including the Surinamese-born MP of Groen-
Links (Green Left), Singh Varma, an outspoken anti-racist. Ironically, it was
particularly the remarks of Glimmerveen, not a party member, which pro-
vided the final push in the legal battle against the party. In reaction mainly
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its neo-Nazism. Though he also joined the JFN, Freling devoted most of his time to the
Aktiefront Nationale Socialisten (Action Front of National Socialists), which he co-founded in
1984 as the Dutch branch of the German organisation with the same name led by Michael
Kühnen (see Ten Haaf 1992; Kafka 1998).
3 On 3 July 1998 the party became the Nieuwe Partij Nederland (New Party Netherlands),
allegedly a new party uniting the Dutch extreme right, but in reality not more than the former
VNN and some veterans of the ‘centre movement’. Already in October it was disbanded and
the ‘new’ Nieuwe Nationale Partij (New National Party) was founded, which today constitutes
a mere sect of some forty people, virtually all veterans (of the ‘moderate’ wing) of the old
CP’86.
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to his remarks, the whole parliament (with the exception of the CD) urged
the Goverment to start criminal investigations into the CP’86, with the
(unspoken) aim of a party ban (see JPR 1997).
In October 1997 the High Court confirmed the ruling of the Amsterdam
court of two years earlier, which had found both the CP’86 and five of its
leaders guilty of inciting racial hatred (Van den Brink 1998). Though the
actual sentences were marginal, one month suspended sentences and fines of
a few thousand guilders, the ruling was generally considered as the first step
to the banning of the party, which was now for the first time officially
labelled a ‘criminal organisation’. At the same time, various people ques-
tioned the usefulness of a ban, given the deplorable state of the party as well
as the bizarre situation that only one of the five convicted ‘leaders’ was still
a member of the party. This notwithstanding, Minister of Justice Sorgdrager
announced her intention to ban the party and started the preparations for
the ‘ghost trial’ a few days after the ruling. It would take until 18 November
1998 before the party was officially banned and disbanded by the Amster-
dam court. By that time, the CP’86 was not more than an empty vessel,
probably containing only the inactive ‘party leader’ Freling, who had lost all
his former comrades as well as the party’s funds, allegedly as a consequence
of his drug addiction.
Throughout its existence the CP’86 has constantly been involved in some
form of negotiations about a possible fusion with the CD, and at times also
with other parties at the extreme right fringe. In 1992 the Belgian VB tried
to bring a wide variety of these parties together – among them the CP’86,
CD, and NB – with the idea of creating one big Dutch nationalist party. The
negotiations failed completely and even the agreement to constitute one
electoral list in the 1994 European election lasted only for a few days. As in
earlier years the main obstacle had been Janmaat, who had demanded that
all other parties and persons would grant him and his party the leading role.
At the CP’86 party conference of 1992 the membership almost unanimously
rejected the possibility of a merger with the CD if it would include the elim-
ination of their own party (which it would do again in 1996). Though con-
tacts concerning possible cooperation were never terminated for long, it
would take until 1996 before serious talks between CP’86 and CD were held
again. It was these talks that led to the demise of the CP’86, putting the
already tense relations between the ‘moderates’ (i.e. Ruitenberg, Mudde, De
Boer and Hoogstra) and the ‘radicals’ (i.e. Freling and Mordaunt) under
even more strain.
Although the CP’86 never maintained a large membership, many of those
within the party (leadership) have been highly active in the extreme right
scene, both inside and outside of the Netherlands. The party held official
contacts with the Flemish VB (and VBJ) and Voorpost, the German NPD
(and JN), the British National Party, and the South African Boerestaatparty
Centrumpartij’86 147
Chap6  28/5/02  13.33  Page 147
(Boer State Party). High-ranking party members had personal contacts with
organisations like the American National Alliance and (sections of) the Ku
Klux Klan, the French Nouvelle Resistance (New Resistance) and the Aus-
trian Aktionsgemeinschaft für Politik (Action Community for Politics). The
CP’86 was also for years officially represented at the annual Ijzerbedevaart
in the Flemish town of Diksmuide, where it had a prominent stand in the
hall of Voorpost.
Profiling the literature
Externally oriented: programmes
In the period 1986–99 the CP’86 published three election programmes and
two party programme (or programmes of principle). The first election pro-
gramme was the undated (probably 1987) ‘party programme’ Voor een veilig
en leefbaar Nederland! (For a Safe and Livable Netherlands!, CP 1987),
which was an almost exact copy of the programme Naar een veilig en leef-
baar Nederland (Towards a Safe and Livable Netherlands) with which the CP
had contested the 1986 parliamentary election. The main difference was
that the CP had used the logo of a traffic sign in which an arrow to both the
left and right was crossed (illustrating the slogan ‘not right, not left’),
whereas the CP’86 used a (Dutch) lion with a sword. The programme con-
tained thirty chapters (policy areas) on a total of twenty-seven unpaged A5
pages. It was never used in elections; neither was the revised 1990 pro-
gramme with the same title, including a short new introduction, some new
demands and the eradication of several old demands (CP 1990). In 1993 the
party published a new version titled Partijprogramma (Party Programme),
with which the party contested the 1994 local and parliamentary elections
(CP 1993). Except for the fact that the CP’86 had changed the title of the
programme and the supplement to the party name (from ‘The national
democratic movement in the Netherlands’ in 1989 to ‘Own people first!’ in
1993), the revisions in the programme were almost unnoticeable.
In 1989 the CP’86 presented its first party programme, under the title
Nationaaldemocratische gedachten voor een menswaardige toekomst
(National Democratic Thoughts for a Human Future, CP 1989). The first
version included fifteen unmarked A4 pages, some of which featured adver-
tisements for the party. The second version was published as a ‘programme
of principle’ in 1990, containing an identical title and content. It included
thirteen unmarked A5 pages, had a more professional lay-out, and was dis-
tributed more broadly. The programme was an almost literal translation of
the 1987 NPD programme, entitled Nationaldemokratische Gedanken für
eine lebenswerte Zukunft, although passages that were placed in a typically
German context in the original were – using similar phrasing – placed in a
typically Dutch context in this new version (see Mudde 1995: 220). In May
1996 the then NVP adopted a new party programme with the title Wie wij
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zijn & wat wij willen (Who we are & what we want, CP 1996), written by
Rüter and Mudde. The so-called ‘Yellow Booklet’, referring both to the
color of the programme and to the ‘Green Booklet’ by Libyan leader
Moamar Quadaffi, counted thirty-two pages and included five sections: the
history of the NVP/CP’86, the ideology, the aims, the statutes and the former
national anthem Wien Neerlands Bloed (Whose Dutch Blood).
Internally oriented: party paper
In 1987 the CP’86 started publishing a quarterly national party paper with
the title Centrumnieuws (Centre News, CN) and the sub-title Blad voor de
Centrumpartij’86 (Paper for the CP’86). The final supervision of the paper
rested with the ‘scientific bureau’, which only existed on paper at that time.
In December 1987 the paper was restyled for the first time, introducing the
logo of the Dutch lion and the Latin slogan ‘Vincit Amor Patriae’ (Patriotism
Conquers) on the front page, as well as a slightly revised sub-title Partijor-
gaan van de Centrumpartij’86 (Party Paper of the CP’86). Though the
number of (unnumbered) pages was extended to fifteen, the paper main-
tained its poor quality in language and lay-out. Most of the articles were
short and vague, printed in a broad variety of different letter types and con-
taining many typing errors. The last 1988 issue introduced a new extension
to the sub-title: ‘the national democratic movement in the Netherlands’. In
the following years the style remained basically the same, but the size of the
paper increased to some thirty pages.
After the influx of the young JFN members a new editorial board was cre-
ated under the leadership of its former chancellor and then CP’86 secretary
Tibor Mudde. As of the third issue of 1991 the party paper was drastically
restyled. For the first time in its existence it was paginated, and the number
of language and typing errors decreased rapidly. Moreover, the paper
became more conveniently arranged. It was (re)structured into several
columns, of which most contained exclusively articles on a single theme
(mainly foreigners). The paper also featured more drawings, cartoons and
quotations from like-minded journals abroad, portraying Viking and Celtic
warriors as the true European heroes of the past. Under the new guidance
the party paper expanded its size considerably, numbering between thirty-
nine and sixty-four pages in the later years. In late 1993 it changed its cover
and lay-out again. The extension ‘the national democratic movement in the
Netherlands’ was deleted and the paper was named plainly Centrumnieuws
– with, in the middle of the name, a Celtic cross and two hands that break
free from handcuffs, one of which features a dollar sign, the other a hammer
and sickle. The style was not changed until the beginning of 1995, when the
now Nationale Volkspartij/CP’86 introduced the radically improved party
paper De Revolutionair Nationalist (The Revolutionary Nationalist, RN). It
had a lay-out quite similar to Revolte, the journal of the Great-Netherlands
action group Voorpost. In addition to the drastic restyling, the new party
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paper also used a new slogan: Voor Volk en Vaderland (For Ethnic Commu-
nity and Fatherland). With the split of the party, the paper disappeared; the
VNN tried for a while to publish a somewhat similar paper as the RN, while
the CP’86 seeked inspiration in its predecessor CN.
In search of an identity
Ethnic nationalism
The CP’86 has always identified itself as a nationalist party, mostly using the
term volksnationalist (ethnic nationalist). This is also the main theme in the
party literature. What ethnic nationalism precisely means to the party, how-
ever, is often simply assumed to be clear to the reader. Sporadically one can
find a clear-cut description such as the following: ‘Country and ethnic com-
munity should be one!’ (CN 1/89). The party holds this to be a universal
truth. It acknowledges the right to self-determination of all ethnic commu-
nities and strives for a world of independent and genuine nation-states. Con-
sequently, it sees its main enemy in imperialism, i.e. the expansion of a
certain state beyond its ‘natural’ territorial borders.
Despite the frequent reference to its own ethnic community and the use
of terms like ‘true Dutchmen’ and ‘paper Dutchmen’, the CP’86 has prob-
lems in defining the own ethnic community. In the pamphlet ‘national demo-
cratic guidelines regarding our national consciousness’, based on a similar
pamphlet of the NPD, it states: ‘The race is the determining factor for the
identity of every ethnic community’ (CN 1/89). In another instance the party
depicts a somewhat organic view of the notion of an ethnic community,
declaring that ‘(y)our soil, your own ethnic community, culture and tradi-
tions form the unmistakable recognition of the roots of your own existence’
(CN 1/89). Despite the confusing usage of the terms race and ethnic com-
munity, the broader idea of the party is relatively clear: only those people are
members of the Dutch ethnic community ‘whose preceding generations
originated from Dutch parents, and among whom the language, culture and
way of life is acknowledged and practised as the only way’ (CN 3/90).
Accordingly, children born in the Netherlands with foreign (grand)parents
(so-called allochtonen) are not considered to be truly Dutch. Though never
stated openly, it is clear from the party literature that truly Dutch people are
part of the ‘white race’. Interestingly, though the party portrays the Dutch
ethnic community always as a homogeneous group in contrast to ‘the’ for-
eigners, at the same time it believes that the Dutch ethnic community
includes several sub groups (such as the Frisians), who live harmoniously
together in one state (CN 1/89).
Part of its ethnic nationalist ideology is the feature of external exclusive-
ness, the claim that the Dutch state should encompass all members of the
Dutch ethnic community. The 1990 programme, for example, states: ‘The
highest goal for us national democrats is a sovereign, non-aligned Dutch
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speaking nation-state in which the whole Dutch speaking part of the nation
in Europe is united.’ In line with this vision the separation of the Nether-
lands and Flanders, referred to as the Northern and Southern Netherlands,
is labelled a volkstegenstrijdige scheiding (a partition which is hostile to the
ethnic community).
We, national democrats, envisage a Dutch ethnic state, which is congruent geo-
graphically with the Northern and Southern Netherlands together, and is inher-
ent to a territory in which the Dutch language, Dutch culture and truly Dutch
traditions are commonplace. It is the character and will of the ethnic commu-
nity that determines the ethnic state and its borders. (CP 1990: 29.8)
This Great-Netherlands state would stretch geographically ‘from Dollart
through Southern Flanders’ (CN 3/89), i.e. the current Netherlands, plus
Belgian Flanders and French Flanders (an area in the Northwest of France).
Remarkably, the rather extreme demand of external exclusiveness features
prominently in the externally oriented literature, both in the election pro-
grammes (after 1987) and in the programme of principle, yet hardly figures
in the internally oriented party papers.
A topic that is prominent in the whole party literature is internal
homogenisation, i.e. the demand that only Dutchmen can live in the Dutch
state. The CP’86 wants to repatriate all foreigners, starting with those who
are illegal and those who are or were criminal (and have lived in the Nether-
lands for less than five years). The few foreigners that will be needed for eco-
nomic reasons can stay in the Netherlands, but only on a temporary basis.
These people should not be allowed to bring their families nor should they
(be forced to) integrate into Dutch society. Foreigners who have been natu-
ralised in the last decades, condescendingly referred to as ‘paper Dutchmen’,
are also to be repatriated to their countries of origin. Finally, the 1990 pro-
gramme includes the new demand that all unemployed foreigners, who have
not yet reached retirement, as well as all ‘social refugees’, will be obliged to
repatriate (CP 1990: 7.9–10).
All election programmes stress the need to bring Dutch policy on immi-
gration into accord with European policy. The European argument is used
solely when other European countries have a policy more favourable to the
CP’86.
At least what has to be avoided is that the Netherlands will take an exceptional
position in Western Europe, by a too negligent adoption of generally accepted
rules of conduct with regard to the policy on foreigners. The Netherlands can
not become a haven for foreigners that are rejected everywhere else. (CP 1993:
7.3)
The CP’86 further demands that acquiring Dutch citizenship should be
made far more difficult. According to the party, it is not meant to provide
foreigners with social and financial security or the (established) political par-
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ties with ‘improper electoral gains’ (CP 1990: 5.19). Should foreigners wish
to acquire Dutch citizenship, they have to make it clear that they indeed
want to become Dutch, will speak Dutch, and will freely and fully ‘har-
monise into the Dutch cultural pattern’ (CP 1999: 5.20).
Until the volksstaat (ethnic state) is realised the party wishes to pursue a
policy of ‘our own people first’ which, for the most part, means ‘our own
money for our own people’. It would also mean the introduction of legal
pluralism, as the CP’86 wishes to bring conditions regarding admission,
employment, housing and expulsion of foreign nationals into accord with
the respective policies of the countries of origin of these foreigners. Conse-
quently, the few foreigners that are allowed to live in the country are
accepted only under clear conditions (to work for a specific period of time)
and under very strict rules.
Exclusionism
Given the lack of an elaborated ideology more complex features like ethno-
pluralism can be traced only by combining different statements within the
party literature. In the early years the party limited itself mainly to fighting
the payment of subsidies for forced integration of ethnic customs and cul-
tures into existing cultural patterns. In the 1990s this opposition was not
only radicalised, but was also (slightly) more substantiated.
The requisition of shelters for asylum seeking aliens, in particular in small com-
munities, is polluting the environment and discriminating against our own
ethnic community. Moreover, it is an unbearable burden for the whole Dutch
society and is rejected by us as inhuman. (CP 1990: 22.12)
According to the party the flood of foreigners has led to the loss of identity
in the Dutch ethnic community, as ghettos of foreigners have made them
into a minority in their own land. But the foreigners have also lost their iden-
tity, since they have been the victims of a ‘foreigner-hostile integration policy
(a forced Dutchifying)’ (CP 1989). As ‘the struggle for homogeneity and the
living together with similar people is anchored in human nature’ (CN 3/92),
the policy of multi-culturalism and integration is perceived as inhuman.
Moreover, integration uproots the foreigners, which leads to confusion and
consequent criminal and amoral behaviour, particularly among the youth.
Therefore, the CP’86 equates a multi-cultural society with a ‘multi-criminal
society’. This whole line of argument is applied exclusively to non-white for-
eigners, however. Within the ‘white race’, often simply equated with the
European culture, integration seems to be possible, according to the party
literature. Hence, it considers European foreigners as posing far less of a
threat than non-Europeans.
Probably the most outspoken example of ethnopluralist reasoning is
found in the party’s support for a Europe of Ethnic Communities. The first
programme had contained a very positive European chapter, proclaiming
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the process of European integration as ‘vital for our political, economic and
societal system’ (CP 1987: 28.1) and stating that the Netherlands has to be
an ‘inspiring but particularly loyal ally’ (CP 1987: 28.2). Though it acknowl-
edged some problems with(in) the European Community – such as the wast-
ing of money, the alienation from the people and the lack of democratic
control – the institution as such was viewed as extremely positive. The
CP’86 even wanted to increase the autonomy of the European Commission,
arguing that it should be able to decide by simple majority. This is therefore
a world apart from the 1990 programme, which called the European Com-
munity imperialist and described it as a perilous threat to Dutch identity (CP
1987: 28.1). EU-phoria had given way to an ethnopluralist EU rejection:
National democrats support the European co-operation of independent ethnic
communities, including the East European countries, but resist any form of
European integration in which our national identity could be endangered. (CP
1987: 28.3).
The CP’86 maintains that the different ethnic communities in (East and
West) Europe share enough common history and culture to work closely
together, yet are at the same time too different to give up their separate iden-
tities and autonomy. Thus, each different ethnic community should have its
own independent nation-state (including, among others, the Bretons and
Basques), which should work together on specific matters, mainly economic
and military.
The frequent usage of the term race, at times used interchangeably with
the term ethnic community, could point to a racist argumentation, hidden
behind the more open ethnopluralist argumentation. The party does con-
sider race to be the determining factor for the identity of every ethnic com-
munity and argues that ‘(o)nly the recognition and the acceptance of the
substantial differences between the races guarantees respect between ethnic
communities’ (CN 3/88). Even in its typically ethnopluralist defense of the
South African apartheid regime it uses racial categories: ‘There is no racism
in South Africa, but a healthy racial consciousness, which is the positive
thinking that grants every race or ethnic community the right to self-deter-
mination, self-development and its own identity’ (CN 1/90). However, the
belief in the existence (and importance) of races is not (openly) combined
with statements that any race is superior or inferior – even though members
of non-white races are always portrayed negatively in the party literature.
Xenophobia
The entire party literature of the CP’86 has always been drenched with
xenophobia. The party paper in particular has a special interest in the nega-
tive sides of immigration. Favourite topics are crimes by foreigners of all
kinds (guest workers, asylum seekers, illegal aliens), preferably rapes and
murders. Originally the party paper would print copies of newspaper arti-
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cles about crimes (allegedly) by foreigners. Following its restructuring spe-
cial columns like ‘adaptation problems’, based on a similar column in the
German extreme right journal Nation [und] Europa, printed lists of excerpts
from these newspaper articles. In addition to these more or less neutral pre-
sentations of facts, all issues of the paper include at least some xenophobic
comments on the multi-cultural society, from either readers or the editors.
The main argument that a multi-cultural society can only be a multi-crimi-
nal society is ‘proven’ by pointing to examples such as former Yugoslavia
(the civil war) and Los Angeles (the race riots of 1994). According to the
party the mass influx of foreigners and the consequent policy of multi-cul-
turalism can lead only to civil war:
After all, the ongoing stream of aliens from ever different countries, next to the
millions of non-Europeans who have already penetrated Europe, are a direct
attack on our economy, on our sense of justice, on our social consciousness, on
our national values and on our personal freedom! (CN 5/87)
Nor are the party programmes free from xenophobia, which is clearly visi-
ble, for instance, in the section of the 1989 party programme with the title
‘the inner peace and security is being seriously endangered by the massive
influx of aliens into our country’. Since 1990, the introduction of the elec-
tion programme declares ‘our resistance against the uncontrolled influx of
hundreds of thousands of criminal and parasitic aliens in our overpopulated
country’ (CP 1993) to be one of the main pillars of the political thinking and
actions of the party.
Ethical values
The preservation of traditional ethical values has always been a regular fea-
ture in the party literature. The election programme originally included a
moderately conservative view, stating that abortion for social reasons should
remain illegal, but not demanding any new (stricter) measures (CP 1987:
5.11). In the 1990 version the position had toughened: abortion was
referred to as ‘the mass murder of the unborn child’ (CP 1990: 12.9) and the
creation of a living climate in which pregnant women would not have to
consider abortion for social reasons was demanded. This toughening was
also visible in the party position on the related issue of euthanasia. The 1987
programme had not yet formulated a standpoint on euthanasia, stating that
a policy paper would be published (it never appeared). In 1990, the pro-
gramme also contained the demand that euthanasia should remain illegal
(CP 1990: 5.10).
The CP’86 considers the traditional family as the cornerstone of society,
within which the most ideal and non-replaceable environment for the
upbringing of children is provided. A special role in the revival of (ethnic)
community spirit is ascribed to the family. The new election programmes
even include a demand for a specific constitutional guarantee for the pro-
154 The Netherlands
Chap6  28/5/02  13.33  Page 154
tection of the family. Moreover, the party also demands that everything
should be done to restore positive future expectations for the family and a
general joy of life, as only then will the family be able to maintain its indis-
pensable place in the (ethnic) community. The position on the family has
consequences for other beliefs. For instance, the party does not look
favourably upon homosexuality. In an Amsterdam council meeting Beaux
described it as ‘an interpersonal practice that goes against nature’ (CN 1/93).
In general, however, homosexuality is ignored rather than attacked in the
party literature. This also goes for feminism, which is not regarded posi-
tively, though seldom addressed (if mentioned at all, feminists are portrayed
as men-hating lesbians). The CP’86 sees man and woman as equal in rights,
but with different tasks in life. It wants a society that is friendly towards chil-
dren and that recognises and enables ‘the sublime role of housewife and
mother’ (CP 1989).
The CP’86 wants the state to become more involved in upholding morals
and values, though it concedes that only a change in mentality can bring back
the desired values of ‘order, discipline, tolerance, refined speech, courtesy,
honesty and being well-groomed’ (CN 3/87). These values seem a world
apart from the current state of affairs, described as:
Self-enrichment, criminal materialism, devaluation of our basic values, secular-
isation, corruption and deceit are features of our modern society with the
resulting excesses: unbridled abortion and euthanasia practices, pornography,
incest, drug addiction, unlimited mental suffering of the many, destruction of
marriage and family morals, uncontrollable crime as a consequence of the lack
of a just and adequate penal system, a criminal foreigners policy and finally
exploitation and humiliation of those that have landed at the bottom of the
social ladder, such as the elderly, handicapped, disabled, unemployed and min-
imum wage earners. (CN 2/89)
The CP’86 believes that the two ‘materialist’ and ‘hedonist’ systems of cap-
italism and socialism (normally referred to as communism) are at the core of
the current moral decay in the (Western) world; after the fall of the Berlin
Wall ‘liberal capitalism’ was declared its main enemy. At the elite level these
systems have led to a situation in which the economically powerful are no
longer bound by a country (or ethnic community), which is in itself juxta-
posed to the nationalist spirit. At the mass level the systems made people into
‘consumer slaves who are devoid of culture’, so that they are easier to con-
trol and thus stimulate the profit of big capital (CN 2/92). Only if these mate-
rialist and hedonist systems (and cultures) are overcome, is it possible to
achieve a return to traditional ethical values.
Socio-economic policy
Originally the CP’86 professed a rather liberal economic view which fea-
tured primarily in the election programme. It stressed the importance of
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decentralisation and privatisation of state tasks, the reduction of collective
spending and tax and premium reductions where and whenever possible (CP
1987: 9.7; also chapter XIII). It further pledged support for reducing the
financial deficit, for a policy of wage restraint, for government support for
the Dutch small business community, and for specially subsidised (research
on) technological innovation and education.
The later programmes were less liberal and more welfare chauvinist in
outlook. They proclaim the full economic and financial dependency of the
Netherlands on international (read US) capitalism (CP 1990: 9.1). Accord-
ing to the new party line, the economic actions of the Dutch government
should make sure that ‘our own ethnic community and not the multi-
national companies profits optimally from the benefits of the market’ (CP
1993: 9.3). The party increased the number of demands to protect the
Dutch economy and business community from negative effects of interna-
tional capitalism. The programmes are also less friendly towards employers
(e.g. CP 1990: 11.13). This transformation had already been visible in the
party paper. Increasingly the party was acting in defense of people in a weak
socio-economic position. In contrast to the popular picture of right-wing
extremist parties in which there is normally very little sympathy for poor
people that ‘live off the state’, the CP’86 hardly ever attacks the welfare
system or those who are dependent upon it. On the contrary, there are reg-
ular features in which outrage is expressed over the poor conditions under
which elderly people in particular have to live. The party rejects any further
cuts in several social benefits, often even calling for increases. The support
for the socially weak falls within a broader pro-worker discourse, also par-
ticularly visible in the paper, in which the party identifies with the common
working man who is threatened by various forces (among others, foreigners,
big business and the government).
The CP’86 claims to aspire to an ‘economic third way’, i.e. a system that
is neither capitalist nor socialist, both of which are perceived as purely mate-
rialist economic systems, operated by the two imperialist powers (the US and
the USSR) to alienate Eastern and Western Europe. They should be replaced
by a common pan-European new economic order. According to the ‘national
democratic guidelines regarding economic and social policy’, the crunch of
this new order is that ‘(a)ll citizens that are dependent upon wages should,
by participating in the productive capacity of the economy, become jointly
responsible and jointly influential as well as sharing in the profit’ (CN 1/89).
This new order, the so-called volkseconomie (ethnic economy), is further
built on the basis of private initiative (which is considered an essential fea-
ture of human nature) and the strengthening of small business.
According to the 1989 programme ‘(t)he future lies in a socioeconomic
order that serves our own ethnic community, bears responsibility for coun-
try and culture, and engenders community spirit’. The ‘national revolution’,
which will create the ethnic economy, will have to bring an end to the ‘scan-
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dalous exploitation, humiliation and uprooting of our ethnic community by
these so-called necessary cuts, reductions and abolitions that have as their
sole target the abolishment of our social system’ (CN 1/88). As far as con-
crete measures are concerned, they remain limited to the repatriation of for-
eigners. In sharp contrast to ‘our own people’, foreigners that profit from the
Dutch welfare state are depicted as ‘parasites’ who do not want to work and
who do their utmost to get as much as possible on the backs of the hard-
working Dutch population. At the same time those that work thereby steal
scarce jobs from ‘our own people’. If the foreigners are repatriated, the party
believes that the Dutch welfare state can be brought back to its old (higher)
levels of the 1970s and 1980s.
The strong state
A theme that has always featured prominently in the party literature, both
externally and internally oriented, is law and order. The 1987 programme
mentioned ‘safe’ as one of two pivotal terms in the title, and the introduc-
tion contained the statement: ‘As a guarantee for the individual freedom of
all citizens, we deem an effective police force as well as a merciless combat-
ing of all forms of crime to be absolutely vital.’ The programme also
included demands for ‘the absolute necessity that sentences are served fully
and under simple and sober conditions’ as well as for the (re-)introduction
of the death penalty (CP 1987: 6.7). The 1993 programme holds the same
tough law and order policies plus the demand for obligatory detoxification
for drugs addicts (CP 1993: 6.9).
In the party paper the omnipresent issue of crime is usually linked to
either foreigners or to the left (both defined in the broadest sense). Accord-
ing to the CP’86 a so-called ‘gang of 50’ terrorises the Netherlands under
such names as anti-fascists, anti-racists, anti-materialists, squatters, etc.
Though officially the enemy of the Dutch state, the gang is tolerated by large
parts of the state apparatus because it has proven valuable in the fight against
the CP’86. Crime by foreigners is another dominant topic in the party paper
(not only in the special columns). The party normally confines itself to
simply presenting the facts and a simple solution: deport all criminal for-
eigners to their countries of origin! In the brochure ‘national democratic
guidelines regarding crime’ it demands the following additional law and
order policies: introduction of working camps and of the death penalty,
stern discipline in prisons, higher sentences, putting the victim at the centre,
less administrative disturbance for the police, and more local policemen (CN
1/89).
A topic that is linked to a variety of themes, mainly traditional values and
crime, is drugs. The CP’86 regards both soft and hard drugs as ‘enemy
number one of the ethnic community’. The poisonous ideas of the (extreme)
left and the general moral decay they have caused especially among Dutch
youth are perceived as the primary causes of the broad circulation of drugs
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in the Netherlands. Although the party proposes a more general change in
moral values, it mainly wants to fight the drugs menace with law and order
solutions: ‘death penalty for drug dealers; impounding of all possessions of
drug dealers; mandatory detoxication for junkies; and immediate expulsion
of foreign junkies’ (CN 3/92).
Defense receives little attention in the party literature of the CP’86. The
party paper addressed the matter only once or twice, whereas the election
programmes always included a separate chapter on defense policy. It origi-
nally numbered no less than sixteen demands, of which the main message
was full support to NATO and all the obligations that stem from the mem-
bership. There was no sign of a militarist outlook, however, and it explicitly
stressed the exclusively defensive tasks of the Dutch army, with no mention
of any calls for the enlargement of personnel or competencies. The later pro-
grammes saw a substantive reduction in the number of points (to six), mainly
as a consequence of the changed position towards NATO. The 1993 pro-
gramme, for example, declared the deployment in peacetime of (parts of)
the Dutch army under foreign leadership to be ‘in violation of the tasks of
our army’ (CP 1993: 30.6). The emphasis on the exclusively defensive tasks
of the Dutch army has also been sharpened. Whereas the 1990 programme
had spoken of this as the ‘first and most important task’, the 1993 pro-
gramme stated that the protection of the freedom and independence of the
country and its citizens was ‘the only task of our army’ (CP 1993: 30.2).
Moreover, in line with the public debate in the Netherlands, though con-
trary to the generally militaristic ideal, the party supported the abolition of
compulsory military service and the introduction of a professional army (CP
1993: 30.1).
Ecologism
The environment and its protection are major concerns of the party pro-
grammes as well as making for frequent topics in the party papers. The
second pivotal term of the 1987 programme, ‘livable’, referred to a combi-
nation of social (protection of certain weaker groups such as disabled and
elderly people), nationalist (rejection of the multi-racial society) and ecolog-
ical views (protection of the environment), of which only the latter one was
really prominent in the programme. The chapter on the environment calls
for a radical change of mentality towards ‘an environmentally conscious
acting and thinking’ (CP 1987: 21.3). It also includes demands for more
policy at all governmental levels to protect the environment as well as for
more knowledge and research on environmental problems and environmen-
tally friendly production techniques.
The CP’86 holds an ecological view on the relation between economy and
environment. Man should return to his harmonious relation with nature, the
ethnic community and the family. Only when man is consciously part of
these larger entities can he experience his identity to the full. As man is part
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of nature, he should take good care of it. According to the pamphlet
‘national democratic guidelines regarding protection of our life and our
environment’, ‘(e)conomic growth is acceptable only when neither the nat-
ural landscape, our environment or the health of the people are destroyed
because of it, nor when the natural resources are plundered in an unbridled
manner’ (CN 1/89). To accomplish this the party presents some concrete
measures, such as an increase in the taxation on cars and free public trans-
port. In accordance with its law and order approach the party calls for a
tougher policy on pollution, in which the polluter pays. However, real
progress can be made only by ‘a revolution in human thinking’, which would
replace materialism and consumerism by ‘experiencing nature, the care for
irreplaceable cultural values as well as for the social security in the family, in
our own area, and in our own country’ as constituting the meaning of life
and the condition of human happiness (CN 1/89).
The topic of the (protection of the) environment has also increasingly fea-
tured in articles about foreigners, especially in the party paper. In the begin-
ning the link between foreigners and the environment was made indirectly,
through the issue of overpopulation. The first election programme, for
instance, stated that overpopulation forced the Netherlands to a restrictive
policy on foreigners as well as stringent rules in the areas of environmental
protection and planning (CP 1987: 20.1). The later programmes added a
direct linkage to this, declaring that ‘(o)ur dear fatherland is made unlivable
as a consequence of the absolute failures of the government and in part
because of the policy on foreigners, which is destructive of the environment’
(CP 1993: 21.20).
Populist anti-party sentiment
One of the dominant features in the party papers is anti-party sentiment
which is linked to virtually all other themes, most notably the multi-cultural
society. In line with its ethnopluralist vision the party argues that the for-
eigners are victims too, victims of the multi-cultural society and the integra-
tion policies of (national and international) politicians. It is the foreigner
policy and the people behind it that are seen as the prime enemies of the
ethnic community. Consequently, the party states: ‘Our actual goal is not
“the removal of the foreigners” but of the clique that has brought them here,
keeps them here and that will immediately bring them here again in the case
that they will be again “needed”’ (CN 2/91). Though the CP’86 mainly tar-
gets the established political parties, the ‘clique’ it speaks of is far bigger.
At a safe distance from the day-to-day problems and worries of the ordinary
man, party bosses, trade unionists, priests, journalists, church officials, radio
and tv dictators and more of that riffraff shack up in their remote and, above
all, safe villas, wondering about the hostility against foreigners and blathering
on about integration, or even worse, deciding that our country is an immigra-
tion country. (CN 2/88)
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The party considers the fact that the established parties present themselves
as different alternatives, by using labels like liberal or socialist, as mere
window-dressing. In the eyes of the CP’86 all (major) political parties are
responsible for the current misery, which is primarily caused by their ‘away-
with-our-own-people’ politics (a term copied from the VB). There is only
one way out of the emerging catastrophe: ‘Change the politicians, before
they change the ethnic community’ (CN 2/93). This change cannot be
realised by supporting Janmaat and his CD, however, since that party pre-
sents no real alternative to the anti-Dutch clique. Various articles in the party
paper accuse them of misusing the issue of nationalism out of political
opportunism. The only goal of these ‘pseudo-nationalists’ is acceptance by
the Establishment, not the realisation of genuine nationalist ideals.
There is only one force that can, will and does fight against this evil clique:
the ethnic nationalists of the CP’86. This is also acknowledged by the estab-
lished parties themselves as ‘they’ consider it (‘us’) their main enemy. More-
over, this is proven by the fact that the party is attacked so vigorously. Many
articles in the paper describe the violations of the democratic rights of the
party and its members, ranging from ‘state terror’ (e.g. arrests, court cases
and house searches), attacks by the state’s ‘subsidised thugs’ (e.g. anti-fascists
and other left-wing organisations), to elections (‘the biggest deception of the
public’). The CP’86 is convinced that it is not given an honest chance to
compete for the voters’ support and consequently considers the Netherlands
to be an undemocratic state. That is, for a large part, why the party strives
to change ‘the political system of the parliamentary dictatorship into that of
an ethnic democracy’ (CN 3/94).
Conspiracies
Until 1990 the election programme of the CP’86 had been free from any ref-
erence to international conspiracies. The 1987 programme had shown a
moderately sceptical world view, being very positive with regard to relations
with international organisations like the EC and NATO, but wary of the
United Nations. In general the programme was reserved concerning relations
with former colonies (except Indonesia) and interference with the internal
affairs of sovereign states. The party argued that the Netherlands is a small
country and should thus be moderate in its foreign political dealings. By the
time of the 1990 programme, however, this moderate scepticism had become
more or less open paranoia. The now national democrats took their lead from
the International Third Position (ITP) philosophy, which aspires to a nation-
alist third way between the two imperialist roads of international capital-
ism/liberalism and international communism/socialism (CP 1990: 29.1). The
ITP philosophy introduced a host of dark forces into the programme:
We consider multinational and international organisations as accomplices of
either international capitalism or international communism. With these we have
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in mind, for instance, the UN, the EC, the IMF, the World Bank, the World
Council of Churches, etc. These organisations are manipulated also by the
American CFR (Council for Foreign Relations) which wants to bring about a
one-world government. The CFR is hard at work to realise what Brezhnev
already predicted in 1975, i.e. the superpower that controls both the Gulf and
South Africa controls the whole world, since that superpower controls 75% of
the oil supplies and ca. 70% of all strategic minerals on earth. (CP 1990: 29.2)
What had already figured in the party paper now also made its entrance in
the election programmes. The CP’86 firmly believes that evil forces are at
work behind the scenes. They control all major governments (American,
Russian, West European), important international organisations (IMF,
World Bank, UN and World Council of Churches) as well as the media (espe-
cially the American). The main goal of these sinister forces is to form a one-
world government. To achieve this they have to break the spirit of the
different ethnic communities, which they do by ‘mixing’ them and under-
mining them both mentally and morally (by materialism and consumerism).
In the 1980s the conspiracies had been mainly linked to world commu-
nism. Large parts of the party paper were filled with virulent anti-commu-
nist articles, dealing for the most part with the atrocities of the USSR and
with accusations against the West European (extreme) left for supporting
them. The fervent anti-communist stand did not lead to a pro-NATO stand-
point, however. The party treated the US as an enemy, which worked
secretly together with the USSR. Some articles spoke of the ‘Finlandisation
of Western Europe’, claiming that the US and USSR together kept Europe,
Germany in particular, divided so that they could rule the world (a typical
NPD argument). Other articles, mainly published before the fall of the
Berlin Wall, claimed that the US (especially president Roosevelt) was in real-
ity pro-communist and had given parts of Europe to Stalin. On a higher level
these conspiracies were always part of the overriding conspiracy of a one-
world government.
Anti-semitism
Although the party is careful not to state who precisely lies behind the one-
world conspiracy it does at times give indications. At the top of the conspir-
acy are the ‘trilateral commissions’ and the Bilderberg Group. These
organisations are primarily (if not exclusively) formed by Jews, as is ‘hinted’
by names such as Rothschild, Kissinger and Oppenheimer. At one time the
party paper explicitly referred to the Protocols of the Meetings of the Learned
Elders of Zion (an anti-Semitic forgery of the Czarist secret service) as proof
of Jewish involvement (CN 1/90). This issue was never distributed for fear
of legal punishment, however. In the next issue the matter was phrased with
a more veiled wording: ‘We know who controls the global media including
the international press agencies’ (CN 2/90).
The occasional anti-Israel articles also fit well into the anti-Semitic con-
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spiracy. Israel, often referred to as ‘the Jewish state’, is believed to control all
Western governments and media, enabling it to build a ‘Great Israeli Reich’
(CN 1/93) without being called to order by the international community.
Several European and virtually all American politicians are ‘outed’ as helpers
of Israel in the party paper. Even Janmaat is depicted as a helper of Israel, as
he supported the deployment of Dutch Patriot missiles to defend Israel
during the Gulf war (in which the CP’86 supported Iraq against the ‘impe-
rialist Zionist aggression’). In other articles the party pays disproportionate
attention to violence by the Israeli state or citizens against the Palestinians.
The CP’86 fully supports the Intifada, the Palestinian uprising in the occu-
pied territories, which it describes as ‘a reaction to the genocide policy of the
Jewish government’ (CN 1/92). It demands a boycott of all products from
and relationships with Israel and, moreover, advocates immediate military
action in the occupied territories as well as the destruction of all nuclear
weapons by means of a short-term occupation of Israel (CN 2/93).
Another example of anti-Semitic conspiracy thinking was apparent in the
many articles on the trial of Ivan Demjanjuk, a Ukrainian-American who was
accused of committing war crimes as a Treblinka camp guard during the
Second World War. The Israeli court case against Demjanjuk received a lot
of attention in the world media as well as in the party paper of the CP’86.
From the outset Demjanjuk was depicted in the paper as an innocent man,
who was ‘extradited by the US to a Jewish blood council’ (CN 1/89). Accord-
ing to the party the whole purpose of the show trial was to ‘keep the memory
to the ‘continuous story of the six million’ alive’ (CN 1/92). Though this
statement hints at a denial of the Holocaust or at least at the accusation that
Israel (or ‘international Jewry’) uses it to further its own goals, revisionism
was never openly expressed in the party literature.
Democracy
All party programmes include positive standpoints on the constitutional
state and on parliamentary democracy. The party stresses the need for the
different state organs to control and be controlled by each other and by inde-
pendent outsiders. And from the beginning the CP’86 has pushed for an
increase in the influence of the people and for a considerable improvement
of the involvement of the citizen with the local and regional councils (CP
1990: 4.4). Remarkably, given its vast critique of politicians, it has also called
for an increase in the number of members of both the Senate (from 75 to
100) and the Second Chamber (from 150 to 200). Moreover, the party uses
the (unpatriotic) argument that this would bring the Netherlands more in
accord with the ratios in other EC countries (CP 1990: 3.7). Notwithstand-
ing its support for the system itself, the CP’86 repeatedly points to the flaws
of the current political practice, which according to the party are falsely
referred to as the pluralist community. The main thorns concern the lack of
freedom of speech (especially for ‘nationalists’), the corruption of the Estab-
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lishment, and the political control of the judiciary. It wants to (re)create a
real democracy, in which the will of the people can freely develop.
One condition to accomplish that goal is the full sovereignty of the entire Dutch
speaking community as a democratic state, which joins all sub-interests as
guardian of the whole, protects the rights of the own minorities, respects the
constitution, and is supported as the sovereign by the people. (CP 1989)
In this volksdemocratie (ethnic democracy) there will be no place for the
‘personal and group egoism [which] have led to an excessive deterioration
of responsible thinking and acting’ (CP 1989). What it actually will contain
remains rather vague. ‘Power to the people at all governmental levels’ (CN
3/94), is the only elaboration given to the term. And the only concrete
demand the party has voiced in this regard is the introduction of the so-
called volksreferendum (ethnic referendum), an optional plebiscite which is
open exclusively to members of the Dutch ethnic community. Throughout
its existence the CP’86 has supported the introduction of a referendum to
break the power of the corrupt elite and return it to the Dutch people. The
party has also used a more opportunist reasoning: ‘Every ethnic referendum
will support us, so we demand the introduction of an ethnic referendum’
(CN 1/88). Except for the introduction of a referendum the CP’86 does not
give any details about the creation of the proposed ‘three V’s’, which stand
for Verandering, Vernieuwing en Verbetering (change, renewal and improve-
ment).
Conclusion
The CP’86 does not have a particularly well-developed ideology. Its election
programmes hold scanty introductions, which precede long lists of unsub-
stantiated demands. The only party programme it ever presented was copied
literally from another party. Its paper mainly contains articles on current
affairs. Substantial articles dealing with questions of the present or future are
absent. This notwithstanding, the literature of the CP’86 is larded with
terms that seem to be part of an elaborated ideology, such as ‘third way’ or
‘national revolution’. The elaboration of these terms (and the ideology
behind them) remains vague if not totally absent and, in addition, terms
come in and out of vogue quickly. Originally, the CP’86 remained loyal to
its predecessor by calling itself a ‘right-wing political people’s party’ (CP
1987). At the end of 1988 this was replaced by the label ‘the national demo-
cratic movement in the Netherlands’, and since 1994 the party refers to itself
as a ‘national revolutionary party’.
The CP’86 began as a relatively moderate nationalist party in the tradition
of its predecessor the CP. Within a few years it had radicalised into an ethnic
nationalist party, striving for both external exclusiveness and internal
homogenisation. The new goal is an ethnically homogeneous Great-Nether-
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lands in which political power is put in the hands of the Dutch people
(mainly through the introduction of an ethnic referendum). The main
change has to come through policies, most notably ensuring stricter law and
order, a return to traditional ethical values and ecological consciousness.
The socio-economic policy will support a strong national welfare state. The
Great-Netherlands will take its place in a ‘Europe of Nations’, based on the
cooperation of independent and genuine nation-states. This Europe will
have to defend itself against the many national and international helpers of
the conspiracy to establish a (Jewish) one-world government.
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Following the detailed analysis at the level of the individual parties, this
chapter will now focus on the comparative dimension. At the core of this
study is the idea of the party family, a distinct group of parties with a shared
core ideology. In the following comparison the similarities of the ideologies
of the five parties will therefore be at the fore, albeit in a manner which
remains conscious of key differences.
Comparing the literature
On average the five parties distribute a moderate amount of literature, but
there are also large differences within the group. Regarding the externally
oriented literature, which is directed at the potential voters, all parties pub-
lish some kind of election programme. In almost all cases the first pro-
gramme was more or less copied from another party or organisation: the
CP’86 copied the programme of its predecessor the CP in full, while the CD
copied substantial parts of that same programme. The first election pro-
gramme of the REP was heavily inspired by that of the CSU, from which
party its leaders had originally split. The DVU programme is a selection of
twelve points from the DV programme, itself a collection of the programmes
of its various action groups. The VB published its first election programme
only in 1991, but its first programme (of principle) was very similar to that
of the Flemish nationalist organisation Were Di.
Most of the parties did not change their election programmes extensively
in content or style. The programmes of the DVU and the CD are particularly
stable, while the CP’86 changed the outlook rather than the look of its pro-
gramme. The VB was late in developing a distinct election programme and
has since proved rather consistent. The only party that effected substantial
changes in both the structure and content of its programme is the REP, which
replaced its original CSU-like programme within two years with a far shorter
and more radical manifesto. This latter would function as the ideological
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core of the later programmes, which maintained the radical tone of the man-
ifesto but combined it with the structure of the first programme.
There are big differences between the parties in terms of the size of the
programmes. At the two extremes are the DVU, with its programme of five
(short) pages, and the REP, with its 1993 programme of one hundred (large)
pages. The election programmes of the other parties average some twenty-
five pages. There are also substantial differences in the variety of party liter-
ature distributed by the parties. All parties publish some kind of election
programme, but in the case of the German parties this is the only externally
oriented literature that they distribute. The CP’86 published an additional
programme of principle, while the CD published a thematic brochure. In
both cases, however, the items were more or less copied: the CP’86 literally
translated its first programme of principle of the German NPD, while the
CD distributed a brochure on AIDS which was developed by and for the Uni-
fication Church. The only party that issued a wide variety of (original) exter-
nally oriented literature is the VB, which began with a programme of
principle and later added election programmes and a range of thematic and
general brochures in the 1990s.
Of all the parties, the DVU is the only one that does not officially publish
internally oriented literature in the form of a party paper. It compensates for
this with the vast amount of literature distributed by the empire of its party
leader, Gerhard Frey, which includes two (previously three) weekly newspa-
pers. The Dutch parties CD and CP’86 issue official party papers although
of a very poor quality (containing various letter types or many language and
typing errors). Moreover, the party papers of the CD appear rather irregu-
larly, the CD-actueel in particular, while the CP’86 paper until recently fluc-
tuated heavily in both structure and volume. The papers of the VB and the
REP make a professional impression, especially since the late 1980s, and are
published regularly (every month) and consistently.
One of the most remarkable differences between the parties is in the
breadth of the literature. At one extreme is the CD, which is virtually a
single-issue party, opposing the creation of a multi-cultural society in the
Netherlands. Few attempts are made in the literature to substantiate this
opposition through ideological arguments. This is not much different from
the DVU, although this party’s dominant theme is the rehabilitation of Ger-
many. Both parties address a very limited number of issues and seem to
accept the main socio-political and socio-economic characteristics of the
present society. At the other extreme is the VB which offers a comprehen-
sive ideological programme. Throughout the years, and mainly in the 1990s,
the party consistently extended its programme to cover an increasing range
of topics through thematic conferences and brochures. The other two par-
ties are in between these extremes, but differ substantially from each other.
The REP has never claimed to be an ideological party and started out more
or less pragmatically, copying most of its programme from the CSU but with-
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out the Christian outlook. Soon afterwards it radicalised and became overtly
nationalist, but the party never reputed its claim or put much effort into the
development of its own ideology. The CP’86, on the other hand, has always
claimed to be an ideological party, and although it uses a discourse that sug-
gests an elaborated ideological programme, it has never developed an ideol-
ogy (of its own) and has proven very inconsistent in its terminology.
Evaluating the analysis
Most studies of party ideology use only election programmes as the source
of analysis. These programmes have the advantage of being officially
endorsed by the party membership or leadership and consequently ‘repre-
sent and express the policy collectively adopted by the party’ (Borg 1966:
97). However, this is also the main problem with election programmes: that
is, they deal with policy rather than ideology. If this analysis had been based
exclusively on the election programmes of the five parties, for example, the
picture of the core ‘ideology’ of the different parties would certainly have
appeared different, first and foremost because the ideological arguments
behind policies are at best often vague, and at worst absent. In addition, sim-
ilar policy demands can be based on different arguments (in different coun-
tries). For example, the call for unification by the German parties is based on
legal arguments such as upholding the German constitution and interna-
tional law, while the same call by the VB and the CP’86 is based on nation-
alist arguments of external exclusiveness.
In addition, most (extreme right) political parties follow more or less the
same structure in their election programmes. Hence, ideologically different
parties address often similar issues. A good example is the environment, an
issue which has been absent from few election programmes since the rise of
Green parties in the 1980s. Another example is socio-economic policy,
which features prominently in many programmes and which might explain
why some authors choose to emphasise this particular aspect of the ideology
of extreme right parties (e.g. Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995). In both cases the
number of demands appears to indicate the importance of the issue, and the
content of the demands appears to point to a certain ideological outlook.
These indications remain vague, however, and sometimes contrast with the
attention they receive and with the positions that are adopted elsewhere in
the party literature.
Given the often shallow character of election programmes it is difficult if
not impossible to determine the importance of the different features within
the (core) ideology of the party. To apply the causal chain approach one not
only needs the arguments that lie behind the individual policy demands, but
also a substantiated description of a more holistic nature, such as, for
instance, those which address the desired model of human cooperation or
state organisation. The addition of party programmes or so-called pro-
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grammes of principle proved to be very fruitful in this respect, as they pro-
vide a more elaborated and thorough description of the party’s (fundamen-
tal) values and goals. Unfortunately, however, not all parties publish such
programmes, and hence party papers were seen to provide effective substi-
tutes. Party papers are usually less elaborated in argument than party pro-
grammes, but are clearly more elaborated than election programmes.
Moreover, party papers provide a clear indication of the importance of the
various ideological traits, especially in terms of how often and how centrally
they feature within the broader ideological argument.
The key question that remains, of course, is whether these sources reveal
all that there is. Some authors, for example, claim that extreme right parties
in particular do not show their true face ‘front-stage’, i.e. to the general
public, but reserve it for the ‘back-stage’, i.e. the real supporters (see Van
Donselaar 1991: 16; also Eatwell 1992: 174). However, this thesis is diffi-
cult to validate or even to test since, in contrast to the front-stage, the back-
stage is not that easy to define and analyse. Who are the ‘real supporters‘?
Moreover, can the back-stage be researched at all? To avoid the thesis from
becoming a conspiracy theory in which the back-stage is always the one
behind that which is being researched (cf. Dahl’s (1989: 272) argument
regarding the testing of theories of minority domination), this study has
sought to distinguish the two ‘stages’ of the parties on the basis of the pri-
mary orientation of the party literature. Externally oriented literature such
as election and party programmes, as well as brochures, were taken as indi-
cators of the front-stage, whereas internally oriented literature such as party
papers were seen as indicators of the back-stage.
In one of the few similar studies of party ideology, both in sources and in
method, Spruyt (1995: 263–76) comes to the conclusion that the VB
deceives its voters by presenting different themes in its propaganda (front-
stage) to those in its programme (back-stage). There are two reasons why
this conclusion is too harsh. First, the selection of propaganda material is too
confined, since it includes exclusively literature that is distributed on the ini-
tiative of the party itself and therefore excludes, for example, election and
party programmes. Second, the difference that Spruyt depicts is mainly in
the elaboration of the themes rather than in the ideological position that is
taken in the different sources. The VB does not present a different ideologi-
cal position in its propaganda; it simply does not present the ideological
argument in its entirety. To a large extent this is the result of the strict selec-
tion of the propaganda items, since election pamphlets generally include
only a few (catchy) slogans and (short) demands rather than the ideological
elaboration of these slogans and demands.
What is most important to emphasise, however, is that when the front-
stage and back-stage are defined on the basis of the primary orientation of
the party literature, the differences between the externally and internally
oriented literature of the individual parties can be seen to be generally lim-
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ited to secondary features and themes. In fact, and this must be underlined,
the core ideology of the parties is (prominently) present in the entire litera-
ture. If there is one exception in this regard, then it is the DVU, which does
not publish its own official party paper. Even in this case, however, both the
externally and the internally oriented literature do reflect the core ideology
of the party. Moreover, when we apply the same distinction to the VB, we
can see a remarkable similarity in ideological content, with even the more
sensitive features such as ethnopluralism and revisionism featuring in both
sources. Indeed, the only small proof of the thesis that certain particularly
sensitive features are hidden from the front-stage is found in the fact that
anti-Semitism is exclusively expressed back-stage, i.e. through the internally
oriented literature. However, although the ideology of the ‘extreme right’
might include more of such sensitive features than other parties, they are cer-
tainly not the only parties that keep these features from the general public.
More to the point, they express (most of) their core ideology quite openly
in their literature.
Comparing the ideology
Nationalism
All of these parties are nationalist parties (see table 7.1, which offers a sum-
mary of the relevance to each party of the various features discussed in this
section), striving for the congruence of state (the political unit) and nation
(the cultural unit). In the case of the VB, nationalism is primarily expressed
through the demand for Flemish independence: the party wants to divide
Belgium and create a sovereign Flemish state. The two German parties DVU
and REP voice their nationalism chiefly through the demand for complete
German independence, claiming that Germany is still limited in its sover-
eignty by the (former) Allies. This demand has become somewhat less promi-
nent since the four-by-two agreement in 1990, which was seen as the basis
for not only the German unification but also the ‘normalisation’ of the inter-
national position of Germany.
In the case of the two Dutch parties, CD and CP’86, nationalism is pre-
dominantly expressed though the demand for internal homogenisation, i.e.
the claim that only members of the Dutch nation are permitted to live in the
Dutch state. For the CP’86 this primarily means that all non-European for-
eigners have to repatriate while European foreigners can assimilate, whereas
the CD wants all foreigners to either assimilate or repatriate. The nationalist
sub-feature of internal homogenisation is also prominent in the party litera-
ture of the other three parties. The VB, for example, makes a similar dis-
tinction as the CP’86 between Europeans and non-Europeans – the German
parties do not address this issue in detail. What all five parties have in
common is the idea that their country should be (at least) mono-cultural and
that this should be realised by an active state policy of (at least) repatriation.
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The second nationalist sub-feature, external exclusiveness, constitutes part
of the ideologies of only the VB and the CP’86. Both parties strive for the
inclusion of all members of the Dutch ethnic community within the Dutch
state, which means the unification of the Netherlands and Flanders into a
Great-Netherlands state. The VB explicitly states that this should be a fed-
eralist state, whereas the CP’86 does not address this issue. Surprisingly,
both parties mention this relatively radical ideal of a Great-Netherlands
principally in their externally oriented literature, most notably in their pro-
grammes of principle. In the case of the VB this might be the result of the
fact that the party considers unification undesirable in the short term, given
that the party believes that the (Northern) Netherlands is currently under-
going a process of left-wing decay.
Table 7.1 Summary table of ideological features per partya
Feature REP DVU VB CD CP’86
Nationalism C C C C C
Internal homogenisation C C C C C
External exclusiveness i i C C
Ethnic nationalism i i C C
State nationalism C
Exclusionism
Ethnopluralism i C C
Anti-Semitism p C C
Xenophobia C C C C C
Strong state
Law and order C C C C C
Militarism i
Welfare chauvinism C C C C C
Traditional ethics C p C p p
Revisionism C C C i
a I have left out ideosyncratic (core) features, such as in the case of the DVU chau-
vinism or ecologism for the CP’86.
(C = core; p = present, not core; i = indication, not explicit).
Despite the fact that the literature of both German parties is drenched with
expressions of open support of German unification, which is perceived as
most important and urgent, the DVU and REP adopt legal rather than
nationalist arguments in support of their case. Both claim that the German
constitution as well as international law still recognises the ‘German Reich
of 1937’ and consequently demand the reinstatement of these borders
through negotiations. The unification of 1990 was regarded as just a first
step in the process of full ‘reunification’, as it included only West Germany
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(the FRG) and ‘Central Germany’ (as they call the former GDR), and not the
genuine East Germany (the so-called Ostgebiete behind the Oder-Neiße
border). Moreover, and in contrast with the assumptions of external exclu-
siveness, the parties also accept the fact that certain parts of the German
nation live outside of the German state. For example, although they both
consider the Austrians to be part of the German nation, they accept the fact
that they live in an independent Austrian state.
These variations are the result of a more fundamental distinction, namely
that between ethnic and state nationalism. The VB and the CP’86 are ethnic
nationalist parties and consider the ethnic community as the prime basis for
human organisation and social solidarity. The ethnic community is defined
on the basis of ethnic criteria, mainly through blood ties. Members of the
Dutch ethnic community are (only) those who are born to Dutch parents,
and ethnic nationalists consider the state as nothing more than the political
arm of the ethnic community. The state should therefore have the same bor-
ders as the ethnic community, a goal which can be realised by separation and
unification. In the case of the VB the two are even combined, since the party
first wants to separate Flanders from Belgium and then to unify Flanders
with the Netherlands into a federal Dutch state.
State nationalists, on the other hand, consider the state as the prime basis
of human organisation and solidarity. The nation is constituted from the
people that are born within the state borders or that live within the state and
want to naturalise. The nation has to be culturally homogeneous but not
necessarily ethnically homogeneous. This is why state nationalist parties
emphasise both repatriation and assimilation as policies to make the state
internally homogeneous. Of the five parties, the CD is, in fact, the only state
nationalist party. The two German parties are clearly nationalist, and use
ethnic nationalist rhetoric (with terms such as Volksgemeinschaft). However,
the literature of the parties specifies neither the criterion for defining the
‘own group’ nor the specific relationship between state and nation, and it
thereby clouds their categorisation within the different subgroups.
Exclusionism
In line with the difference in nationalism the parties also vary in the argu-
ments they use to include and exclude people from the ‘own group’. The two
ethnic nationalist parties VB and CP’86 are openly ethnopluralist, believing
that people are inextricably linked to a specific ethnic community and that
both the people and their ethnic communities are unequal but equivalent.
Hence, they demand the repatriation of foreigners on the grounds that all
people should live ‘according to their own nature’. However, as they believe
that Europeans are linked by a sort of European meta-culture, these parties
also accept the possibility of assimilation in the case of European foreigners.
The ideologies of the two German parties are too nebulous to include such
elaborated world views as ethnopluralism, although vague indications are
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present in the literature of the DVU. The state nationalism of the CD, on the
other hand, does not allow for ethnopluralism, and with the exception of an
occasional hint, this kind of argument is absent from the literature of that
party.
Racism is not an evident part of the party ideology of any of the five par-
ties. The majority of the parties do not even formally speak of ‘races’ and the
two parties that use this terminology (the VB and the CP’86) express a belief
in the existence of different races without proclaiming the superiority of any
one of these. For the CP’86 in particular the distinction of humans into races
precedes that into ethnic communities and seems to be of even greater
importance. It primarily demands the separation of races and is far less strict
with regard to the separation of different ethnic communities within one
race (the VB has a similar argument but within the European meta-culture).
Whether the absence of an openly expressed belief in hierarchy of races is
caused by legal pressure, especially in Germany and the Netherlands (see
Van Donselaar 1995), is impossible to ascertain on the basis of this study.
What speaks against a moderating effect of legal pressure is the fact that
anti-Semitism is clearly visible in the case of both German parties (mainly the
DVU) and the CP’86. While the CD and the VB do not consider Jews to be
an issue and neither attack nor address them, the three other parties persis-
tently portray Jews in a negative manner in their literature. The REP mainly
addresses Jews in reaction to allegations of racism and anti-Semitism by
Jewish persons and organisations, while the DVU shows an interest in Jews
(and Israel) that borders on an obsession. The three parties generally address
Jews as part of a classic conspiracy theory in which they are portrayed as a
closed group of internationally powerful people that conspire either against
Germany (in the case of the DVU and, to a lesser extent, the REP) or are
trying to create a one-world government (in the case of the CP’86).1
Xenophobia
As is evident from the whole party literature, and most notably the party
papers, all parties are xenophobic. Everything what is considered ‘alien’, or
deviating from their own nation and conventions, is portrayed as negative
and is perceived as threatening. This applies not only to the cultural values
of other ethnic communities, but also to the values of particular minorities
within their own ethnic community, such as homosexuals and the left. More-
over, xenophobia has an international dimension in that all of the parties
perceive the world as hostile towards their own group. In this respect the
German parties point mainly to the actions of the former Allies, while the
CP’86 sees a conspiracy to establish a one-world government. All parties
perceive the process of European integration in general, and the abolition of
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internal borders in particular, as a threat to the character of their own group.
Except for the CD, the parties all also point to the threat of the growing
influence of American culture (‘Cocacolonisation’) in Europe.
Most attention in the xenophobic party literature is paid to the threat of
(mass) immigration and the creation of a multi-cultural society. All parties
portray an image of a ‘flood’ of immigrants which is out of control and
which is kept hidden by ‘the Establishment’. Immigrants are seen as com-
petitors, since they take away jobs, money and houses from the ‘own
people’. They are also linked to every other threat or problem in the coun-
try (and even in Western Europe more generally), such as rising crime, moral
decay, or in the case of the Dutch parties (most notably the CD), overpopu-
lation. The multi-cultural society is portrayed as a ‘multi-criminal society’;
indeed, according to the ethnic nationalists (VB and CP’86), this is inevitable
since the people that live outside their own ethnic community become
uprooted and consequently morally degenerate, whereas the other parties
claim simply that the immigrants do not want to integrate.
Though the xenophobic propaganda of all five parties is rather similar in
argumentation, there are differences in the groups that function as the main
targets in the respective literature. Originally the VB had targeted mainly
European immigrants, but it shifted in the 1980s to the group that is also the
main target of the two Dutch parties, Muslim immigrants from Turkey and
Morocco in particular. In addition to the usual allegations about foreigners
(lazy, criminal, backward), the Muslims are depicted as the fifth column of a
fundamentalist and backward religion. Asylum seekers generally featured
less prominently in the literature of the Dutch speaking parties, though this
changed when this issue gained salience in the public debate in these coun-
tries during the 1990s. In the case of the German parties asylum seekers have
always been the most targeted group of foreigners, even though their impor-
tance increased even more during the asylum debate in the early 1990s. For
these parties the Muslim immigrants seem to constitute a major new target
in their xenophobic propaganda.
The strong state
A general belief in the importance of law and order is present in the ideol-
ogy of all five parties, though only the VB expresses this in an open manner,
stating that human life is only possible in a well-ordered community. In the
case of the other parties the belief is mainly addressed by means of a rejec-
tion of permissiveness and the call for a strong state. This strong state should
provide for a police force that is extensive in terms of personnel, equipment
and competencies. Moreover, the judiciary system should be purged of left-
wing elements and should deliver harsher sentences which would then be
executed to the full, under strict conditions and covering a wider variety of
crimes. Except for the VB and the REP, all parties call for the introduction
of the death penalty. The issue of crime is also generally linked to that of
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immigration and increasingly to that of ‘the left’ in general, and to ‘anti-fas-
cists’ in particular.
In contrast to their strict and prominent law and order position, the par-
ties are relatively modest in their attention to and position on defense issues,
showing no signs of militarism. All election programmes include a section on
defense in which the institution of a national army is supported, albeit with-
out calling for significant expansions in personnel or competencies. More-
over, the parties stress the purely defensive tasks of the army and are wary
of international deployment. Most parties accepted NATO as a lesser of two
evils during the Cold War, for example, and since then they have found in
international Islam a new reason for continuing that support. The CP’86,
however, changed to an openly anti-NATO position at the end of the 1980s,
following its ‘conversion’ to national democracy.
A special position is taken by the DVU, which is the only party that shows
signs of a militaristic outlook, and it supports a strong army in which civil-
ians are not expected to play a leading role. More importantly, it argues that
the German army should be strictly independent, and consequently it has
always opposed NATO membership. The foundation of its militaristic posi-
tion is to be found in the legacy of the past rather than in present day poli-
tics, however. Indeed, one of the most prominent features of Frey’s
newspapers in particular has been the rehabilitation of the German soldiers
who fought during the Second World War and time and again the militaris-
tic virtues of these soldiers are applauded as part of this rehabilitation.
Welfare chauvinism
Socio-economic policy features prominently in the externally oriented liter-
ature of all five parties, yet is far less visible in their internally oriented liter-
ature. Only the party papers of the REP and the CD devote regular attention
to this theme, albeit without presenting a clear socio-economic programme.
As with all other parties, they support the core aspects of the current system
of a mixed economy in their respective countries, and only the VB tries to
present a more or less alternative system based on a sense of solidarism. For
the VB, the solidarist ‘people’s economy’ is achievement-oriented and builds
on the duty to work and on the central role of the family. This solidarist
system does not differ very much from the systems of the mixed economy
favoured by the other parties, however, which are also (more or less)
achievement-oriented and family-friendly. Despite the fact that all parties
support some form of welfare state, most regularly cite neo-liberal rhetoric
and return regularly to various neo-liberal hobby horses, such as the limita-
tion of public subsidies and an emphasis on the ‘squandermania’ of the state
and its bureaucracy.
The main distinctive feature of the socio-economic policy of all parties is
welfare chauvinism: that is, they believe that the fruits of the national econ-
omy should first and foremost (if not exclusively) come to the benefit of their
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‘own people’. This means not only that jobs and money should be used for
their own people rather than for immigrants, but also that the state should
protect certain sectors of the ‘native economy’ against foreign competition.
All parties stress the importance of national agricultural production, for
example, although this point is most prominently emphasised in the (early)
literature of the REP. Even in the beginning, when the party programme still
included a pro-EC position as part of the legacy of its CSU origins, the REP
paper called for the protection of German farmers to the point of leaving the
EC. In addition, a call for support for their ‘own’ small businesses and for
the protection of this ‘backbone of the national economy’ against multi-
nationals is present in the whole literature of all five parties. These points
became more prominent with the increasing level of European integration,
and most notably the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, which all parties con-
sider a serious threat to the viability of the national economy.
Traditional ethics
Though all parties hold a traditional view on ethical values, not all devote
much attention to the issue in their literature. Moreover, some parties worry
mainly about and warn against the alleged ongoing process of moral decay
(the REP), which is part of an international conspiracy (the CP’86), while
others present an elaborated alternative programme (the VB). All parties,
however, stress the importance of the traditional nuclear family (including
one man, one woman and many children) and reject any possible threat
against it (such as abortion, homosexuality or divorce). Moreover, with
regard to gender relations most parties also (try to) present themselves as
more progressive than they actually are. Despite efforts to accept the work-
ing woman, most parties see women first and foremost as mothers, although
this is less the case for the Dutch parties. In general the values that are
defended are presented as part of a European culture which is based on both
Christian and humanist traditions. Christianity itself is not an issue for the
parties and they are generally hostile towards ‘organised Christianity’
(Church authorities), which is portrayed as degenerated, left-wing and anti-
national (especially in the case of the German parties).
Revisionism
One of the aspects in which the two Dutch parties deviate most clearly from
the other three parties is in the fact that they devote almost no attention to
the Second World War. In sharp contrast, the party papers of the DVU deal
more with this issue than with current affairs. Most of the articles that
address the role of the Germans during the war, and its legacy on post-war
Germany, contain a clearly revisionist view. Either they call for the rehabili-
tation of German soldiers and their actions or they stress the war crimes of
the Allies during and after the war (so-called Aufrechnung). The party never
goes so far as to condone (major aspects of) Nazi-Germany, however. The
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REP shares this feature of revisionism with the DVU, although it is more
moderate in its arguments and in the attention it devotes to the topic. For
the REP in general, and for Schönhuber in particular, revisionism is mainly
part of the attack against alleged anti-national politicians (among their
favourite targets was former German President Richard von Weiszäcker).
The VB also devotes a lot of attention to the legacy of the Second World
War, most notably through the issue of amnesty. As in the case of the two
German parties, it identifies with those who lost the war, the radical wing of
the Flemish movement, but without fully condoning their ideology. How-
ever, whereas the German parties mainly try to defend the actions of the
German soldiers by pointing to their lack of choice (‘they had to do their
duty’) or by pointing to similar actions by soldiers of other countries (mainly
from the former Allies), the VB openly condones the actions of the Flemish
collaborators. According to the party they acted ‘for the good of Flanders’
and that is the only criterion for deciding between good and evil. Moreover,
while the German parties keep some distance from ‘contaminated’ people
(this applies less to the DVU) the VB openly applauds former leading col-
laborators and accepts them in leading positions within the party.
The extreme right party family: fact or fiction?
In the first chapter I discussed the (comparative) literature on extreme right
parties of the third wave (1980–99). As could be seen, different scholars
grouped different parties together and did this under different labels. Some
consensus could nevertheless be uncovered. First, the term extreme right (or
right-wing extremist) is still broadly accepted as the most satisfying collec-
tive noun. Second, this term is generally used to describe an ideology con-
taining a combination of several distinct features. Third, and despite several
borderline cases, there is a large number of political parties whose extreme
right status is not debated. On the basis of this consensus, the following
propositions were constructed:
1 The extreme right party family consists of a distinct group of parties that
shares a common ideological core.
2 This common ideological core includes (at least) that combination of fea-
tures generally defined as right-wing extremist.
3 Within the broader extreme right party family at least two subgroups can
be distinguished on the basis of ideological extremity.
Having compared the literature and ideology of the parties in detail, I will
now turn my attention to the consequences of these findings for the ‘extreme
right party family’. In the following discussion, I will assess in what way the
findings support or reject each of the three propositions.
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The common ideological core
The foregoing analysis has clearly demonstrated that all five parties share an
ideological core which is built around the nucleus of nationalism. All parties
are first and foremost nationalist parties, aspiring for the congruence of state
(the political unit) and nation (the cultural unit). The state should implement
a policy of internal homogenisation to create a mono-cultural society which
at least includes the repatriation of (some) foreigners. In addition, xenopho-
bia determines the world view of the parties in which everything ‘abnormal’
(or better: that which is perceived as deviating from their own nation and
conventions) is seen as negative and threatening. This includes both ‘inter-
nal enemies’ (e.g. immigrants, homosexuals) and ‘external enemies’ (e.g.
supranational organisations). The combination of nationalism and xeno-
phobia determines the preferred socio-economic policies of the parties,
which can best be described as welfare chauvinist; that is, the state 
should ensure that employment and welfare policies work to the (exclusive)
benefit of ‘the own people’. Consequently, foreign policy should be directed
at protecting the sovereignty of the own state and at the welfare of the own
people. A fourth core ideological feature is a belief in law and order, in
which the state should maintain a strict legal system and should enforce
these rules actively and rigorously. Again, the underlying arguments are
based on nationalism and xenophobia, i.e. protecting the nation from 
evil outside forces. For all parties this belief in law and order includes a
moral dimension, though this is not always a core feature of the party 
ideology.
Before testing whether the core ideology is also indeed extreme right, as
is generally assumed, the matter of distinctiveness may be taken a step fur-
ther, by questioning the extent to which this core might also be shared by
two other groups of parties that are sometimes believed to overlap consid-
erably with the (alleged) extreme right family: left-wing extremist parties
and (neo-)conservative parties. For example, one of the theoretical schools
within the study of right-wing extremism (see Mudde 1996), the extremism-
theoretical school, emphasises the similarities between right-wing and left-
wing extremist parties, pitting both against (left-wing and right-wing)
democratic parties. Moreover, the shared core feature of all these ‘extrem-
ist’ parties is generally defined as the rejection of (core aspects of) democracy
(e.g. Backes 1989; Pfahl-Traughber 1992). In this case, however, as we have
seen, rejection of democracy is not in fact part of the core ideology of the
five parties with which this study is concerned; indeed, despite much criti-
cism, all five accept (parliamentary) democracy. Moreover, while some
authors have argued that pluralism is a core feature of democracy, and that
extremist parties are essentially anti-pluralist or better monist in that they
treat cleavages and ambivalences as illegitimate (e.g. Lipset and Raab 1970),
this is also not that helpful for an understanding of this group of parties. For
although the core ideology of the five parties includes some form of monism,
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most notably in the struggle for a mono-cultural state, on other aspects the
parties do accept a plurality of ideas and organisations.
A more problematic border seems to exist between extreme right and
(neo)conservative parties. According to some authors these two groups are
part of the same ‘silent counter-revolution’ (Ignazi 1992). Neo-conservatism
has been primarily associated with a political philosophy within Anglo-
Saxon countries (with thinkers like Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer and Peter
Viereck), with the most significant party political representatives being prob-
ably the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher and the Republican
Party under Ronald Reagan. What characterised these parties was first and
foremost ‘a revival of classical liberalism’ (Green 1987: 2), with the core of
the neo-conservative ideology being summarised as a combination of eco-
nomic liberalism and socio-cultural conservatism (cf. Dubiel 1987; Girvin
1988; Ignazi 1992). It is particularly in the feature of socio-cultural conser-
vatism that a similarity between the extreme right and neo-conservatism can
be seen. For, although this is not part of the core ideology of the ‘family’, all
five parties certainly do share a (secular) traditional ethical view, and in the
case of some parties (most notably the VB), it is even a core feature of the
party ideology. Various authors (e.g. Ignazi 1992; Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995)
have also stressed the salience of economic liberalism for extreme right par-
ties. Indeed, some definitions of radical right (populist) parties come very
close to the definition of neo-conservatism. As noted, however, these five
parties do not in fact advocate ‘rightist free market economics’, as Kitschelt
(1995: 2) argues, but rather support some form of welfare system, if only for
their ‘own people’. Moreover, the two groups of parties differ even more
fundamentally in that the extreme right parties in general, and the ethnic
nationalists in particular, put their emphasis on the collective, whereas neo-
conservatives put an emphasis on the individual. In addition, while neo-con-
servative parties appear to accept the primacy of economics, ‘extreme right’
parties are intent on restoring the primacy of (national) politics.
An extreme right core
Having established that the core ideology of the five parties is distinctive,
both in general and in relation to the core of left-wing extremism and neo-
conservatism, I now turn to the question whether this core ideology does
indeed fit the label ‘extreme right’, as is generally assumed to be the case. As
we have seen (on pp. 10–11), the concept of right-wing extremism is usually
defined as a political ideology composed of a number of different features.
Five such features are mentioned in particular, in one form or another, by a
majority of the authors involved: nationalism, racism (including ethnoplu-
ralism), xenophobia, anti-democracy and the strong state (Mudde 1995:
206). To speak of right-wing extremism in this sense does not require that
all five features need be present, but rather that there should be a combina-
tion of some of the features. Three different approaches to the problem of
178 The ideology of the extreme right
chap7  28/5/02  13.33  Page 178
defining the necessary combination of features can be distinguished: a quan-
titative, a qualitative and a mixed approach (Mudde 1995: 218–19).
In a quantitative approach all five features are considered of equal impor-
tance and the only criterion used to define the necessary combination of fea-
tures is the actual number of features. So, for example, one can argue that at
least half of the features should be present, which means three or more. In
this study, we have indeed found that half of the five features that are part of
the definition of right-wing extremism are also part of the common ideo-
logical core of the five parties, namely nationalism, xenophobia and law and
order (the latter as part of the strong state). Consequently, if the quantitative
criterion is set at (at least) half of the number of features, the combination
of nationalism, xenophobia and law and order is sufficient to constitute
right-wing extremism, and the party family identified in this study can be
said to hold an extreme right core ideology.
In the qualitative approach, on the other hand, one or more features are
considered to be ‘more equal’ than others: for instance, in the extremism-the-
oretical tradition there can be no (right-wing) extremism without the feature
of anti-democracy. So even if all four of the other features are present, they
would not constitute extremism. As we have already seen above, the core ide-
ology of the five parties does not include the feature of anti-democracy and
therefore the party family is not (right-wing) extremist according to the
extremist-theoretical school. However, if the prime feature were to be nation-
alism or xenophobia, the parties would certainly be labelled extreme right.
The third approach combines the quantitative and qualitative approaches:
for example, it requires at least two features, and of these two at least one
has to be ‘exclusionist’ (i.e. nationalism, racism or xenophobia) and at least
one has to be ‘hierarchic’ (i.e. anti-democracy or strong state). Utilising this
combination of one exclusionist and one hierarchic feature, a combination
which is also revealed in studies of right-wing extremism at the individual
level (Meijerink et al. 1998), the core of the party family can again be clas-
sified as extreme right. Two features of the core ideology can be categorised
as exclusionist (nationalism and xenophobia), while law and order is a hier-
archic feature.
In conclusion, the core of the party family ideology identified in this
analysis, which entails a combination of nationalism, welfare chauvinism,
xenophobia and law and order, can be labelled extreme right according to
all three approaches, though it seems to constitute a borderline case. More-
over, a problem that any scholar of the extreme right is confronted with, is
that semantically the terms ‘extreme right’ and ‘right-wing extremist’ point
to the wrong direction. After all, the extreme right ideology is neither an
extreme form of right-wing thinking, as the communist theory postulates
(e.g. Kühnl 1992), nor a right-wing form of extremist thinking, as the
extremism-theoretical school argues (e.g. Backes 1989).
This might be the reason that a growing group of scholars work with alter-
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native labels, often explicitly denouncing the term extreme right. However,
as has been argued above (in chapter 1, pp. 11–14), these ‘new’ labels are
generally defined in rather similar terms and therefore hardly constitute real
alternatives. This is most notably the case with the term ‘radical right’, which
is also most often used interchangeably with the term ‘extreme right’. But
even most definitions of the various forms of ‘populism’ do not differ much
from those of ‘right-wing extremism’. The main advantage that these defin-
itions offer is that they generally do not (explicitly) include the feature of
anti-democracy (see Backes 1991; Taggart 1995), nor its semantic meaning.
This said, they put the emphasis on the feature of populism, which is pre-
dominantly defined as a particular political style rather than a specific ideo-
logical feature (e.g. Betz 1994; Pfahl-Traughber 1994). As the concept of
party family is defined in (exclusively) ideological terms, this would mean
stretching the concept.
A final option would be to use either more or less demanding concepts,
i.e. to travel up or down Sartori’s famous ladder of abstraction (Sartori
1970). At the bottom of that ladder one would find the most demanding
concepts like fascism and National Socialism, which generally include the
five features of right-wing extremism as well as some additional features.
Though some of these additional features are of an ideological nature, such
as ‘palingenesis’ (Griffin 1995) or a ‘Third Way’ (Eatwell 1995), most refer
to forms of political organisation or style (e.g. Payne 1995). In either case,
the term fascism offers no way out, introducing either even more demand-
ing or non-ideological features. In contrast, concepts at a higher ladder of
abstraction, most notably nationalism, are too general and provide too little
discriminating power. Though the identified ideological core is clearly
nationalist, not all nationalisms include also the features of xenophobia and
law and order (e.g. Kohn 1945; Tamir 1993).
It seems therefore most useful to stick with the term ‘extreme right’.
Though the ideological core falls only just within the definition of right-wing
extremism, and the term provides some semantical confusion, alternative
labels do not overcome these problems. Therefore, they do not justify the
rejection of what is still the most generally used term to describe this partic-
ular party family.
A moderate and a radical subgroup
The third proposition holds that all extreme right parties can be grouped
together on the basis of a certain shared core of ideological features, while
at the same time certain parties can also be grouped together in subgroups
based on a more specific core. What is essential in this approach to classifi-
cation is that these subgroups also share all features of the whole group (cf.
Sartori 1970), such that while the extreme right party family as a whole
shares the core ideology of the four features listed above, the subgroups will
have to share these four features and one or more additional features.
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The most commonly identified basis for distinction between subgroups of
extreme right parties is the presence/absence of a ‘fascist legacy’, which in
essence is seen to emerge in the party’s (negative) position on democracy.
This has been elaborated most explicitly by Ignazi (1992), who defines the
whole extreme right party family on the basis of two criteria and adds a third
criterion to distinguish between two subgroups. So while all extreme right
parties are placed at the far right of the national political spectrum (the spa-
tial criterion) and have a negative attitude toward the political system (the
attitudinal-systemic criterion), one subgroup includes features of a ‘fascist
corpus’ in its party ideology (the old/traditional subgroup) and one does not
(the new/post-industrial subgroup). The subgroup of the new/post-industrial
extreme right parties is considered to be more ‘moderate’, while the old/tra-
ditional subgroup is depicted as more ‘radical’. Indeed, rejection versus
acceptance of the democratic system is usually also seen as the main distinc-
tion between right-wing extremist and right-wing populist parties, although
most authors use this criterion to distinguish between two groups rather
than two subgroups (e.g. Backes 1991; Betz 1994; Taggart 1995).
In contrast to the views of these authors the analysis of the ideology of
these five parties does not support a distinction within the group on the basis
of their stand on democracy. All five parties accept democracy, including the
CP’86 and the DVU which are generally classified as old/traditional extreme
right (see Ignazi 1992: 10). The criterion of ‘a fascist legacy’, though creat-
ing more problems in its application, leads to the same conclusion. Accord-
ing to Ignazi, the criterion is to be interpreted simply as ‘a reference to
myths, symbols, slogans of the inter-war fascist experience’ (1992: 10). If
applied somewhat loosely, this would mean that all parties except for the CD
would qualify as being old/traditional extreme right parties. If applied
rigidly, only the VB (if any) would qualify, since this party is at least the most
open and positive in its references to (Flemish) inter-war fascist movements.
In both instances, however, the two subgroups would include totally differ-
ent parties than those identified in the general classifications (Ignazi 1992;
see also Kitschelt 1995).
Even more important is the fact that the distinction between subgroups on
the basis of a fascist legacy or (anti-)democratic character does not address
the core of the ideologies of these parties. As noted, all extreme right parties
share an ideological core of nationalism, welfare chauvinism, law and order
and xenophobia. The main ideological distinction within this extreme right
family is therefore between the ethnic and state nationalist parties. Thus, the
ethnic nationalist subgroup combines the extreme right core with an ethnic
nationalist and ethnopluralist outlook. Within this view their own group,
their own ethnic community, is defined on the basis of a (rigid) ethnic crite-
rion and should live according to its own nature. This means that the con-
gruence of state and ethnic community is accomplished by both internal
homogenisation (repatriation) and external exclusiveness (unification or
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separation). The second subgroup holds a state nationalist outlook in which
their own group is defined on the basis of a civic (and more flexible) crite-
rion. Generally, all people who are born within a certain state or who want
to naturalise are considered as part of their own group. The congruence of
state and nation is to be accomplished exclusively by internal homogenisa-
tion, and more concretely by the choice between assimilation or repatria-
tion.
Two of the five parties belong to the subgroup of the ethnic extreme right
parties, namely the VB and the CP’86. To some extent this subgroup most
closely resembles the generally accepted image of the extreme right party,
since it is generally ethnic nationalism that is described as ‘extreme’, or
‘ultra’ nationalism and ethnopluralism that is generally depicted as racism in
the many definitions of right-wing extremism (see Herz 1975; Mudde
1995). Given the fact that it uses a more rigid criterion for defining its own
group, it can also be labelled the (more) ‘radical’ subgroup. The ‘moderate’
subgroup of the state extreme right parties includes only one of the five par-
ties, namely the CD. This leaves us with the two German parties DVU and
REP, which are clearly part of the extreme right family, but which cannot be
categorised in one of these two subgroups. This results for the most part
from the vagueness of their ideological programmes, as neither party clearly
identifies the basis of its definition of its ‘own group’.
Finally, it is also worth noting that various authors have linked the extrem-
ity of the ideology of extreme right parties with the levels of their electoral
success. Indeed, most authors believe that ideologically ‘moderate’ extreme
right parties are electorally more successful than the ideologically ‘radical’
parties (e.g. Ignazi 1992; Greß 1994; Kitschelt 1995; Jackman and Volpert
1996). Following the distinction of this study, between a radical subgroup of
ethnic nationalist and a moderate subgroup of state nationalist extreme right
parties, the VB and CP’86 belong to the radical subgroup while the CD con-
stitutes the moderate ‘subgroup’. And although the number of parties is
rather small, not least because of the fact that the two German parties cannot
be categorised into either of the two subgroups, the proposition that mod-
erate extreme right parties are electorally most successful is not sustained.
The radical subgroup contains both the most and the least successful parties
(the VB and CP’86 respectively) and the ‘moderate’ CD falls in between
these two. Consequently, the difference in the electoral performance of par-
ties within the group(s) is not only larger than that between the groups, but
it is also confounded by the case of the VB, which is by far the most suc-
cessful in electoral terms, and at the same time the most radical in ideologi-
cal terms.
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Final thoughts
As of yet, the research on political parties in general and party families in
particular that has been conducted on the basis of an ideological approach
has been very limited in both range and quantity. This lack of research is par-
ticularly apparent in comparative studies (Lawson 1976; Dierickx 1994),
and seriously constrains the capacity of cross-national research to build on a
notion of the party family as a means of determining which parties may be
usefully compared to one another. And although this study has focused only
on extreme right parties, and moreover within only a limited number of
countries, it hopes to have provided a more general model for such research
which could be applicable to all sorts of parties (extreme right or otherwise)
and in all types of countries (also beyond Western Europe).
This study also reveals the limitations of the ideological approach. In-
depth studies of party ideologies are clearly very time consuming and are
therefore limited in the extent to which they can be usefully employed.
Moreover, every researcher is not only limited by time but also by language,
and given that these studies must include the analysis of primary literature,
which is usually available only in the original language, the number of par-
ties that can be studied by any single researcher is unquestionably limited (no
matter how much time is available). There are, however, some ways in which
to overcome most of these practical problems. For one, it is not necessary
that one particular scholar should analyse the party ideology of all parties of
a particular family to find the core of that ideology; indeed, it is the sort of
research work which is ideally suited to the collaboration of teams of schol-
ars from different countries working to a common cross-national frame-
work. Moreover, studies of a single party can also provide important and
useful data for cross-national studies on party families. What is essential,
however, is that studies on party ideologies employ concepts that are clearly
defined, that are used more generally in the field, and that can ‘travel’ (Sar-
tori 1970; Rose 1991).
The categorisation of political parties according to broader families has by
now become a more or less standard procedure in the numerous cross-
national studies of political parties, and distinctions between party families
have thereby become fundamental elements in studies in such diverse sub-
fields as coalition formation (Budge and Keman 1990; Laver and Schofield
1990) and policy analysis (Esping-Andersen 1985; Van Kersbergen 1995). At
the same time, one of the main problems with these varied applications has
often been the shallowness and ambiguity of the categorisations, both in
terms of the character of the individual families and of the differences and
borders between them, and therefore of the whole enterprise itself.
The matter of these borders and classifications is far from merely acade-
mic, for they determine which parties are part of which group, and therefore
which parties may be compared in cross-national research as being ‘alike’.
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The proof of various theses that involve political parties is therefore highly
dependent on the accuracy with which the initial classification of the parties
is conducted. To classify the Scandinavian Progress Parties as (neo-)conserv-
ative rather than extreme right, for example, as seems to be more appropri-
ate, will have serious consequences for our understanding of both the
beginning and the breadth of the current third wave of extreme right parties.
At the same time, however, there is no reason to believe that the problems
of defining borders and reclassifying parties apply solely to the extreme right
party family. In fact, doubts on the ideological homogeneity may be, and
have been voiced for all party families. In this sense, it is hoped that further
studies of political parties in general, and of party families in particular, that
apply the ideological approach can provide a clarification of the ideological
core of the various families and of the borders between them, so providing
a more robust basis for the classification of individual parties, and for the
testing of many of the more important theses in comparative politics.
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The following list includes political parties which are generally considered to be
members of the extreme right party family of Western Europe and which contested
nation-wide elections (i.e. parliamentary or European) at least once in the period
between 1980 and 1999.
Country Extreme right parties
Austria Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
Belgium Agir
Front National
Front National Belge
Parti des Forces Nouvelles
Vlaams Blok
Denmark Dansk Folkeparti
Fremskridtspartiet
France Alliance Populaire
Front National
Front National – Mouvement National
Mouvement pour la France
Parti des Forces Nouvelles
Germany Deutsche Volksunion (-Liste D)
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands
Die Republikaner
Greece Chryssi Avghi
Ethniki Politiki Enosis
Enomeno Ethniko Kinema
Italy Alleanza Nazionale
Lega Lombarda
Lega Nord
Lega Veneto
Movimento Sociale Italiano (-Destra Nazionale)
Movimento Sociale Italiano – Fiamma Tricolore
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Luxembourg Nationalbewegong
Netherlands Centrumpartij
Centrumdemocraten
Centrumpartij’86 (/Nationale Volkspartij)
Nederlandse Volks-Unie
Norway Fedrelandspartiet
Fremskrittspartiet
Portugal Força Nacional-Nova Monarquia
Partido da Democracia Crista
Partido de Solidariadade Nacional
Spain Allianza por la Unidad Nacional
Alternativa Democratica Nacional
Falange Española Autentica de las JONS
Falange Española de las JONS
Falange Española Independiente
Fuerza Nueva/Frente Nacional
Union Nacional
Sweden Ny Demokrati
Sverigedemokraterna
Switzerland Freiheitspartei der Schweiz
Lega dei Ticinesi
Nationale Aktion für Volk und Heimat
Schweizer Autopartei/Parti Suisse des Automobilistes
Schweizer Demokraten/Démocrates suisses
Schweizerische Republikaner Bewegung/ Mouvement 
Républicaine Suisse
Vigilance
United Kingdom British National Party
National Front
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Nationalism: The belief that the political unit (the state) and the cultural unit (the
nation or ethnic community) should be congruent.
State nationalism: The state is the primary unit of organisation, while the nation con-
sists essentially of the people living within the borders of the state. Membership of
the nation is based on civic criteria like the ius soli and citizenship requirements.
Ethnic nationalism: The ethnic community is considered the primary unit, while the
state is seen as essentially the political expression of the ethnic community. Mem-
bership of the ethnic community is based on ethnic criteria such as the ius sangui-
nis and ethnicity.
Internal homogenisation: Only people belonging to the X-nation have the right to
live within the borders of the X-state. Foreigners are accepted only as (temporary)
guests with limited rights; most notably, non-nationals are not allowed to have
political rights.
External exclusiveness: State X needs to have all people belonging to the X-nation
within its borders. The state is linked to an ethnic community, which again is
linked to a certain territory.
Exclusionism: The distinction between groups whereby one group (they) is excluded
from certain aspects of the life of the other group (we).
Racism: The belief in natural (hereditary) and permanent differences between groups
of people with the centrality of a hierarchy of races.
Ethnopluralism: The belief in permanent (natural or hereditary) differences between
groups of people (races and/or ethnic communities) with the centrality that all
groups are equivalent but different; people should live within their own group and
the groups should live separated; people have both the right and the duty to live
according to their own ‘natural way’.
Ethnocentrism: The belief in cultural and (in principle) temporal differences between
groups of peoples, with the centrality that the own group is superior to the others.
Anti-semitism: The belief that the Jewish race or ethnic community is in its entirety
bad; variants of a Jewish-led world conspiracy (in the tradition of the Protocols) 
with the conclusion that the Jews (‘they’) are essentially against the ‘own group’
(‘us’).
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Xenophobia: Fear, hate or hostility with regard to groups that are perceived as ‘alien’
or ‘strange’, such as foreigners, immigrants, asylum-seeker, etc. The idea that any-
thing ‘alien’ is threatening.
Anti-democratic features: Criticism of ‘democracy’ as a political system; views that
are opposed to (various) core features of democracy (like pluralism, parliamen-
tarism, political equality, etc.).
Elitism: The belief that people are divided by birth into leaders and followers; a small
elite should lead the masses without their interference; the common man is not
able to decide on difficult matters (such as politics).
Führerprinzip: One person is gifted by nature with the qualities that good leadership
requires. This leader is the heart of the (ethnic) community and has absolute
power. His leadership is above discussion, as only he is able to decide what is good
and bad for the (ethnic) community.
Monism: The tendency to treat cleavage and ambivalence as illegitimate; rejection of
contradistinctions within the (ethnic) community and the state are not accepted;
the part (individual) is nothing without the whole (state) and they thus have the
same interests.
Organic vision of the state: The state is regarded as an organism. This means that one
is born into it, and that one has a fixed role to play in the state; it further implies
a hierarchic order; Fremdkörper, i.e. people who do not perform their correct role
or who do not have a role to play in the state, make the state ill and have to be
taken out of the process.
Technocracy: Technocrats, i.e. people who are not elected but are qualified on the
basis of their skills, should have a leading role in political and economic matters.
Populism: The belief in the soundness of the common man; anti-elitism; support for
direct democratic measures on the basis of letting the people decide; call for ref-
erendums at various levels and to go back to the grass-roots.
Anti-party sentiments: Systematic criticism of political parties, directed either at the
institution itself or at the policies and behaviour of ‘the’ political parties.
Extremist anti-party sentiments: The political party as an institution is rejected, often
on the grounds of its divisive nature or on the basis of the fact that it forms a bar-
rier between the rulers and the ruled.
Populist anti-party sentiments: Certain political parties (usually the major or estab-
lished parties) are rejected, often because of their bad functioning or because of the
group they (do not) represent.
The strong state
Law-and-order: The belief in order and authority, accompanied by the demand for
strong punishment of breach of the rules (e.g. high sentence, sober prison condi-
tions, capital punishment); to maintain order the state should have a strong police
force in terms of personnel, equipment and competencies.
Militarism: The call for a strong army to protect the national interests; serving in the
army as the highest honour; war is considered the natural condition; peace is con-
sidered an artificial period between wars; war is considered to be more than a
means to pursue the ‘national will’ as it is the ultimate goal. Positive and unique
attributes are ascribed to war and the soldier functions as a role model.
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Environmental position
Ecologism: The vision that nature should be carefully exploited by men; the search
for a balance between economic growth and environmental protection; warning
for the exhaustion of natural resources; criticism of economic growth at all costs;
the belief in technology and human inventions to reach this goal.
Environmentalism: The vision that nature is equal to man and should be treated with
the same respect; no attack on nature on the basis of materialist arguments; the
belief that this can only be realised by a new way of thinking (i.e. the rejection of
the belief in progress through expansion) and not solely by technological improve-
ments.
Ethical outlook
Traditional ethics: Concern with the breakdown of the nucleus family, community,
religion, and traditional morality from a non-religious viewpoint; values are
grown as historical basis of society and their decline means the breakdown of soci-
ety. For a strict ban on non-ethical behaviour (pornography, abortion, homosexu-
ality); a plea for duties, honour, order, dignity etc. over materialist and hedonist
motives.
Religious ethics: Concern with the breakdown of religious values as the backbone of
society; emphasis on a combination of values like the nucleus family, community
and religious morality; opposition to modernisation of the Church.
Libertarianism: Putting the autonomous individual and his rights and duties at the
centre; support for freedom of choice (abortion, euthanasia, drugs); opposition to
state regulation state of ethical questions.
Socio-economic policy
Corporatism/solidarism: Support for trilateral governing, which involves the state as
well as the workers and the employers; economy should come to the good of the
whole nation and not to specific groups; national solidarity instead of class strug-
gle. 
(Neo-)Liberalism: Strong belief in the natural working of the market; a minimum of
state intervention in the economy; deregulation of economy; support of private
enterprise; strong emphasis on freedom and individualism.
Socialism: Support of strong state control over sectors of the economy; support of
strict and detailed planning of the economy; nationalisation of vital sectors of the
national economy.
Welfare chauvinism: Socio-economic policy should be directed first and foremost to
the ‘own group’. Priority in jobs and social benefits for the own people. State pro-
tection of certain areas of the national economy against foreign competition.
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